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INTRODUCTION  
This study examines the Kemalist discourse of the Kadro, Markopaşa and Yön journals and their 
role in the connections between Kemalism and leftist ideas. Analyzing and comparing these three 
journals throughout the 1930s, 1940s and 1960s will provide valuable information on left-wing 
interpretations of Kemalist ideology by different left-leaning groups which have had varying 
objectives. 
 
Kemalism emerged as the ideological framework for the Turkish Republic in the early 1920s and 
often refers to the hegemonic ideology of the republic. It includes political thought and practices 
of Mustafa Kemal and his party, the RPP (Republican People’s Party). Kemalism’s tenets are 
crystallized in the “six arrows of the RPP”, which are nationalism, populism, laicism, 
republicanism, reformism, and etatism.  
 
Despite its clear directions, Kemalism has never been formulated clearly, although it has 
functioned as the official ideology of the republic. Due to its relative ambiguity and its changing 
reference points, several people from different periods and political backgrounds were able to 
adopt Kemalist ideology. Consequently, how to define Kemalism has led to big questions in 
political life as well as in academic world in Turkey: Is Kemalism a way of “Turkish 
enlightenment”? Is it democratic or authoritarian? Is it a modernizing or a conservative ideology? 
Does it fit left-wing or right-wing politics? Does it carry features of solidarism or socialism? 
What is its exact relation with ideologies like positivism and corporatism?  
As such, understanding the left-leaning interpretations of these influential journals may shed light 
on the attitudes of different types of intellectuals about Kemalism. In order to understand this, 
discussing Kemalism and putting it in a certain ideological context seems unavoidable. This is an 
important issue, since many of studies on Kadro and Yön do not question the very nature of 
Kemalism clearly, and therefore the exact relationship between these journals and Kemalism does 
not reveal itself. Although the scope of this thesis cannot include lengthy discussions about 
Kemalism, some of these crucial questions will be answered, especially in the Kadro chapter 
where they appear for the first time. 
 
Kadro, Markopaşa and Yön are not only journals but also political currents of different scales. It 
is quite common for Turkey’s intellectuals to gather forces around journals, which sometimes 
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evolve into political or literary currents within time. As such, the journals became crucial for 
many groups for expressing themselves, as they have done since the Ottoman times. For example, 
as expressions of different currents, “Meşveret”, “Servet-i Fünun”, “Halka Doğru”, and “Büyük 
Doğu” are all such journals. However, journals became particularly important for leftists in the 
republican era. Although not abundant in numbers, their existence was crucial for people who 
published them, especially when expressing leftist views or being involved in politics through 
legal channels was not possible. Particularly, the “Aydınlık” journal of Turkish Workers and 
Peasants Socialist Party by 1921 and “Resimli Ay” of Zekeriya Sertel by 1924 functioned as a 
platform for many famous intellectuals and activists such as Sabiha Sertel, Nazım Hikmet, Vala 
Nureddin, Ethem Nejat, Şefik Hüsnü, Suat Derviş, future Kadro writers Vedat Nedim, Burhan 
Asaf, Ismail Hüsrev, Şevket Süreyya and Markopaşa’s Sabahattin Ali.  
 
These efforts continued in the following years and the journals that are discussed in this thesis are 
also such intellectual currents which came into prominence in a vanguard role. Kadro proved its 
foresight with its anti-imperialist ideas about the independence movements of underdeveloped 
countries almost twenty years before the “third-world” term was invented. Markopaşa came 
forward with its unique oppositional style and its courageous stand against the government, even 
though this resulted in grave consequences for its writers. Eventually, Sabahattin Ali was killed, 
mainly due to the events which were triggered during the Markopaşa period,1 and his case 
became a harsh reminder for all leftists of the “dangers of being a dissident.”2 Finally, Yön served 
as a platform for progressive and leftist intellectuals and showed its influential role in Turkey by 
breaking the taboo subjects. It questioned the Kurdish issue, named it the “Eastern Problem” for 
the first time, and published the work of the communist poet Nazım Hikmet, who died in diaspora 
in Russia in 1963. 
 
Analyzing the relations of these three journals with Kemalism as the dominant formal ideology of 
their time is crucial as this will provide a concrete discussion about the three different intellectual 
attitudes towards Kemalist ideology. In this way, it will be possible to see what exactly these 
intellectuals understood from Kemalism and how they interpreted it according to their world-
view. This is important because Kadro, Markopaşa and Yön members all described themselves as 
Kemalists, although they had different positions towards the regime. It will be interesting to see 
                                                 
1  Geriye Kalan, Aziz Nesin, Tekin Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1975, p.17 
2  Markopaşa: Bir Mizah ve Muhalefet Efsanesi, Levent Cantek, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001, p. 40 
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how diverse or similar these intellectuals were in their ideologies and practices. In order to do 
this, the journals will be examined in light of the tenets of Kemalism. 
 
Until now, studies were undertaken by historians and political scientists who strictly focused on 
Kadro and Yön, but not on Markopaşa. There is academic work that directly focuses on 
Markopaşa such as Levent Cantek’s “Markopaşa: Bir Mizah ve Muhalefet Efsanesi” and that 
study is very helpful to grasp Markopaşa’s history and style as an oppositional satirical journal, 
however, its focus was mainly on journalism. As a result, there has not been enough attention on 
Markopaşa to examine its relationship with Kemalism, especially through text analyses. 
Therefore, examining Markopaşa articles in detail in order to understand its interpretation of 
Kemalism might be quite helpful. In addition, comparing this leftist journal to the Kadro group, 
which worked for the Kemalist regime while Markopaşa writers were deeply troubled by it, may 
provide interesting insights about Kemalism, especially because both journals claimed to have 
Kemalist ideology. Therefore, it is crucial to add Markopaşa to the comparisons between left-
leaning journals to see if they have any common point in Kemalism to bring them together. In this 
way, this research will provide new perspectives for this discussion. 
 
Related to the above-mentioned issues, the following questions will be examined in the study: As 
left-leaning intellectuals, what was the exact relation of the writers with the Kemalist regime of 
their time? What were their interpretations of Kemalist ideology? Was their interpretation in the 
same line with Mustafa Kemal and the RPP or at least derived from it? How did they deal with 
ambiguities and blurred lines of Kemalism? How did they cope with the authoritarian tendencies 
of Kemalism as being left-leaning intellectuals? Did they contribute to Kemalist ideology by 
employing their intellectual power or did they challenge it? How were interpretations of these 
journals affected by the complex nature of Kemalism, which includes eclectic and sometimes 
contradictory features that is often open to both left-wing and right-wing interpretations? Did they 
try to attribute left-oriented concepts or ideas to Kemalism? Did they integrate Kemalism into a 
left-wing discourse? If so, how did this discourse change over a forty year period? On expressing 
the views of the left-leaning intellectuals in Turkey in the mid-1930’s, the late 1940’s and in the 
1960’s, how did they differ from each other or resemble each other in their interpretations of 
Kemalism? 
 
The thesis consists of three main chapters and each chapter is devoted to one journal. In every 
chapter, there is brief background information about the journals. Following this, their views and 
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position regarding Kemalism are discussed on the basis of the six arrows of Kemalist ideology. In 
this way, the nationalist, populist, etatist, laicist, reformist, and republicanist tenets will be 
discussed for each journal in connection with other arrows.  
 
The core of this research is based on the journals’ discourse and interpretations. Therefore, in 
every chapter, there will be text analyses based on the primary sources, and comparisons between 
the journals. Text analyses based on the primary sources are crucial for this research, since it 
gives a clear idea about what exactly the writers think, how they laid out their ideas, their 
strengths as well as their contradictions. When necessary, the secondary sources will also be used, 
especially for background information. 
 
The first chapter is devoted to Kadro, a monthly journal of political, economic and social ideas, 
published between 1932 and 1934. Except for Yakup Kadri, the members of the journal were 
former communist intellectuals who tried to develop a socio-political ideology for the regime and 
sought support from it. The basic discussions about Kemalism and its six tenets will be briefly 
covered in the first chapter.  
 
When discussing Kadro, the focus will often be on Şevket Süreyya Aydemir. Although other 
writers are very important and their role in Kadro’s success is indisputable, Şevket Süreyya’s 
tireless enthusiasm seemed to be the driving force in Kadro to make it an influential journal. His 
efforts in connecting Kemalism, anti-imperialism and independent movements of the 
underdeveloped world never ceased. Almost thirty years after the Kadro period, he also 
contributed to Yön journal with his articles. Therefore, he is the main link for many scholars who 
point out the similarities between two journals.  
 
The second chapter addresses Markopaşa, a weekly political satire magazine from 1946 and 1949 
published under different names. This exceptional publication became very successful and 
popular in a quite short time with its harsh criticism against the RPP regime and set a unique 
example. Its writers Sabahattin Ali, Aziz Nesin, Rıfat Ilgaz and Mim Uykusuz frequently 
confronted courts and jails due to their journal. Although it was one of the most influential and 
oppositional journals in the history of the republic, it was often overshadowed by larger scale 
leftist political movements like the TIP (Workers Party of Turkey) or by other left-leaning 
publications which had a larger volume and more serious outlook, like Kadro and Yön. 
Nevertheless, Markopaşa was the first left-wing publication which was able to reach a large 
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number of people. Although it was only a four-page magazine, it was as important as the Kadro 
and Yön journals and it left a legacy behind for dissidents and leftists. For example, in the Gezi 
Park protests of 2013, a symbolic special edition with the same name was published with the 
contribution of leftist journalists and intellectuals who chose a similar oppositional position 
towards the government. Regarding this, in this research, Markopaşa - which has been mostly 
examined as a part of a legacy of journalism before - will be analyzed with a special focus on its 
relationship to Kemalist ideology. 
 
The only difficulty studying this journal is that it does not provide as much material in the way 
Kadro and Yön do. Although the main articles are enough to have a clear idea about the line of 
the journal, it requires some time to gather tangible material from other parts due to their short 
and satirical style. 
 
Finally, the third chapter will be about Yön, a weekly political journal which was published 
between 1961 and 1967 mostly by leftist or left-leaning intellectuals who became more active in 
political life through their journal. The members of this group expressed their desire to bring a 
socialist order to Turkey. This journal became a very important platform towards opening the 
press and politics to leftists and normalized their ideologies by discussing them openly in the 
journal. After members felt disappointed in parliamentary methods, the Yön movement changed 
direction and started to consider a radical transformation of society through a military 
intervention. After Yön was closed down, some of its members published another journal called 
“Devrim” (Revolution), between 1969 and 1971, in order to evaluate and clarify military 
intervention options for a transition period towards socialism. In this chapter, however, the major 
focus will be on the Yön journal, rather than Devrim.  
 
The primary source material for the thesis consists of the Kadro, Markopaşa, Yön and, Devrim 
journals. Additionally, some of the books and articles from other publications that belonged to the 
writers of these journals were also used when it was necessary. The IISH in Amsterdam and 
Leiden University Library provided most of the primary and secondary sources for this study. 
IISH’s rich collection was indispensable for obtaining original Markopaşa series and Yön issues, 
and Leiden University Library for the Kadro issues and most of the secondary sources. For 
Devrim, rather than the actual journals, a collection of articles of Doğan Avcıoğlu named 
“Atatürkçülük, Milliyetçilik ve Sosyalizm: Doğan Avcıoğlu, Yön ve Devrim Yazıları” were used.  
 
 10 
Given their clear role in the formation of left-wing Kemalism with strong nationalist tones 
(Ulusal Sol), Kadro and Yön journals have provided a fertile soil for a great deal of scholarly 
publications. Tekeli and Ilkin’s book “Bir Cumhuriyet Oyküsü: Kadro ve Kadrocuları Anlamak” 
provides detailed information about Kadro’s journey, while Mustafa Türkeş’s book “Kadro 
Hareketi: Ulusçu Bir Sol Akım” and his articles about Kadro provide valuable arguments about 
the ideological background and objectives of the journal. Şevket Süreyya’s book “Inkılap ve 
Kadro” was also often used. This book was written just before Kadro’s publication. It was also 
referred to by other Kadro writers in their articles, since it served as a summary of Kadro’s ideas 
in general.  
 
Markopaşa journal’s name changed very often, thus, it will appear under different titles. Still, the 
main focus will be on the early Markopaşa series, which includes Markopaşa, Merhumpaşa, 
Malumpaşa, and Ali Baba, which were published when all the main writers could still 
contribute. When necessary, the series that was published without Sabahattin Ali, such as 
the secondary series of Markopaşa, Hür Markopaşa, and Yedi Sekiz Paşa were also used. 
Regarding the matters about Markopaşa series, the “Başdan” journal, which was published by 
Aziz Nesin following the Markopaşa period, was also quite helpful. Although Başdan provides 
clearer information about ideas of Aziz Nesin and many other leftists, it is not the main focus of 
this thesis because of its different style compared to the original Markopaşa series. Moreover, 
Zincirli Hürriyet of Zekeriya Sertel also used for Sabahattin Ali’s article in it since it was helpful 
to understand his ideas in a detailed way. 
 
As secondary sources, Levent Cantek’s “Markopaşa, Bir Mizah ve Muhalefet Efsanesi” and 
Mehmet Saydur’s “Markopaşa Gerçeği” provide almost all the necessary background information 
about the series and inner dynamics of the group in chronological order. Additionally, Kemal 
Bayram Çukurkavaklı’s book “Sabahattin Ali Olayı” (Sabahattin Ali Case) and Kemal Sülker's 
“Sabahattin Ali Dosyası” are good sources in order to grasp the series of events that led to Ali’s 
murder. 
 
Along with the Yön and Devrim journals, Doğan Avcıoğlu’s books “Türkiye'nin Düzeni” (The 
Social Order of Turkey) and “Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi” (The History of National Liberation) were 
also used. The first one is a valuable source to follow Avcıoğlu’s ideas in a clear way. Although 
there are several academic studies about Yön, Gökhan Atılgan's book “Yön-Devrim Hareketi: 
Kemalizm ile Marksizm Arasında Geleneksel Aydınlar” proved to be the most useful source in 
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this subject by providing almost all of the necessary background information as well as beneficial 
arguments about Yön and leftist movements of the time. Fahrettin Altun’s article “Discourse of 
Left Kemalists in Turkey: Case of Yön” and Özgür Mutlu Ulus' study “The Army and the Radical 
Left in Turkey: Military Coups, Socialist Revolution and Kemalism” were also used since they 
bring respected discussions to the subject. 
 
There is a wide variety and vast number of scholarly work on Kemalism. Still, Taha Parla and 
Erik-Jan Zürcher’s research and arguments on Kemalism were the most suitable for this research, 
even though they have very different understandings of Kemalism. Particularly Parla & 
Davidson’s study on Kemalism, “Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order” 
and several articles from Zürcher were very helpful for clearing up the ambiguities in Kemalist 
ideology as well as collection of articles on Kemalism and leftist movements of Turkey by the 
“Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce” (Political Thought in Modern Turkey) series. 
 
Many other sources were also used for background information when necessary. Although only a 
number of them appear in the thesis, the memoirs of some of the most prominent intellectuals of 
Turkey, such as Sabiha Sertel, Zekeriya Sertel, Vala Nureddin, Müzehher Va-Nu, Şevket Süreyya 
Aydemir, Vedat Nedim Tör, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Aziz Nesin and Rıfat Ilgaz were read 
as a background information. These memoirs were extremely helpful to observe different 
opinions over crucial events of Turkish politics, and more importantly, to grasp the spirit of their 
period. 
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1 KADRO 
The Kadro journal was published between January 1932 and December 1934. Its founders were 
Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, the franchise holder; Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, the ideologue of the 
movement; Vedat Nedim Tör, the editor; and Burhan Asaf Belge, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin and 
Mehmet Şevki Yazman, who were regular writers.3  
 
Except for Yakup Kadri, who came from a large landowner family and belonged to the Mustafa 
Kemal fraction since the early 1920s, all Kadro writers came from middle-class families and they 
were involved in radical leftist movements before 1930.
4 Şevket Süreyya was a pan-Turanist until 
he witnessed the Bolshevik Revolution in Azerbaijan and became a communist in his early 
twenties. However, after his imprisonment following his prosecution in the mid-1920s, he ended 
his relationship with the leftist movement and after 1927 he supported the Kemalist regime. 
İsmail Hüsrev’s ideas were affected by anarchism, and later he studied with Şevket Süreyya in 
Russia. Vedat Nedim and Burhan Asaf studied in Germany and due to the influence of the 
Spartacist movement they adopted socialist ideas.
5
 In the following years, all of them cut their 
relations to leftist movements. Just after the Great Depression, when the Kemalist regime was 
seeking new ways into economy, Kadro members had a chance to contribute to the construction 
of Kemalist ideology via their journal. In 1932, Yakup Kadri, who was already a deputy in the 
RPP, obtained permission for the journal through Mustafa Kemal. Prime Minister Ismet Inönü 
was already aware of Kadro members’ efforts to publish a journal, and he also supported it.6  
 
From the beginning, Kadro writers were warned not to be involved in daily politics. 
Consequently, these self-appointed intellectuals intentionally stayed away from commenting on 
daily political events and tried to affect the state’s economic programs via their journal. Indeed, 
they were aware of the fact that Mustafa Kemal, as the “real” ideologue of the state, would not 
allow them to own the notion of being the “ideologue of the regime.”7 
 
                                                 
3 Sometimes writers like Hakkı Mahir, Tahir Hayredin, Ahmet Hamdi Başar and Falih Rıfkı also contributed the 
journal. 
4 For more information about Kadro movement see: Bir Cumhuriyet Oyküsü: Kadro ve Kadrocuları Anlamak, İlhan 
Tekeli & Selim İlkin, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, Istanbul, 2003;  Kadro Hareketi: Ulusçu Bir Sol Akım, Mustafa 
Türkeş, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 1999 
5 “Kadro ve Kadrocuların Öyküsü”, İlhan Tekeli & Selim İlkin in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol, volume 8, 
İletişim Yayınları İstanbul, 2008, p. 602 
6 Bir Cumhuriyet Oyküsü: Kadro ve Kadrocuları Anlamak, Tekeli & İlkin, 2003, p. 142 
7 “Kadro ve Kadrocuların Öyküsü”, Tekeli & İlkin, 2008, p. 611 
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Kadro eventually came into prominence with an ideology which was a superficial combination of 
Marxism, nationalism, and corporatism.
8
 The journal tried to develop an ideological framework 
in which the Turkish revolution was interpreted as a struggle against imperialism as part of a 
world-wide struggle for political and economic independence by the exploited countries.
9
 
According to Kadro, underdeveloped colonies and semi-colonies enabled in development of 
capitalism. This situation caused a growing conflict between industrialized metropolitans and 
non-industrialized colonial and semi-colonial countries.
10
 The new era would have witnessed 
national wars of independance and would have been determined by new autarkical-national 
states.
11
 Turkey, as the only country that succeeded in its struggle for independance, would have 
set an example to those who were still in need of political independence.
12
  
 
As an underdeveloped country, the main issues for Turkey were industrialization and 
accumulation of capital.
13
 Kadro argued that because of this new type of economic structure, the 
state should organize society with the right to interfere in all social and economic activities. In 
this way, the development of capitalism and class conflicts could be avoided. Kadro insisted that 
the journal had an alternative third-way between capitalism and socialism. 
 
Due to their education, Kadro writers were influenced by a wide range of intellectuals. As a 
result, it is possible to encounter ideas of influential leftist ideologues such as Lenin, Rosa 
Luxemburg, and Sultan Galiyev as well as more conservative ideas of Durkheim, Sombart and 
Ziya Gökalp in the Kadro journal.
14
  
 
                                                 
8 Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System, Kemal Karpat, Princeton University Press, Princeton-New 
Jersey, 1959, p.70 
9 İnkılap ve Kadro: İnkılabın Ideolojisi, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Muallim Ahmet Halit Kütüphanesi, Ankara, 1932, p. 
47-55  
10 “Emperyalizm Şahlanıyor mu”, Şevket Süreyya, Kadro, issue 16, p. 6-9, April 1933;  “The Ideology of the Kadro 
(Cadre) Movement: A Patriotic Leftist Movement in Turkey”, Mustafa Türkeş in Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 34, no: 
4, Turkey Before and After Atatürk: Internal and External Affairs, October 1998, p. 113-115 
11 “A Patriotic Leftist Development Strategy Proposal in Turkey in the 1930s: The Case of the Kadro Movement”, 
Mustafa Türkeş, in International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, No: 1, February 2001, p. 100-101; “Milli 
Kurtuluş Hareketlerinin Cihanı Telakki Tarzı” in İnkılap ve Kadro: İnkılabın İdeolojisi”, Şevket Süreyya , 1932, p. 34-
38; “Çökmekte Olan Cihan Nizamı”, Burhan Asaf, Kadro, issue 1, p. 22-27, January 1932 
12 İnkılap ve Kadro: İnkılabın Ideolojisi, Şevket Süreyya, 1932, p. 45 
13 Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System, Karpat, 1959, p. 70 
14 “Kadro Dergisi”, Mustafa Türkeş, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009, 
volume 2, p. 465 
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Although “cadre” as an ideological group was never defined clearly,15  Kadro believed in the 
leadership of a political elite cadre who could understand and solve the problems of the Turkish 
society.  
 
Kadro’s writers identified themselves with the republican regime and stayed loyal to it. However 
their close relations with the government made them a target of their former comrades, such as 
Şefik Hüsnü and Nazım Hikmet, and they were accused of being traitors and fascists due to their 
changing sides in politics. When they tried to affect the regime with their etatist plans, they 
disturbed people with liberal tendencies within and out of the parliament as well as hardliners of 
the RPP such as Recep Peker and Necip Ali as well. Journalist Ahmet Ağaoğlu, the RPP deputy 
Mahmut Soydan and Celal Bayar, who was the leader of Iş Bank Group and who led the liberal 
wing of the RPP, did not favor Kadro’s strict plans about etatism.  
 
It should be noted here that neither liberal minded deputies nor hardliners of the RPP were against 
etatism. They were against Kadro’s interpretation of etatism due to its intense anti-capitalist 
discourse and its demand for large-scale intervention of the state to the economy. On the other 
hand, hardliners, especially Recep Peker, did not appreciate the efforts of Kadro’s members to 
contribute to Kemalist ideology. He objected to the publication of the journal from the beginning 
because he perceived Kadro’s efforts as an intrusion into his area of expertise.16 Being the target 
of several groups as well as being kept under the watchful eyes of the regime forced Kadro 
members to be very careful. Still, they were sometimes labeled as “communists” or “fascists” by 
the abovementioned groups due to their use of Marxist conceptions or state-led economy 
planning which resembled Russian or Italian examples.  
 
Kadro survived from closing down much earlier due to Ismet Inönü’s support,17 since Inönü was 
more open to Kadro’s ideas about extensive etatism policies than Mustafa Kemal. However, by 
the time Kadro became an issue between Ismet Inönü and Mustafa Kemal, Mustafa Kemal 
seemed to favor ideas of Celal Bayar and Iş Bank Group more. Celal Bayar’s appointment as 
minister of economy in September 1932 in Ismet Ismet Inönü’s cabinet settled the situation. 
However, the tension about Kadro escalated when Mahmut Soydan published a critical article in 
Milliyet Journal about an article which was published in Kadro in October 1933 by Ismet Inönü 
                                                 
15 “The Ideology of the Kadro (Cadre) Movement: A Patriotic Leftist Movement in Turkey”, Türkeş, 1998, p. 115 
16 Bir Cumhuriyet Oyküsü: Kadro ve Kadrocuları Anlamak, Tekeli & İlkin, 2003, p. 142 
17 Ibid., p. 349 
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in which Inönü defended his interpretation of etatism.
18
 Recep Peker’s constant complaints about 
Kadro to Mustafa Kemal added more tension to the disagreements.
19
 At the end, the franchise 
holder Yakup Kadri was appointed to Tirana as an ambassador and the journal was forced to 
cease its publication in 1934.
20
 After all, Kadro’s contribution was not indispensable for the 
regime. As a result, Kadro journal could not influence the regime as much as its members wished, 
and the Kemalist regime sought more practical solutions than Kadro offered.  
 
 
1.1 Nationalism 
In this chapter, Kadro’s interpretations of Kemalist nationalism regarding Kadro’s ideological 
connections to nationalism, the journal’s stress on connecting nationalism with etatism and anti-
imperialism as well as Kadro group’s position towards exclusivist sides of Kemalist nationalism 
will be discussed. 
 
 
1.1.1 Kadro Writers and their Relation with Nationalism Prior to Kadro  
Kadro wanted to bring a solution to economic problems of the new nation-state. The journal was 
a result of the Kemalist regime’s search for new strategies in the economy after the Great 
Depression. Due to its writers’ leftist background and tendencies, the journal often focused on 
economic issues. Kadro declared that regarding economic matters, the journal favored 
nationalism. Even before their collaboration with Kemalists, Kadro members had already focused 
on etatist–nationalist plans.21  
 
The nationalist world-view of Kadro members had been shaped prior to their involvement with 
the leftist movement. The early education of all of the Kadro members was a result of the 
modernized late Ottoman education system. They were probably affected by positivism as well as 
the waves of European-rooted nationalism in those schools. In that sense, their understanding of 
nationalism was not substantially different from Mustafa Kemal, except for Kadro’s assertion of 
an economy-centered understanding to this arrow. 
 
                                                 
18 100 Soruda Türkiye'de Devletçilik, Korkut Boratav, Gerçek Yayınevi, 1974, Istanbul, p. 179-180 
19 Bir Cumhuriyet Oyküsü: Kadro ve Kadrocuları Anlamak, Tekeli &İlkin, 2003, p. 349-350 
20 Zoraki Diplomat, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara, 1967, p. 6-9; Politikada 45 Yıl, Yakup 
Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Iletişim Yayınları, Istanbul, 2013, p. 100-103 
21 Kadro Hareketi: Ulusçu Bir Sol Akım , Türkeş, 1999, p. 90-91 
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As Şevket Süreyya points out, many of the prominent leftists of Turkey started their intellectual 
journey as youngsters who sought new ways to save their country. In the beginning, the primary 
aim of those patriotic young people was to save what was left from the Ottoman Empire.
22
 In the 
meantime, some of them encountered leftist ideas in the whirlwind of 1910s and early 1920s and 
adopted them. In other words, many Turkish leftists who were interested in socialism started their 
political life as avid patriots under the influence of a strong nationalism, and subsequently 
confronted with leftist ideas.  
 
Nevertheless, Turkish leftists’ condition was not an exception. At that period, several people who 
were involved with leftist ideas and Bolshevism followed a similar path. As is explained by 
Benningsen and Wimbush, many people from Turkic and Muslim minorities in the Russian 
Empire, who joined the Bolsheviks, had a pragmatic side. According to them socialism and 
internationalism would elevate them to equality with the Russians. They considered the 
realization of socialism as a prelude to the achievement of national liberation. And although the 
most members of these native groups had a commitment to radical change like Bolsheviks, they 
were not true Marxists but radical nationalists.
23
 In many cases, these native elites considered 
socialism as an organization plan, and not as a comprehensive body of doctrine promising to 
restructure their national society along proletarian internationalist lines. They saw socialism as a 
technique for underground work as well as a useful technique for mass action. Indeed, in some 
cases, socialism meant the promise of outside support for them.
24
  
 
As Mete Tunçay points out, despite its insistence on using Marxist terminology, the TKP 
(Turkish Communist Party)
25
 was one of the most nationalism-oriented groups within the 
                                                 
22 Suyu Arayan Adam, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Öz Yayınları, Ankara, 1959, p. 45, 168-170 
23 Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World, Alexandre A. 
Benningsen & S. Enders Wimbush, Publications of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Number: 11,  Chicago, 
1980, p. 33 
24 Ibid., p. 13-14 
25 Around 1920, there were three main organizations of Turkish communist movement: “Communist Party of Turkey” 
(TKP) under the leadership of Mustafa Suphi in Baku; “People’s Participation Party” (Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası) 
which was formed by Binbaşı Salih and “Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party” (Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi 
Sosyalist Fırkası) under the leadership of Şefik Hüsnü and Ethem Nejat. “Aydınlık” was the journal of TWPSP, which 
was called later as TKP, since the leader Mustafa Suphi and many of the important members of the first TKP were 
murdered in 1921. Nazım Hikmet, Şefik Hüsnü, Sadrettin Celal, Şevket Süreyya, Ismail Hüsrev, Vedat Nedim, and 
Burhan Asaf were prominent members of Aydınlık group. Some of the members of this group studied in Germany and 
were inspired by Spartacist movement, while some of them studied in KUTV in Russia. Since Mustafa Suphi and 
Green Army of Binbaşı Salih were eliminated within a short time, the party of Şefik Hüsnü was the only communist 
organization which managed to resist until 1925. There was another, a “formal”, TKP which was formed in 1920 by 
request of Mustafa Kemal to control the communists and to please to Russia but it did not last long. see: “Türkiye'de 
Komünist Akımın Geçmişi Üzerine”, Mete Tunçay in Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol, İletişim Yayınları, 
İstanbul, 2007, p. 349-355; Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar (1908 - 1925), Mete Tunçay, Bilgi Yayınevi, 2nd Edition, Ankara, 
1967; Turkey’s Politics, The Transition to A Multi-Party System, Karpat, 1959, p. 355 
 17 
Comintern, and this condition was mainly due to Vedat Nedim and Şevket Süreyya’s stance 
within the organization.
26
 Nonetheless, Şevket Süreyya and Vedat Nedim were not exceptions. 
Prominent leaders of the leftist movement such as Mustafa Suphi and Ethem Nejat also had 
strong nationalistic tones.
27
  
 
Except for Yakup Kadri, Kadro writers were active members of the radical leftist movement in 
the first half of the 1920s, before the establishment of Kadro journal. Even then, their 
nationalism-oriented ideas were the main characteristic of their world-view. Around 1924-1925, 
Şevket Süreyya and Vedat Nedim advocated nationalist policies within Aydınlık group. Şevket 
Süreyya-Vedat Nedim fraction which also included Burhan Asaf and Ismail Hüsrev,
28
 argued that 
Comintern’s new decisions were not in favor of Turkey anymore, because the decisions were 
reflecting the self-interests of Soviet Union.
29
 They stated that Marxism should have interpreted 
according to Turkey’s circumstances because policies of Comintern had changed over the time 
dramatically and protected self-interests of Soviet Russia solely. Obeying every single order from 
Comintern would not help Turkey to achieve a better system because Comintern did not protect 
benefits of the Turkish leftists anymore. In order to develop a new, unique strategy for the 
country, Turkish leftists should have been more independent and should have made their own 
decisions.  
 
Although their articulations had a point and were not necessarily wrong, Şevket Süreyya and 
Vedat Nedim’s nationalist interpretation of the new situation generated a debate within the 
Aydınlık group and caused a splitting of the group into two factions. After the prosecutions 
towards the left, Şevket Süreyya, Ismail Hüsrev, Vedat Nedim and Burhan Asaf cut their relations 
with the leftist movement. Vedat Nedim’s leave became a controversial issue within the leftist 
movement due to his collaboration with police and his handing over of information about the 
organization following the 1927 prosecutions.
30
 
 
Yakup Kadri, on the other hand, was not involved in any leftist activity. He had a friendship with 
Mustafa Kemal and he never abandoned his nationalist approach. He was also married to Burhan 
Asaf’s sister Leman Hanım. Burhan Asaf’s disengagement from the leftist movement was related 
                                                 
26 Mete Tunçay, Milliyet Sanat Dergisi, 4 April 1976 as cited in  Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Kadro, Merdan Yanardağ, 
Siyah Beyaz Basın Yayın Dağıtım, Istanbul, 2008, p. 111 
27 “Türkiye'de Komünist Akımın Geçmişi Üzerine”, Tunçay, 2007, p. 350 
28 Yıllar Böyle Geçti, Vedat Nedim Tör, Milliyet Yayınları, 1976, p. 10 
29 Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar (1908-1925), Tunçay, 1967, p. 169 
30 Yıllar Böyle Geçti, Vedat Nedim, 1976, p. 10-11 
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to his close relationship with Yakup Kadri, who was an RPP deputy and one of the regular guests 
of Mustafa Kemal in the presidential residency. Compared to other Kadro members, he cut his 
relations with the leftist movement earlier. At the time of the 1925 prosecutions, unlike many 
leftists, Burhan Asaf was not arrested but only interrogated. After this incident, he left the 
organization, and he went to Ankara same year to work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
31
 
Burhan Asaf had a crucial role in bringing Kadro group together by introducing Şevket Süreyya 
and Vedat Nedim to Yakup Kadri. In this way, by 1931, future Kadro writers Burhan Asaf, Vedat 
Nedim, Şevket Süreyya and Ismail Hüsrev came together in Hakimiyet-i Milliye newspaper for 
the first time.
32
 In the following years Burhan Asaf became an RPP deputy and in the 1950s he 
joined Democrat Party. His nationalist approach can be followed throughout his political career. 
 
 
1.1.2 Nationalism and National Economy 
The nationalist arrow, as one of the main tenets of Kemalist ideology, basically included 
nationalization policies, especially in the 1920s and 1930s. 
 
As Zürcher explains, around the turn of the 20
th
 century, the effect of Turkish intellectuals from 
the Russian Empire was growing among the Ottoman ruling elite. Those intellectuals were 
inspired by Ismail Gasprinskij’s “Usul-u Cedid”, which meant awareness of and pride in 
Turkishness as a distinct identity. Due to this effect, intellectuals like Ahmet Rıza, Abdullah 
Cevdet, and Ziya Gökalp made valuable contributions to the idea of Turkish nationalism. 
Although pan-Turkist sentiments, like pan-Islamist ones, were present at the time, CUP (The 
Committee of Union and Progress) never opted for a Turkish state over an Ottoman one.
33
 
However, in 1923, Ottomanism was no longer an option for Turkey and the Muslim nationalism 
of the years of 1912-1922 was abandoned.
34
 With an immense effort at nation-building, Kemalists 
based the new republic on the idea of a “Turkish nation”, which was situated as an alternative to 
the religious community of Ottoman “ümmet”. Since the role of religion was excluded from this 
context, the nation was described as a social and political formation that linked citizens by unity 
of language, culture and ideal.
35
 
                                                 
31 Bir Cumhuriyet Oyküsü: Kadro ve Kadrocuları Anlamak, Tekeli & Ilkin, 2003, p. 102 
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Kadro writers supported Kemalist attempts on invention and construction of a new national 
identity in the absence of religion. In this sense, like rest of the Kemalists, Kadro saw nationalism 
as a social project, i.e. a unifying regulatory power. Along with their interpretation of “populism”, 
nationalism was a key element for the journal to create a classless, cooperated, homogeneous and 
well-ordered nation. 
 
According to Kadro, nationalism was a progressive and a revolutionary power, and it constituted 
a crucial part of economic development. A well-planned powerful economy was one of the main 
components of being a nation.
36
 
 
Kadro regarded economic development as the core of its ideology. In this context, its main 
criticism over Kemalist nationalism was its lack of emphasis on the etatist arrow, which was one 
of the six arrows of Kemalism that was introduced in 1931 and refers to the statist policies of the 
economic wing of the Kemalist nationalist policies. According to Vedat Nedim, without 
economic development, political independence always would have been in danger.
37
 Şevket 
Süreyya insisted on inserting “economic unity” to the description of the “nation,” along with 
“unity of language, culture and ideal.”38 Here it can be said that, with its strong focus on 
economy, Kadro’s description of nation resembles Marxist descriptions as it can be followed in 
Stalin’s work,39 rather than the Kemalist version.  
 
In the early issues of the journal, Şevket Süreyya was eager to define Kadro’s understanding of 
nationalism as “social nationalism” (sosyal milliyetçilik - sosyal nasyonalizm). As Türkeş points 
out, what Şevket Süreyya meant with “social nationalism” was an integrated national economy 
and rejection of class dictatorship of the proletariat or any other class.
40
 In this way, Şevket 
Süreyya expressed his desire for the continuation and deepening of socio-economic reforms and 
hinted that the jounal’s distance towards socialism. However, soon after Hitler started to use 
“national socialism”, Şevket Süreyya disowned this term. 
 
                                                 
36 İnkılap ve Kadro: İnkılabın Ideolojisi, Şevket Süreyya, 1932, p. 92 
37 “Müstemleke Iktisadiyatından Millet Iktisadiyatina I”, Vedat Nedim, Kadro, issue 1,  p. 8, January 1932 
38 Inkılap ve Kadro: Inkılabın Ideolojisi, Şevket Süreyya, 1932, p. 96-97 
39 Stalin pictured concept of nation as ”a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a 
common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.” in Marxism 
and the National Question, Joseph Stalin Works, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1953, volume 2,  p. 
307 
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When the description of the “nation” was discussed, Şevket Süreyya returned to articles of Ziya 
Gökalp, whose ideas were adopted by the Kemalists to a great extent. Gökalp’s descriptions about 
“nation” and “national unity” were used by the Kemalists, except for the relatively important role 
of the religion in society. As Zürcher mentions, Gökalp opposed the traditional Islamic position 
that Islam and nationalism were incompatible, and he saw Islam as a constituent element of the 
Turkish national identity as well as a source of strength for nation-building.
41
 According to 
Şevket Süreyya, Gökalp’s ideas were important, since he gave a structure to the concept of “the 
nation”, which was a heterogeneous mass under the cosmopolitan rule of Ottomans until 
Gökalp’s formulations. However, Şevket Süreyya also pictured Gökalp as a narrow-minded, pre-
First World War thinker who failed to understand the importance of the economy for a nation’s 
existence. Although his contributions were very significant, his formulizations lacked economic 
structure. Şevket Süreyya insisted on the necessity of challenging Gökalp’s ideas, because the 
new Republic needed a new “economic-nationalism.”42  
 
Türkeş points out that Şevket Süreyya was anxious to draw a line between the intellectuals of the 
Unionist Era and those of republican period, since the former put the main emphasis on history, 
culture and ethnicity; while Kadro put economic development to the center.
43
 Şevket Süreyya’s 
criticisms towards Ziya Gökalp can be taken as an indirect criticism towards Mustafa Kemal, who 
disappointed Kadro members by not focusing on etatism in the way they had anticipated.  
 
 
1.1.3 Anti-Imperialism 
Kadro’s nationalist tendencies became more pronounced in their interpretation of anti-
imperialism. As Türkeş explains, according to Kadro, the twentieth century was going to be the 
age of national liberation movements.
44
  All the colonies and semi-colonies, like Turkey, were 
going to gain their political independence which would be followed by economic 
independence.”45  
 
Nevertheless, Kadro’s perception of anti-imperialism objected to internationalism in a Marxist 
sense. The journal declared that Kadro was against both internationalism and cosmopolitanism, 
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since the first one was regarded as a part of the socialist system and the latter as a result of the 
capitalist system. Instead of being an internationalist (socialist) or cosmopolitan (liberal-
capitalist) society, Turkey should have focused on its national virtues. Under these circumstances, 
staying as a “nation state” was the best way for Turkey to keep its independence politically and 
economically. Indeed, Türkeş draws attention to the fact that Kadro hinted at not having 
internationalist qualities even in its first issue by declaring that the world-view of the Turkish 
revolution was going to be a unique one.
46
 
 
In this respect, the journal interpreted anti-imperialism as independent nations’ support for each 
other and objected to the disintegration of nations in favor of a unified proletariat in an 
internationalist movement. “Are all nations moving towards a single world order?” asked Şevket 
Süreyya and replied: “No! We think that the new societies in the world will be separate, self-
contained institutions politically and economically.” 47  
 
Kadro writers, especially Şevket Süreyya, argued that maintaining political and economic 
independence and national consciousness depended on protecting the country against imperialists. 
Turkey’s economic and political independence was bound to the faith of the colonies and 
underdeveloped countries which had the opportunity to establish an alliance against imperialists. 
Without the support of those countries, facing capitalist powers and keeping economic 
independence at the same time was not possible. Turkey’s victory of 1923 was a unique 
experience as well as an inspiration for those who had been fighting against imperialists. 
Therefore, Turkey, as the representative of national independence movements, meant to keep its 
connection to the anti-imperialist movements of the underdeveloped countries.
48
 In the meantime, 
dealing with the economy and improving it with rapid development plans were the most 
important issues for Turkey.
49
 If this strategy had been followed, Turkey could have benefited 
from the atmosphere of the Great Depression, since the crisis brought new opportunities for 
underdeveloped countries.
50
  
 
As seen here, Kadro was in harmony with the regime in terms of seeking nationalist solutions for 
development. Still, the journal tried to convince the regime to focus on rapid industrialization and 
plan the economy as soon as possible and not to neglect its link with the underdeveloped 
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countries which engaged in national liberation movements, although the writers were aware of 
Kemalist regime’s reluctance towards the last issue. 
 
Since anti-imperialism was one of the most important features of Kadro’s ideology, looking at the 
ideas of Kadro members on anti-imperialism in detail may help to understand how the writers 
perceived it; how their version of anti-imperialism linked to Kemalist thought; and whether they 
contributed to Kemalist ideology by making this connection. 
 
In the early 1920s, Şevket Süreyya and İsmail Hüsrev were inspired by the anti-imperialist ideas in 
Russia. Both studied in KUTV (Communist University of the Toilers of the East), which was the 
most important center for transmissions of national communist-socialist ideas. As Benningsen and 
Wimbush explain, KUTV opened in September 1921, and it remained as an active and influential 
forum until 1924, when its staff was purged for the first time. From the beginning, KUTV became 
an intellectual headquarters for revolutionary high cadres from the colonial world. There, the 
students encountered the ideas of the Muslim national communists
51
 in a systematic fashion as well 
as ideas of Lenin and other Marxist theoreticians. The important Muslim national communist 
leaders, including Sultan Galiyev, Turar Ryskulov, Nariman Narimanov were among the permanent 
teachers. Many of them insisted that the success of a revolution in Europe depended on the success 
of the revolution in the East.
52
 Nazım Hikmet, Vâlâ Nureddin, Şevket Süreyya, and İsmail Hüsrev 
were among their students. 
 
This schooling must have made quite an impact on Şevket Süreyya and İsmail Hüsrev’s ideas, since 
anti-imperialism provided new insights for them to combine their ideas of nationalism and 
communism. As Şevket Süreyya pointed out, socialist leaders did not focus on problems of 
oppressed minorities and the question of nationalism prior to the Bolshevik Revolution.
53
  
 
As stated by Jeremy Smith, Marx and Engels viewed nationalism as a product of the growth of 
capitalism as well as a result of the competition between the bourgeoisies of the various national 
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states. Nationalism was an ideological weapon which would tie workers to an illusory common 
interest with their own ruling classes. However, the workers had no country and at the end, the 
supremacy of the proletariat would bring an end to all national differences.
54
 Besides, according to 
the Benningsen and Wimbush, the eyes of socialist leaders were all fixed on Europe, because they 
believed that a revolution in Europe was going to change the world. The East was not a target of 
their socialist advances because it had no proletariat, and therefore it could have no revolution. 
According to them, the “national problem” was marginal, destined to die a natural death in the 
socialist world. With the exception of Stalin and to a lesser degree Lenin, almost all of the 
Bolshevik leaders, as true internationalists, remained indifferent to the national-colonial question.
55
 
 
According to Smith, Lenin agreed with Rosa Luxemburg and the orthodox Marxist opinion that 
nationalism was the product of capitalism, and that it was reactionary and divisive. Still, unlike 
Luxemburg and the Austro-Marxists, Lenin insisted on a critical distinction between the 
nationalism of oppressor nations such as Great Russian Chauvinism and the nationalism of the 
oppressed non-Russian minorities in the Russian Empire
56
 
 
As d’Encausse points out, when discussing the economic development of Poland, Rosa Luxemburg 
argued that in some cases national struggle for independence would have adverse consequences. 
The workers’ movement was already spreading throughout the empire, thus as long as the state was 
developing democratically, socialists should not have supported a nationalist movement, or in other 
words, “a bourgeois goal”.57 Lenin essentially shared her view, but after 1905, he became 
convinced that the Russian working class needed allies to overthrow power, and those nationalist 
aspirations could contribute to the struggle. In this period, Lenin’s central concern was to maintain 
the unity of working class movement prior to the revolution.
58
 As a result, although he was in 
agreement with Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin considered her strategy to be mistaken. Here, the axis of 
Lenin’s program was to keep the concept of the “nation” out of working class ideology and to 
create a temporary alliance between national movements and the working class. At this point, he 
did not develop an overall theory about nationalism, but he tried to define a national program that 
would still preserve the hegemony of the proletariat. Although his adversaries accused Lenin of 
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focusing the attention of oppressed nationalities on the national question and distracting them from 
the true task of the proletariat, Lenin’s concessions to the nation were temporary, limited and 
conditional.
59
 In response, he wrote “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination” as a critique of 
Rosa Luxemburg’s arguments which insisted that national interests were a deception. Lenin 
rejected her idea, and he claimed that the proletariat had to fight for national emancipation because 
the proletariat was against all kinds of oppression. In this way, it could be possible to gain the 
support of national movements for the revolution in Russia. Thus, Lenin’s support for self-
determination was strategical and it based on an internationalist outlook.
60
  
 
It also should be noted here that after he became the leading spokesman on nationality affairs in 
1913 with Lenin’s request, Stalin made his most significant contribution by developing a Bolshevik 
theory of nationalism. With the encouragement of Lenin, Stalin wrote his article, “Marxism and the 
National Question” in 1913 about self-determination. According to d’Encausse, although Stalin had 
been instructed by Lenin to refute Austro-Marxist arguments against self-determination, he, in fact, 
refashioned their ideas. Similar to some Austro-Marxists, he was impressed by the development of 
strictly national liberation movement in the Caucasus. Although he tried to deny it, Stalin described 
nationalities as a historically stable community of people who possess an identity that has evolved 
centuries. And he did not exclusively link it to the stages of capitalism. In this sense, as d’Encausse 
claims, Stalin was the first in Russian Social Democrat Labor Party to recognize the seriousness 
and permanence of the national problem. In the end, Stalin’s work became a fundamental 
contribution to Marxist thought;
61
 although Lenin disapproved of some of the elements of his work 
strongly.
62
 
 
All this said, the Marxist thesis on nationalism was not satisfying for Kadro. According to Şevket 
Süreyya, Marxism overlooked the reality of nationhood.
63
 As a result, Kadro writers became 
interested in the theories of Lenin and Stalin, since Leninism was an important inspirational source 
for them, especially with its anti-imperialist theory. Kadro writers must have been aware of the fact 
that the theorization of the encounter between Marxism and the non-European world was achieved 
mainly by Lenin. Nonetheless, the priority that was given to the proletariat in Lenin and Stalin’s 
work seems to have disappointed Şevket Süreyya. He argued that Lenin and Stalin improved the 
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theory around national movements and socialism, but they failed when they degraded the role of 
national independence movements into a secondary position.
64
  
 
As Türkeş emphasizes, Kadro was influenced by Lenin but did not fully adopt his arguments.65 At 
this point, theories of nationalist-communists from Russia and Eastern countries within the anti-
imperialist struggle might have been more interesting for Kadro members, since they had more to 
offer concerning the role of nationalism. As a result, there is a great deal of resemblance between 
Kadro and some of the nationalist-communists who joined the Bolsheviks, such as Sultan 
Galiyev.
66
 However, this does not necessarily mean that Kadro members borrowed their ideas 
directly from Galiyev, since they were also prominent intellectuals who were eligible enough for 
creating similar ideas. 
 
Kadro’s different stance from Lenin on anti-imperialism was particularly revealed in the 
discussions regarding the nation-state’s role. In Lenin’s writings, the “nation state” mostly appeared 
as a temporary phase that preceded a socialist revolution; therefore as a transition period. However, 
for Kadro, becoming a “nation state” was regarded as an aim to be fulfilled for a nation. Unlike 
Lenin, Kadro explicitly objected to any form of unity and cooperation on the basis of 
internationalist class solidarity; and the journal preferred cooperation of independent nation states 
instead. Kadro’s definition of revolution had two stages: The first stage was the War of Liberation 
and the second stage was the achievement of economic independence. At this juncture, Kadro’s 
explanations of the revolution within stages resemble Stalin’s ideas and his “two stage” theory.67 
However, Kadro might have bent the meaning of the stages; because Stalin did not intend to create 
independent national states in the way Kadro meant. 
 
Anti-imperialism was crucial for the journal’s ideology; however, it was re-formulated by Kadro 
writers to be in line with journal’s nationalist world-view. For them, the first step of anti-
imperialism was ignoring its internationalist qualities and limiting its meaning mainly to the 
solidarity of underdeveloped nations which engaged in liberation movements. The second step for 
Kadro was incorporating anti-imperialism into the Kemalist ideology by claiming Turkey as the 
first country to win its independence against imperialist powers. However, the second goal turned 
out to be quite a difficult one to achieve, since the journal’s interpretation of anti-imperialism was 
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not shared by the leading Kemalists such as Mustafa Kemal, Ismet Inönü, and Recep Peker. Indeed, 
they did not seek any serious involvement with the emancipation struggle of underdeveloped 
nations. As a result, this issue became a point of tension between Kadro members and the leading 
Kemalists. 
 
Kadro’s insistence on attributing anti-imperialist features to the Kemalist ideology is quite visible in 
the articles, in fact. The writers, especially the ones with a leftist background, often brought on the 
intrinsic anti-imperialist qualities of the “Turkish revolution” and insisted on describing the War of 
Independence as the first national victory of independence in the anti-imperialist struggle. 
Nevertheless, although he adopted an anti-imperialist discourse in the early 1920s, at a time when 
help from the Soviet Union was needed; Mustafa Kemal was quite reluctant to adopt the same term 
in the 1930s. At the time of the War of Independence, when Kemalists were fighting against the 
imperialist countries, Mustafa Kemal mentioned the anti-imperialistic character of their struggle. 
However, those anti-imperialist utterances seem to be rather tactical moves rather than being 
ideological ones.
68
 This can be followed in Mustafa Kemal’s references to anti-imperialism, since 
he often refers to a glorious past of the Ottoman Empire that had ruled a large part of the world, 
rather than aiming internationalism in a socialist context. The main reason for Mustafa Kemal’s 
anti-imperialist utterances was his need for Soviet Union’s support. Besides, Enver Pasha was a 
dangerous rival for him, since Enver cooperated with Turkish leftists in Russia and was offering 
himself as an alternative choice to Soviet Union, in case Mustafa Kemal fails in Anatolia.
69
 The 
anti-imperialist discourse of the early 1920s diminished by time, as Kemalists secured their political 
power, which also supports the idea that their discourse was tactical.  
 
Apparently, Kadro ignored this and deliberately accentuated Kemalism’s anti-imperialist content 
and the writers insisted on connecting Turkey to an international network of underdeveloped 
countries. 
 
Kadro writers were most likely aware of the fact that their effort on this matter was hardly 
acceptable for Kemalists. However, the writers were concerned about the deceleration of reforms, 
and they were probably disturbed by the rapid bureaucratization within the state. As a result, they 
tried to offer a solution by pointing out the advantages of being in touch with anti-imperialist 
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movements. Regarding anti-imperialism, their efforts can be read as their demand to keep the spirit 
of “revolution” of the early years of the republic alive. It was also an implicit criticism towards the 
government for ignoring new possibilities in the economy just after the Great Depression. 
 
In short, Kadro used anti-imperialism in a nationalist context as the conflict between developed 
imperialist nations and underdeveloped nations. Nonetheless, Kadro’s ideas were not appreciated 
enough by the regime. In the 1950s, the theoreticians of Dependency Theory also accentuated anti-
imperialism. Their arguments about the conflict between developed and underdeveloped nations 
resemble Kadro’s formulizations, due to the fact that they built on the same sources: Lenin and 
Rosa Luxemburg. Thus, Kadro is considered to have formulated the conflict between center and 
periphery countries before the theoreticians of Dependency Theory by several academics. 
 
It should also be kept in mind that the Aydınlık group supported the independence movement of 
Turkey as well as anti-imperialist attributions about it from the beginning.
70
 After its 4
th
 Congress in 
1922, Comintern decided to support the independence movement in Anatolia, in case it would 
evolve into a socialist movement later. With the necessity of being in harmony with both Kemalists 
and Comintern’s decisions between 1922 and 1924, communists in Turkey attributed some 
characteristics of communism, such as anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism, to the Kemalist regime, 
which in fact did not embody those characteristics intrinsically and fully. Once the nationalists 
seized power, their anti-socialist attitude became clearer and the leftists were eliminated within a 
relatively short time. However, with their attributions, early leftists set the stage for leftist 
interpretation of Kemalism which was theorized and improved by Kadro to a great degree between 
1932 and 1934. The anti-imperialist interpretations of Kemalism became a strong tendency within 
the leftist movement of Turkey, and it left a blueprint behind to be followed by many who wanted 
to combine Kemalism with leftist ideas in the following years. As such, nationalist tendencies 
within Turkish left helped to link Kemalism to leftist interpretations to a great extent.  
 
Nationalism and its connection to anti-imperialism and internationalism are still an issue for leftist 
movement. Abolition of frontiers for internationalism or not, supporting national resistance against 
imperialism or opposing to nationalism within the context of class consciousness are still the 
problems that are disputed. It seems Kadro made a significant contribution to associate leftist ideas 
with nationalism and Kemalism. 
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1.1.4 Exclusivist Policies of Kemalism 
The subject of Kadro and nationalism has been studied several times, with the majority of studies 
usually focused on etatism and Kadro’s efforts on relating nationalism with anti-imperialism. 
However, these studies sometimes overlook the high degree of harmony between Kadro and the 
exclusivist policies of Kemalist nationalism. 
 
As Parla mentions, the “nation” was described as the unity of language, culture, and ideal by 
Mustafa Kemal. As a result, Turkish identity was non-restrictive in ethnic terms, in the sense that 
all persons of different ethnic backgrounds could consider themselves to be “Turks.” As article 88 
of the 1924 Constitution states, “The people of Turkey regardless of their religion, and race, in 
terms of their citizenship, to be Turkish.”71 Nevertheless, Turkish nationalism did not consist of all-
inclusive features. The concept of “Turk” in Kemalism mostly carried exclusive, supremacy-
oriented, ethno-racialist elements. After all, Mustafa Kemal’s famous sentence was “How happy is 
one who says, ‘I’m a Turk’’, not “How happy is one who says, ‘I’m a Turkish citizen.”72  
 
Parla states that particularly in the early years of the republic, nationalism carried a defensive reflex 
and emphasized national sovereignty. This was partly a counter-discourse of Kemalism towards 
colonial concepts which considered the Turks as a group of people who were “unable to stand alone 
in the modern world.”73 Thus, in practice Kemalist nationalism aimed to demonstrate that Turks 
were an independent nation and they were able to govern themselves without any intervention of 
Western powers. However, the same defensive reflex sometimes included a strong exclusive 
discourse, especially when the authority or the legitimacy of Kemalists was challenged or was in 
danger, like in the cases of Kurdish upheavals or Armenian territorial claims. In this sense, general 
understanding of nationhood was not directly ethno-racist, but in practice, ethnic differences were 
monitored carefully and easily led to discriminatory practices.
74
 
 
Although the Kemalist nationalism’s main emphasis was on its unifying aspects, and Kemalists 
aimed to boost the image of the Turkish nation and to create a national pride with Turkish 
nationalism; racist elements became more visible within the Kemalist ideology in the 1930s, in line 
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with the developments in Europe.
75
 Especially in the 1930s and 1940s, discrimination against Jews 
and Christians was quite strong. The government-backed “Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş” (Citizen, Speak 
Turkish) campaigns towards minorities, which were started in 1928 by law students and continued 
during the 1930s; Turkish Resettlement Law of 1934, which was part of Turkifying projects of the 
state and triggered the Jewish Pogroms in Thrace in 1934 as well as the Dersim massacres in 1938; 
and the introduction of a “Wealth Tax” to eliminate non-Muslim bourgeoisie in November 1942 
were obvious examples. These discriminatory practices continued in the following years and 
resulted with the Istanbul Pogrom against non-Muslims, especially Anatolian Greeks, in September 
1955.  
 
Here it can be questioned that as a left-leaning journal, how Kadro coped with exclusivist features 
of Kemalist nationalism and how the journal responded to the regime’s discriminative potential 
towards different ethnic and religious identities. 
 
Şevket Süreyya stated that the Kadro group disapproved of any ethno-racial reductionism and 
discrimination.
76
 However, in a closer look, some of the Kadro articles reveal exclusivist traits of 
Kemalist nationalism with strong ethno-racial elements. Although these traits were not a primary 
feature for Kadro, their existence exhibits the high degree of harmony between the Kemalist regime 
and Kadro’s ideology.  
 
Akin to the RPP’s Kemalist line of the early 1930s, issues about non-Turkish and non-Muslim 
groups were easily turned into sensitive subjects for Kadro. This becomes quite visible when 
different nationalities, particularly when Kurds and their uprisings were in question. At this point, 
Kadro writers did not seem to question the official ideology. Instead, they supported the prevalent 
Kemalist view, especially on issues about the Eastern provinces. This attitude might have been 
rooted in the Turkish side’s fear of possible independence and territorial claims by the Kurdish 
community in the first half of the 1920s. Continuous Kurdish upheavals in the East from the early 
years of the republic must have been unpleasant reminders of this anxiety. As Zürcher points out, 
huge amount of territorial loss and traumatizing events following the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, which meant in many cases the loss of hometowns for leadership cadres, must have made 
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quite an impact on the minds of the founding cadres of the Kemalists.
77
  This also explains their 
sensitivity about territorial claims in the new Turkish Republic to a degree.  
 
The Kemalist government’s methods towards the upheavals of Sheikh Said, Dersim and Ağrı were 
quite rigid. The regime’s methods often meant the merciless suppression of riots and the rejection 
of Kurdish identity as well as many other ethnic groups. As a result, in practice, adoption of 
Turkish nationalism led to the forced assimilation of thirty percent or so of the population which 
did not have Turkish as its mother tongue.
78
  
 
Kadro’s full support for the methods of the regime on this issue can also be read as Kadro’s 
harmony with the regime as well as its members’ discomfort towards the riots and upheavals in 
general. Like the rest of the Kemalists, Kadro members seemed to be affected by positivism and its 
distrust of masses to a certain degree. 
 
In parallel with the official ideology, the Kadro journal refused to recognize Kurdish people as a 
nation. Ismail Hüsrev wrote that: “In the absence of a Kurdish national movement, is it possible to 
talk about the existence of a ‘Kurdish nation’? Our answer to this question is negative. In the 
Eastern regions, instead of a Kurdish nation, there are some Kurdish-speaking tribes along with 
Turkish elements who were forced to speak Kurdish for hundreds of years. Besides ‘nation’ is a 
paramount social category which requires many qualities, such as mutual collaboration between 
individuals and common ideals on benefits on economy, culture, history, and politics. Considering 
Kurdish society, which even lacks the simplest harmony among its members and is far from any sort 
of national unity except for a common language, as a nation would be wrong.”79  
 
Şevket Süreyya explicitly defended assimilation policies of the regime towards Kurds between 
1924 and 1931. According to him, those measures were necessary, because they were taken against 
“reactionary powers”. “Kurdishness” as a term did not represent nationhood but a reactionary and 
feudal system.
80
 In this way, he added an economic dimension to the subject. By degrading the riots 
into reactionary and feudal uprisings, Şevket Süreyya justified the Kemalist intervention in the area. 
According to him, the Turkish army was there, because the republic and new order needed to be 
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defended against the agents of a backward feudal regime. As a result, in Kadro articles “Kurd” 
usually meant “ignorant reactionary,” not a member of a specific nation or ethnic group.  
 
Here it should be noted that assimilation policies towards non-Turkish and non-Muslim minorities 
were already part of the Kemalist regime. In 1925, just after the Sheikh Said rebellion, the “Reform 
Plan for the East” (Şark Islahat Raporu) was prepared under the orders of Mustafa Kemal to take 
necessary measures in the Eastern provinces. These plans were mainly used for “Turkifying” the 
East with ethnic demography policies such as eviction of Armenian or Kurdish villages, replacing 
the area with emigrants from Caucasus, and the deportation and forced migration of Kurdish people 
to western regions.
81
 Especially in 1927, with the “Law on the Transfer of Certain People from 
Eastern Regions to the Western Provinces” (Bazı Eşhasın Şark Menatıkından Garp Vilâyetlerine 
Nakillerine Dair Kanun) these plans took a concrete form, and certain families and persons were 
deported. It seems Kadro’s ideology already included Kemalist arguments about these reports and 
following measures about Eastern provinces. However, Kadro strengthened and justified those 
Kemalist ideas by backing them with strong arguments and by adding powerful economic insight to 
the debate. 
 
Consequently, some of the Kadro articles carried supremacy-oriented ethno-racialist language, 
especially about Kurds. According to Şevket Süreyya, "The history of cities like Van and 
Diyarbekir in Ottoman times is also a history of suppression and assimilation of the Turkish 
population, Turkish language and Turkish culture in the area. The history of Ottoman period was 
marked by conflicts between economically and legally free Turkish elements (villagers and city-
dwellers) and Kurdish feudalism which enslaved these individuals economically and legally. We see 
that the Ottoman Palace always sided against Turks in this conflict. At those times, due to fear of 
Persian raids, Ottomans kept Kurdish feudal chiefs on their side and placed them nearby the 
eastern borders. The Ottomans sacrificed the region's Oğuz Turk population, who were there long 
before the Ottomans, to Kurdish feudalism. In those regions, Ottomans' imperial orders served to 
spoil Turkish blood and to ruin Turkish laws and Turkish economy. (...) In this way, the Turkish 
population who represented free trade, small-scale agriculture and highly civilized culture, from 
the Aegean See and to the Tuna River, was betrayed in Diyarbekir and Van provinces by the 
Ottoman palace; and was enslaved to feudal system which represented nothing but illiteracy and 
lack of culture compared to the high level of Turkish civilization. (…) Kurdishness is an economic 
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system which is based on serfdom, poverty and lack of land of the agrarian producers.” 82 He 
further argued that Dersim was in fact land of Oğuz Turks, not of Kurds. 
 
Kurdish people are the largest ethnic minority and have been subjected to assimilation policies 
throughout the history of the republic. In Kadro journal, the Kurds were often described as 
reactionary, inferior feudal elements, which were threat to the republic, Turkishness, and laicism. 
This discourse glorified the Turkish race, as part of an extreme nationalistic view of the Kemalist 
regime of the 1930s. In this way, Kadro strengthened the link between the economic backwardness 
of the Eastern provinces and the inferiority of the Kurdish people. In this sense, Kadro not only 
shared the prevailing Kemalist view but also helped the regime to reshape its ideological discourse 
to justify the assimilation policies of the following years. 
 
Kadro’s economy oriented world-view can be followed easily in their arguments. While Kemalists 
rejected Kurdish identity and described their riots as mere results of reactionary and religious 
activities; Kadro added an economic substructure to the matter and explained that the problems of 
the east mainly pertained to economic backwardness. The writers usually claimed that with an 
improved economy, many of the existing problems would have been automatically solved.
 83
 The 
crucial role of the economy in Kadro’s descriptions of “the nation” was also striking. One of the 
main reasons for Kadro’s rejection of recognizing Kurdish people as a nation was their economic 
backwardness and failure of forming an economic unity.  
 
Still, although the Kadro group did not recognize Kurdish people’s identity as a nation, they 
occasionally brought up problems about Kurdish issue. In a way, Şevket Süreyya captured a part of 
the truth when explaining the backwardness of Eastern provinces with economic determinism. 
However, his reasoning did not stop there. He negatively described Kurdishness, placing it opposite 
to Turkishness. Whether he was aware of it or not, he explicitly categorized the Turkish nation 
above Kurds. In his articles, Kurdishness was often negatively pictured, not only due to its close 
link to economic- feudal relations but also due to its ethno-racial connotations.  
 
Kadro journal’s position towards Kurds indicates some inconsistencies as well as complexities of 
combining nationalism with anti-imperialist elements. The first indication of this is Kadro’s 
categorization of any form of Kurdish disobedience as a reactionary activity, even though the 
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journal called for the support of the struggle for independence of exploited people in 
underdeveloped countries. Despite the fact that Kadro blamed developed Western countries for 
their ignorance towards the struggle for liberation of backward nations and held them responsible 
for their underdevelopment, Kadro intellectuals failed to recognize similar problems for Kurdish 
people. By reducing the existence of Kurds into reactionary-feudal groups which lacked any form 
of unity except for a common language, Kadro did not have to question the predicament that Kurds 
in Eastern provinces faced, as well as the stern measures taken against them. Subsequently, Kurds 
were not taken into account by Kadro as one of the oppressed nations, and the Turkish Republic 
was not considered as an oppressive regime. Moreover, Kurds were depicted as strong enough to 
exploit and assimilate the Turkish elements of the Eastern Anatolia; thus they should have been 
stopped and modernized by the republican regime. According to Şevket Süreyya, “Kurdishness 
with a feudal structure aims for the elimination of the Turkish population, language, and free 
thinking altogether. (...) Kurdish feudal chiefs dominated the area at the expense of land, blood, 
religion and dignity of Turks who were assimilated forcefully and they were Kurdified.”84 
 
With this logic, Kadro justified assimilation policies towards other ethnic minorities as well. Since 
their identities lacked the necessary qualities to be acknowledged by the regime, it was normal to 
define them as “Turkish”, regardless of any consideration about their consent. 
 
Here, it should also be noted that Kurds drew a great deal of negative attention from the regime due 
to their large population and their dissatisfaction with the republic, which often emerged as 
disobedience towards the regime in frequent riots. Compared to Kurds, assimilation policies 
towards other non-Turkish Muslim minorities, such as the Laz, Abhaz, and Circassians, were less 
severe, possibly due to the less threatening position of those minorities towards the regime. Their 
assimilation process often took place in an indirect way, such as not supporting their language and 
cultural diversity through education or other official means.  
 
The exclusivist tone of Kadro was not limited to the Kurds, however some of the articles revealed 
the blurry line between national pride and ethno-racialism and Kadro’s language occasionally 
exhibited a threatening tone of Turkish nationalism towards other ethnic and religious minorities. 
Sometimes the minorities were blamed for treason. According to Burhan Asaf, having both non-
Turkish and non-Muslim identities meant having an intrinsic quality or at least a natural inclination 
for being a treacherous citizen. In his article, he warned the minorities to be more aware of the 
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value of the tolerance of the Turks by comparing their position with the Jews in the Nazi Germany: 
“We did not seek necessary solutions for teaching our language to our minorities to an extent that 
at least they could do grocery shopping in Turkish. In Germany, neither Jews speak Spanish nor do 
Polacks speak Polish. If you asked them, you would see that they all consider themselves as 
German. Still, the great German nation needed to take drastic measures to penalize the minorities 
among them. However, here, from Tatav to Tünel, between Balat and Fener, the disobedient spirit 
of Ottoman religious communities rules. I doubt that those people who even cannot do shopping in 
Turkish would learn our language, give up the language that they speak, integrate to our cultural 
life, and eventually give up their non-Muslim Galata identity! It’s a lot of work! I hope that the 
measures taken against the Jews in Germany set a good example for the minorities in our country. 
They should not forget that to be as hospitable as Turks; a nation should be as superior and 
tolerant as Turks. But our hospitality is not limitless. As being guests in our country, minorities 
should learn how to integrate to our culture eventually. Otherwise, they should leave. Until now, 
our minorities did not become members of our community because they insisted on being different. 
From now on, for their own sake, they should find ways to confirm their sincerity and loyalty to us 
without our constant guidance.” 85  
 
Burhan Asaf’s discourse may have been partially rooted in nationalization policies of the economy. 
Minorities like Armenians, Anatolian Greeks, and Jews had a great deal of shares in commerce, 
business, and banking; therefore were subjected to the dramatic effects of nationalization policies, 
starting from late Ottoman period. 
 
On the other hand, Yakup Kadri was sensitive about Armenian genocide claim and he was offended 
by it: “Then times came that even the European nations believed those hypocrite fictitious stories. 
When American theaters showed fairy tales about Armenian massacres; the eyes of Yankees were 
filled with tears, even though their hands had covered with the blood of black Americans. We 
(Turks) were pictured as if we were perpetrators of all the horrendous crimes in the world. Those 
were painful times for all of us.”86  
 
Concerning the exclusivist language towards the non-Turkish and non-Muslim minorities, there 
was a striking resemblance between Kadro members and some of the prestigious figures of 
Kemalist regime, such as Falih Rıfkı Atay. According to him, “The Turkish revolution also has a 
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name, as the French and Russian revolutions have, and that is called Kuvayi Milliye (National 
Forces). This refers to the revolution that has been fought in the name of Turkish people. Kuvayi 
Milliye knows that anybody who does not carry a genuine Turkish origin is the enemy, who exploits 
Turkish element to its core. Kuvayi Milliye does not distinguish between the Ottoman Palace, Bab-ı 
Ali (the imperial government), Ottoman Galata, Süleymaniye Mosque-Madrasah, Fener Church 
and School from the enemy’s bayonet that kills the unborn babies of the Anatolian mothers.” 87  
 
As it is clear from above-mentioned examples, Kadro’s expressions with respect to nationalism 
display compatibility of its ideology with the Kemalist nationalism, even with its extreme rightist 
sides. This may be explained by the nationalist ideologies of the Kadro members prior to their 
involvement with leftist movement as well as by the effect of the strong hegemonic power of 
Kemalism on the minds of intellectuals at the time. The single-party regime and the political 
climate of the world, which favored authoritarian regimes, can be also taken as important 
complementary elements in the formation of the journal’s ideological choices.  
 
Kadro’s ideology and its strong nationalist tendencies were severely criticized by some of the 
prominent leftists of Turkey such as Nazım Hikmet88 as well as conservative writers such as 
Peyami Safa.
89
 The journal was often described as a fascist group by leftists, and Şevket Süreyya 
and Vedat Nedim were considered traitors.
90
 Although Şevket Süreyya and Burhan Asaf defended 
their ideas in an article towards these accusations,
91
 negative criticisms forced Kadro writers to be 
more careful about their language and especially about the journal’s position towards rising fascist 
powers of Europe. Consequently, they had to put a lot of effort to distinguish themselves from both 
racism and traditional-conservative nationalism. According to its writers, Kadro’s ideology was 
misunderstood about nationalism and it didn’t carry any racist or fascist elements. They insisted 
that Kadro group introduced a unique socio-economic dimension to nationalism; therefore their 
interpretation was a new kind of “dynamic nationalism” and was not connected to socialism and 
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fascism.
92
 With these claims, Kadro tried to present its nationalist approach as a dynamic 
modernization project peculiar to Turkey.  
 
Apart from accusations of fascism, as Şevket Süreyya claims, Kadro was also stigmatized as a 
communist publication by Milliyet newspaper and the Iş Bank Group, which was led by Celal 
Bayar. The hardliners of the RPP such as Necip Ali and Recep Peker did not trust Kadro either.
93
 
The leftist past of the writers was often presented as a strong indication of the journal’s real nature, 
and the writers were pictured as supporters of the Bolshevik system due to their etatist ideas. Even 
Ismet Inönü, who supported Kadro about etatism, had his share of these accusations.
94
 Under these 
circumstances, emphasizing nationalism helped Kadro as a legitimating mechanism, since being a 
nationalist was perceived as a basic necessity in order to be a patriotic citizen by the regime. Other 
than proving Kadro’s nativity and patriotism, embracing a nationalist discourse probably made it 
relatively easy for Kadro members to discuss subjects such as etatism, planned economy or anti-
imperialism, which were easily attributed communism. 
 
In short, a nationalist aspect was already embedded in the world-view of Kadro members long 
before their journal was published. Kadro supported the Kemalist nationalist project to unify the 
nation under the same Turkish identity, even in the times this effort included exclusivist, ethno-
racial discourse and implementation of heavy measures. The writers tried to add a distinct economic 
dimension to nationalism and attempted to keep the link between Kemalism and anti-imperialism 
alive. Their main aim was connecting Turkey to the world-wide movement of emancipation of 
underdeveloped countries. Nationalism also helped former leftists of Kadro as a practical 
legitimizing mechanism and helped them to work for the Kemalist regime with less conflict. 
 
 
1.2 Populism 
Analyzing the main points of Kemalist populism, from which Kemalist leadership derived an 
ideological base for its legitimating mechanism to claim power, may be useful for understanding 
Kadro’s, as well as Markopaşa and Yön’s, interpretations of Kemalism. Since left-oriented 
interpretations of Kemalism were partially derived from some of the basic elements of Kemalist 
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populism, subjects which are connected to Kemalist populism such as the society, classes and 
elitism will be discussed in this chapter. 
 
Kemalist populism is not related to modern-day populism but to the German and Russian romantic 
idealization of “the people”; in German “Völkisch” and Russian “Narodniki” movements. As 
Zürcher explains, the Russian Narodniki movement
95
 had quite an impact on the emergence of this 
populist ideology in the minds of Turkish-Ottoman intellectuals. As a result, a Kemalist 
understanding of populism included romantic idealization of “the people”, in particular, the 
Anatolian peasantry, which directly owed something to the romantic nationalist “Halka Doğru” 
(Towards the People) movement of the World War I and, indirectly, to the Narodniki in Russia.
96
 
With the World War I, early Narodnik impact gradually disappeared, and populism gained a new 
dimension, a solidarist outlook, under the influence of French sociology.
97
 
 
In the early years of the independence movement, the concept of populism was very important for 
nationalists to unite representatives of different groups in the Great National Assembly, as well as 
to gain support from the Soviets for the independence movement. As Tekeli and Şaylan argue, 
although Mustafa Kemal tried to base his movement upon the people from the start of the War of 
Independence, he did not propose a populist program until some other groups came up with 
“populist” programs to the GNA. Therefore, it is possible to say that the Populist Program of 1920 
was put forward tactically by Mustafa Kemal in order to eliminate his opponents within the 
GNA.”98 Besides, populism gained a different meaning and function due to the changes during and 
after the War of Independence. When there was no need for the vast support of “the people” and 
Soviet Union anymore, the Kemalist understanding of populism changed.
99
  Consequently, once the 
Kemalist nationalists secured their power, the pluralistic tone of Kemalist populism of the early 
years of national struggle weakened. Under the single-party rule, the slogan “for people, by people” 
was replaced by the concept of “for people, despite people”.100 
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Kadro appeared at the beginning of the 1930s, when the Great Depression already discredited 
political and economic liberalism in Turkey. While strengthening the single-party rule in parallel to 
the general tendency of the world that favored strict regimes, Kemalists sought more secure 
solutions in the economy. Under these circumstances, developing an economic plan and seeking 
ways to affect Kemalist policies via their journal were the two primary objectives for Kadro 
members. However, their main aims were connected to their economic targets; therefore the 
populist arrow was not essential for them. They did not define their journal as a populist 
publication, since they did not need a populist discourse as much as Kemalists needed it during the 
War of Independence and in the early years of the republic. 
 
Although the Kemalist discourse emphasized the importance of populist arrow, Kemalists did not 
bring any clear explanation about the nature of their populism. The concept of the “nation” (millet) 
and the “people” (halk) were often used interchangeably. Taha Parla points out that since the link 
between populism and nationalism was a significant component of the Kemalist internal 
legitimation strategy, the nationalist and populist arrows were closely related.
101
 Mustafa Kemal 
consciously and actively enforced the relationship between populism and nationalism. In this way, 
the Kemalists used their view of “the people” to justify their sole position as rulers of the state by 
using their strategic legitimation advantage. They created a conceptual continuity between RPP and 
the nationalist movement, in other words between populism and nationalism. As a result, the 
populist discourse of the Kemalists ensured RPP’s claim to represent the whole society and the 
party’s assumed role to protect the interests of the whole nation.102  
 
Kadro did not provide any clear description for “the people”either. The writers used the “people” 
and the “nation” interchangeably. According to prominent liberal journalist Ahmet Ağaoğlu, 
despite their frequent usage of the word “people”, Kadro writers were unable to explain this word 
elaborately. Although the issues about the economy were subject to detailed analyses, “the people” 
was used in an ambiguous way; because it was an abstract, even romanticized idea in Kadro’s 
ideology. He claimed that Kadro’s lack of clearity on this matter was a sign of the journal’s 
ignorance about the people, as well as its general tendency to reduce “people” into a mass which 
needed to be led by an elite “cadre”.103  
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1.2.1 Elitism 
As one can see from the journal’s title, Kadro aimed at forming an elite cadre which would create 
an ideological framework for the regime. According to Kadro, identifying the problems of the 
nation and achieving ideal solutions under the guidance of an intellectual group of bureaucrats was 
the best possible way to deal with problems. Kadro members probably considered themselves as 
future members of this cadre. In this way, the writers clearly showed that the journal’s ideology was 
“elitist” towards politics. Here two influences may have been at work: On the one hand positivism, 
with its reliance on a managerial class and on the other Bolshevism, with its preference for a small 
cadre-led vanguard party. 
 
Despite their elitist tendency however, Kadro writers were aware of the gap between educated 
classes and ordinary citizens. Yakup Kadri, who was a famous novelist as well as a journalist and 
politician, crystallized this problem in his influential novel, “Yaban” (Stranger). By describing the 
predicament of a high-ranking army officer in a remote village of Anatolia during in the War of 
Independence, he tried to explain the difficulties that were experienced by the intellectual, once he 
is confronted with ignorance, poverty, and the illiteracy of peasants.  
 
When Kadro tried to persuade the RPP leaders to form a group of intellectuals to consult, the 
journal’s desire for an “elite cadre” was not welcomed by the many within the parliamentary. The 
main reason for this negativity was the ambiguous nature of the “cadre”. In order to prevent 
connotations to communism, Kadro explained the differences between its “vanguard cadre” and the 
Leninist notion of a “professional revolutionary” carefully. The writers claimed that the “cadre” 
belonged to the whole nation, rather than being representative of a specific social class, as it was in 
Leninism.
104
 Besides, Russia’s development path was completely different than Turkey’s. In order 
to gain economic independence, Turkey needed an intellectual nationalist cadre,
 105
 which had 
nothing to do with communism.
106
  
 
At this point, Kadro was not crucially very different from rest of the Kemalists. Despite its rhetoric 
of the “people’s government”, Kemalist understandings of governance was elitist to some extent. 
Like Ziya Gökalp and many other Ottoman intellectuals, the Kemalist leadership believed that the 
right of governance in Turkey belonged to the well-educated intellectual elite and prominent 
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members of society, more than the masses.
107
 Due to their education and background, Kemalists 
were conditioned to believe in progress in a certain European way. However, rather than the 
egalitarian and democratic ideas, they were often inspired by right-wing currents of Europe such as 
solidarism and positivism.
108
  Therefore, with its significant impact on the founders of the republic, 
positivism can be taken as one of the major contributors to the elitist features of Kemalism, which 
already carried elitist features due to political tradition of the country. As a result, Kemalists 
claimed the power as state-elites, and they did not intend to form an administration in which they 
could share the power with common people. 
 
Whether Kadro’s writers were influenced by positivism via their early Ottoman education or later 
via Leninism, they shared the “elitist” traits of Kemalism. Besides, Kadro members supported the 
regime’s elitist features by arguing that the state had every right to implement certain policies to 
enforce reform projects over the society via a certain group of state-elites and intellectuals. By 
accepting elitism as an essential element, Kadro showed its approval for top-down decisions of the 
single-party regime. Therefore it can be said that elitism enabled the Kemalist regime to adopt strict 
top-down policies with ease, and opened the way for authoritarian tendencies. Indeed, the elitism of 
the regime coincided with overall trend of the world which was already tolerant for authoritarian 
regimes and strict top-down policies at the time. 
 
 
1.2.2 Classes and Society 
In general, discussing the ideas of Kemalists on economic-social classes and society can be 
beneficial to grasp Kadro’s conceptualization of the society.  
 
Kemalists shared Ziya Gökalp’s solidarist perception of society which was influenced by 
Durkheim, who thought of the society in terms of harmony rather than conflict. As a result, 
Kemalists often defined society in “classless”, “united” and “complementary” groups without 
conflicting interests.
109
   
 
As Parla points out, the first aspect of Kemalist populist discourse was the claim that classes in 
Turkey were not in conflict. This claim can be read as a defensive response to Soviets and Marxist 
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concept of class struggle. Mustafa Kemal insisted on Turkey’s incompatibility with communism, 
due to lack of class conflicts. According to him, although the Turkish nation possessed various 
classes, the present classes would not have followed very different interests from one another; 
because they were in the nature of being necessarily complementary of each other. Mustafa 
Kemal’s “classes in harmony” rhetoric was helpful for securing the position of RPP, since in the 
absence of the class conflicts the party was enough to secure rights of all social classes, because it 
represented the whole nation in the GNA.
 110
 
 
The second aspect of Kemalist discourse about society and social classes appeared around the 
beginning of the 1930s and claimed that social classes did not exist in Turkey. This rhetoric was 
also in agreement with policies of the anti-liberal wing of RPP and anti-liberal political climate of 
the world after the Great Depression.
111
 This view became evident in the 1931 program and 
continued with a slightly modified version in 1935 program. However, as Zürcher points out, the 
Italian labor code was implemented in 1936 in order to prohibit all class-based organizations, 
despite the fact that the regime denied the presence of the classes.
112
 It seems that the indecisive 
attitude of the Kemalists towards classes and Turkey’s social structure was one of many 
contradictions within the ideology.  
 
With Kadro, the main discussions about classes came from Şevket Süreyya, Ismail Hüsrev, Burhan 
Asaf and Vedat Nedim; in other words from the writers with a leftist background. Despite the 
official Kemalist view of the 1930s, Kadro’s writers often tried to acknowledge class divisions. 
According to Vedat Nedim, Turkey could not be considered as a classless society, because every 
inch of the country was filled with people who belonged to a different social class due to their 
position in economic life.
113
 The variety and structure of those classes resembled the classes of a 
liberal economy.
114
 However, according to their needs in the discussion, some of the writers 
sometimes preferred to ignore the presence of classes. For example, while Şevket Süreyya, Vedat 
Nedim and Ismail Hüsrev referred to the existence of classes, Burhan Asaf emphasized the classless 
structure of Turkey. According to him, Turkey’s lack of industrial development prevented Turkish 
society from forming clearly divided social classes.
115
 At the beginning of the Turkish revolution, 
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the Turkish nation was a classless society. Thus, it was still possible to prevent the formation of 
classes due to the weak nature of existing divisions.
116
  
 
In the 1930s, when the leaders of the regime were claiming different economic classes did not exist, 
writing about social classes in detail was challenging for Kadro. Due to the writers’ leftist 
backgrounds, their arguments about class conflict and particularly about “classless society” -which 
in fact were not dramatically different than Kemalist solidarist view- were not received well. 
Mahmut Soydan, a deputy and a representative in the liberal Iş Bank Group claimed that Kadro 
propagandized communism.
117
 As a devoted liberal, Ahmet Ağaoğlu was also very critical about 
journal’s anti-liberal perception of the classes.118 His criticism urged Kadro members to prove their 
ideological distance towards socialism and communism when they commented about classes. 
 
Kadro intellectuals were after a well-controlled etatist economy however, so this objective often 
manifested itself in their descriptions of society, which was usually pictured as a well-controlled, 
well-ordered structure. They often idealized a “classless”, “united” and “complementary” society as 
an essential necessity to realize reforms and economic plans.
119
 In this way, the whole society was 
going to be in order, free of class conflicts and also ready for necessary implementations in a top-
down fashion. As seen, whether they ignored or acknowledged the existence of the classes, Kadro 
writers interpreted their existence as a negative effect in Turkey. The writers often stated that any 
class-based progress should have been prevented in the country, since the formation of the social 
classes would have triggered class struggles and lead the way to the development of liberalism, 
capitalism or socialism, all of which were harmful systems for the country.
120
 In this respect, they 
were quite similar to most of the Kemalists who had anti-liberal views at the time, although the idea 
of “classless society” might have been borrowed from Marxism by Kadro.  
 
Like Mustafa Kemal, Kadro also connected nationalist and populist arrows but usually with more 
emphasis on economy. As stated by Ismail Hüsrev, Kadro was against the domination of one class 
on another, regardless of the nature and position of that class. Elimination of socio-economic 
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classes was a necessity for movements of national independence, due to the possible destructive 
effect of class conflicts within the nation.
121
  
 
As seen, while in the early years of the republic, Kemalists defined society and classes to defend 
and legitimize their own power, Kadro writers did a similar thing to legitimize their economic 
targets in the early 1930s. In this respect, it is possible to say that Kadro’s interpretation of society 
and classes was deeply related to the journal’s vision and plans about the economy. Vedat Nedim 
proved this very clearly by pointing out that the most vital issue for the Turkish revolution was 
achieving the goal of being a classless society and rapidly attaining a developed economy at the 
same time. For him, the only way to achieve that purpose was via the formation of an etatist 
economy.
 122
  
 
Kadro believed that the state, as a classless organ, was also above all classes.
123
 As Türkeş 
emphasizes, according to Kadro, the state did not belong to any particular class or act on behalf of 
any particular group. The state was composed of a conscious “cadre”, which would act on behalf of 
the whole nation.
124
  
 
The above-mentioned remarks of Kadro about the harmful results of class conflicts can be taken as 
an effort to show the ill-effects of capitalism to the Kemalist regime, which usually followed a 
capitalist route in economy. According to the journal, capitalism had a potential to evolve into 
socialism, along with other problems. Therefore, the best thing to do was to achieve new solutions 
to create an independent economic system which was free of both capitalism and socialism.
125
  
 
Along with capitalism, Kadro opposed socialist development in Turkey as well. According to the 
journal, Turkey was too fragile to be part of the aggressive capitalist system and it lacked essential 
necessities to achieve a socialist order, such as class conflicts, well-developed industries, and a 
strong proletarian class. Şevket Süreyya and Burhan Asaf held capitalism responsible for existence 
of liberalism and occurrence of social classes; therefore they pictured socialism as one of the 
harmful results of capitalism.
126
 However, preventing socialism was possible. If the state would 
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have controlled the economy for the benefit of the whole nation, there would not have been any 
ground for the formation of conflicting classes.
127
 
  
Kadro writers insisted that their ideas did not originate from any specific ideology, even though the 
influence of the Soviet Union on their economical plans as well as the anti-imperialist discourse of 
Leninism on “the conflict between developed and non-developed nations” were quite obvious.  Due 
to Kadro’s left-oriented discourse, which often argued about anti-imperialism, class-conflicts, 
classless society, and etatism, the journal was referred as a leftist publication by many.
128
  
 
As Türkeş mentions, economic and social developments of human history were often explained by 
Kadro writers, especially by Şevket Süreyya and Ismail Hüsrev, in accordance with historical 
materialism or sometimes with dialectic materialism.
129
 However, it should be kept in mind that the 
same writers were very critical towards Marxist ideology and socialist order at the same time. 
Şevket Süreyya criticized the shortcomings of Marxism on recognizing different paths of 
development of Eastern examples, especially in Asian and African societies.
130
  
 
At this point, the presence of Marxist / Leninist concepts in the journal’s discourse, but also 
Kadro’s usage of those left-oriented concepts and the context in which they appeared deserve equal 
attention. As it is evident from the articles, Kadro writers made crucial changes in the concepts that 
they borrowed from Marxism, sometimes by keeping the main schema while emptying its Marxist 
core or sometimes by using the schema in an entirely different context. For example, the idea of 
class conflict was easily replaced by the conflict between developed and underdeveloped nations in 
Kadro’s ideology. In other words, the idea of “conflict” was present but it was used in a different 
context in Kadro. In this way, the notion of “conflict” lost its Marxist core and gained a new 
nationalist aspect. It was the same for Kadro’s interpretation of anti-imperialism, which was 
borrowed from Leninism but gained a nationalist dimension with the journal’s interpretations, akin 
to the ideas of some of the Muslim national communists of Russia. Kadro ignored that Lenin’s main 
focus was on the dictatorship of the proletariat and his support for national liberation movements 
was conditional and temporary.  
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When all these factors are taken into consideration, it is better not to take Kadro’s rejection of 
Marxism merely as a defense reflex under the watchful eyes of Kadro’s opponents. Kadro 
members’ disengagement from the leftist movement as well as above-mentioned ideological 
differences with Marxism and socialism are important indicators of Kadro’s ideological distance 
from socialism. It should be kept in mind that even though some of the influential ideas of Kadro 
were inspired by Marxism and Leninism, Kadro’s interpretation of class and society seems quite 
compatible with Kemalist solidarist alternative, which aimed at achieving a united and well-ordered 
society in harmony, and without strong class divisions.  
 
Elitism, romantic idealization of the concept of “the people” along with a distrust of the masses, 
authoritarian tendencies, intolerance for upheavals, anti-liberal and anti-socialist attitudes, and a 
solidarist view of a united and well-controlled society were the features shared by Kadro like the 
most of the Kemalists. Therefore it is possible to say that the traits of positivism and solidarism 
were clearly present in their ideology. Despite Kadro’s statist, left-oriented plans, and its discourse 
which were heavily inspired by Soviet Union, Kadro’s ideology was quite compatible with 
Kemalist populism, regarding Kadro’s interpretations of elitism, the people, society, and social 
classes. At this juncture, Kadro’s Kemalist interpretations and its transformation and tailoring of 
left-oriented concepts place the journal closer to Kemalism and its solidarist - positivist rightist core 
rather than Marxism and socialism. Therefore, addressing Kadro as a “left-leaning” and “patriotic 
ideology” within Kemalism, rather than a “leftist” group seems more convenient. 
 
Kadro was clearly elitist and did not aim at reaching the general population but rather state elites.  
As a matter of fact, Kadro intellectuals were not closely attached to the idea of populism. In this 
respect, they were quite different than the Markopaşa journal of the late 1940s, which set a different 
example than Kadro, even though it was also published by a group of Kemalist intellectuals.  
 
 
1.3 Republicanism 
Republicanism is one of the six arrows of Kemalist ideology. For Kemalists and RPP “the republic” 
was the broadest institutional agent of their transformation as well as the expression of anti-
 46 
monarchism, anti-theocratism and national sovereignty.
131
 As Parla mentions, the meaning of 
republicanism, therefore, can not be comprehended apart from the meanings of nationalist and 
populist arrows; because these two arrows express anti-monarchical interest of popular organs over 
and against the organs of arbitrary government by the Ottoman regime.
132
  
 
Since it was based on republican principles of governance and it replaced absolutist, imperial and 
monarchical governing structures of Ottoman Empire; Kemalist republicanism can be taken as a 
modern system for Turkey.
133
 However, Kemalist republicanism does not only consist of these 
modern and progressive features. As Parla points out, it also includes the notion of charismatic 
leadership, authoritarian tendencies and hierarchical structuring; therefore the republic idea in 
Mustafa Kemal’s thinking is not a “democratic” republic in its core.134 In this respect, Kemalism 
has a contradictory nature. 
 
According to Şerif Mardin, Young Turks’ desire for parliamentary regime was a desire to find a 
system in order to prevent the decline of the Ottoman Empire, which was struck with waves of 
nationalism at the time. The discussions about the parliamentary system aimed at strengthening and 
saving the empire, rather than people’s participation in politics or demanding more freedom.135 In 
this sense, Young Turks were introducing a new concept but were they using it in order to conserve 
the existing order. Here, an analogy can be made between Young Turks and the Kemalists, since 
the Kemalists introduced the republic but they employed it to strengthen their power and rule, 
rather than improving freedom and active participation in politics. In this respect, Kemalists were 
quite similar to late Ottomans, and there were striking similarities between mentality of late 
Ottomans and leaders of Turkish Republic. At least, the course they followed indicates that 
governing mentality of the Kemalists bear great resemblance with late Ottomans.
136
 
 
Kadro’s 22nd issue was devoted to the republic and republicanism due to the tenth anniversary of 
Turkish Republic. In this issue, Şevket Süreyya wrote that the biggest reform which ever took place 
in Turkey was foundation of the Turkish Republic. Without republic, there would not have been 
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enough ground to keep independence of Turkey.
137
 In the same issue, Kadro declared that Kadro’s 
primary duty was protecting the Turkish Republic and its reforms.
138
 
 
Although Kadro glorified the republic continuously as other Kemalists did, the journal preferred to 
use the word “inkılap” (reform) more often than “republic.” In the articles “inkılap” usually was 
used instead of “Turkish Republic.” This urged Ahmet Ağaoğlu to criticize Kadro for avoiding 
usage of the term “republic”, therefore for not giving enough importance to the republicanist arrow. 
His comments indicated that republican system might have not been very important to Kadro as a 
political system due to left-oriented ideas of its writers.
139
   
 
It seems intellectuals of Kadro interpreted the republican arrow as a complementary instrument in 
order to shape the country. Like rest of the Kemalists, the republic was the first step for Turks to 
become a proud and independent nation for them. Other than that, Kadro did not pay too much 
attention to the republican arrow and chose to focus on the anti-imperialist character of the 
independence struggle and continuation of the reforms. Although the regime was quite content with 
the republic and its gains, Kadro group warned that Turkey’s former exploitation was mostly based 
on economic reasons; therefore heading towards non-capitalist, non-liberal etatism policies was an 
urgent issue for the republic. Apparently, Kadro’s ideas that were inspired from leftist ideologies 
were not in conflict with the republican regime as the way Ağaoğlu criticized. Kadro’s main 
concern was not about republican system but the regime’s shortsightedness in the economic field.  
 
Kadro members shared anti-monarchist and anti-theocratic ideals of Kemalism. Like Mustafa 
Kemal or any other Kemalist at the time, they highlighted the differences between the Kemalist 
republic and the Ottoman Empire and consequently contributed to the efforts to create a constructed 
version of official history about Ottoman past. Similar to hardliner RPP deputy Recep Peker, who 
blamed Ottomans for discriminating Turkish elements in the empire,
140
 Şevket Süreyya blamed 
Ottoman period for its downgrading policies towards Turks. He claimed that the Ottoman palace 
always sided with Kurdish feudal powers in the Eastern provinces and deliberately discriminated 
Turkish people in that region in every possible way.
141
 According to Burhan Asaf, both theocracy 
and monarchy had a tendency to be used as a tool by the imperialist powers. The caliphate, for 
example, could have easily been used in order to control Muslims. Besides, basic principles of these 
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establishments were incompatible with codes of the modern world; therefore they were nothing but 
obstacles for modern society. Thus, abolition of those establishments was quite useful for the 
“Turkish inkılap.”142 
 
According to Vedat Nedim, “Europe is like tower of Babel. Everybody talks, argues, explains 
things according to their own values and philosophy; still nobody understands each other. Because 
those people are individualist and every single person is the captain of his/her own ship. I think 
today’s Germany is victim of French democracy, rather than the Versailles Treaty. People are lost 
and confused between numerous political parties and fractions there. The democracy has been 
abused by everybody, especially opportunist politicians like Hitler. He is against democracy but he 
owes his very existence to the chaos that was created by democracy. Without extreme tolerance of 
democratic system there would be no Hitler, who is symbol of the self-destructive nature of liberal-
capitalist system.”143 
 
Kadro was against parliamentary democracy and sided with one-party rule. According to the 
journal, democracy was part of the capitalist and liberal system, and it could be hazardous to 
Turkey’s system by triggering class conflicts. According to Kadro, democracy and the liberal 
system lost their credibility with the Great Depression. At that juncture, what Turkey needed was a 
state-controlled economy. Since a controlled economy needed a controlled political atmosphere, 
democracy should have been avoided.
144
  
 
As seen, the Kadro group often confirmed the authoritarian tendencies of the Kemalist regime. 
Apparently, Kadro’s ideological opposition against liberalism made it easy for them to justify 
authoritarian policies of the regime.  Although they had a tense relation with hardliners of RPP due 
to disagreements about etatist arrow,
145 
when it comes to strict policies, Kadro members did not 
seem to be in conflict with them. At this point, their ideas were quite similar to Recep Peker who 
stated that reforms often required the use of force due to resistance of the reactionary elements 
against new movements. According to Peker, taking rigorous steps and exercising strict policies 
was quite normal for Turkish reform in order to protect and establish itself.
146
 However those 
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policies did not deprive Turkish people of their freedom, because in Turkey every kind of freedom 
existed.
147
 
 
When elaborating their ideas about liberalism, Kadro writers often categorized concepts such as 
individualism, freedom and liberty as part of the liberal-capitalist thought. As a result, these 
concepts appeared in connection with those systems and they were subjected to negative comments 
in several articles.  By referring to these concepts mostly in connection with liberalism and by 
reducing them into technical terms, Kadro also tried to justify the strict regime of the single-party 
period.  Since the writers interpreted democracy and multi-party system as harmful outcomes of 
capitalism, they praised RPP’s single party system. They intentionally ignored its shortcomings and 
flaws, since they perceived it as a useful tool to implement state-led economy policies. Şevket 
Süreyya advocated the state’s domineering power over public sphere in many levels.148 Vedat 
Nedim claimed that state was the only and sole power and all the individuals were in fact “state’s 
material.”149 Burhan Asaf approved RPP’s domineering role in politics and he demanded even 
stricter control of the government over the press and the radio. According to him this was necessary 
to defend the state against its enemies and the best way to use the press for advantage of the 
government.
150
 Şevket Süreyya advised to use the radio in a controlled way as well.151 
 
Apparently, one-party rule and its strict style to create a solidaristic, well-orderly nation was quite 
convenient, particularly for non-liberal wing of the RPP and Kadro group in order to exercise their 
own top-down plans.  
 
Leadership was also an important component in Kemalism as it was in the countries like Italy and 
Germany. As Parla mentions, since authoritarian systems need leaders and chiefs, Kemalism was 
prepared to do this by cultivating myth of leadership of Atatürk in Turkey. This effort can easily be 
followed in Recep Peker’s ideas. According to Peker, “The leadership requires special qualities, 
since the Chief illuminates his party and his surroundings with his warmth and enthusiasm. He 
easily leads people to the purposes and goals that were shaped and justified by him. The chief of a 
nation is always the most advanced person in his society in every way, along with his superior 
moral values, willpower, courage and culture.
152
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It is possible to come across similar expressions about Mustafa Kemal and his role as a leader in 
Kadro. For example, Şevket Süreyya joined the Kemalist efforts to create a myth of leadership 
around Mustafa Kemal by referring to him as “the chief” and making comparisons between him and 
main figures of the Ergenekon legend of the Turkic people.
153
 In another article, he attributed 
special qualities to the leadership mission exactly like Recep Peker. According to Şevket Süreyya, 
in the final chapters of the world history, Mustafa Kemal was the only leader who had power and 
capacity of “making a nation” following a military victory. “The chief” appeared in history when 
political victory ended and reforms began. The chief always led the way with his wisdom. Due to 
his intuition and farsightedness, he was always one step further than the rest and he shaped the 
events and occurrences beforehand. He was the one who gathered all those special qualities in 
himself.”154  
 
Mustafa Kemal’s success in the War of Independence and his respectability can be taken into 
account as reasons for those praises. Still, it is difficult to overlook Kadro’s voluntary contributions 
to leadership myth of Mustafa Kemal.  
 
Here, it should be noted that authoritarianism was a common tendency in the world in the 1930’s. 
The Great Depression caused fear and instability and damaged the trust in liberalism and the 
democratic system. A climate of political and economic insecurity also set the stage for 
authoritarian-totalitarian regimes as it had happened in Germany and Italy. Soviet Union, on the 
other hand, already started new economic plans and implemented NEP by 1921and later a planned 
economy in order to strengthen industry. Under the leadership of Stalin, a strict political 
atmosphere was formed which was followed by political purges against opposition. Under those 
circumstances, countries like Soviet Union and Italy were seen as powerful countries which 
survived from the Great Depression without any apparent vital damage. As Zürcher mentions, in 
Turkey after the declaration of the Law on the Maintenance of Order in March 1925, the 
government was already an authoritarian one-party regime and at the party congress of 1931, 
Turkey’s political system was officially declared as a one-party state. Indeed, except for the Free 
Republican Party (Serbest Fırka) experiment in 1930, legal opposition to RPP was not possible until 
after the WWII.
155
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Relative stability and success of the regimes of Russia and Italy were appreciated by Kadro. This is 
also obvious in Yakup Kadri’s series of articles named “Ankara, Moskova, Roma”. In one of his 
articles, he wrote that Mussolini was like a foreman, rather than a dictator and owing to him, Italy 
worked like clockwork. After all, fascism was just a method for the state, a new model with new 
technologies. There was not trace of any political or philosophical ideology or doctrine in 
fascism.”156 
 
Due to their tolerance for authoritarian tendencies of the regime as well as their positive comments 
about the fascist regime of Italy, Kadro writers were heavily criticized by prominent leftist figures 
such as Şefik Hüsnü, the leader of the Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party,157 and poet 
Nazım Hikmet, who studied in KUTV along with Şevket Süreyya and Ismail Hüsrev in the early 
1920s.
158
 Because of constant criticism and in the face of the rising power of Hitler and Mussolini, 
Kadro had to defend and redefine its ideology.  Kadro members argued that the Kadro movement 
was aware of the dangers of fascism and its shortcomings. What Kadro was formulating was a 
unique solution for Turkey, not a fascist doctrine.
159
  
 
Kadro’s sympathy for strict regimes drew the attention of the liberal Ahmet Ağaoğlu to a great 
degree. He claimed that although Kadro writers denied supporting fascist ideas, their articles 
indicated the opposite. Indeed, they often advocated the methods that were implemented by the 
fascist regimes. Similar to fascists, Kadro also had a great devotion to “the state” and the writers 
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expressed their desire to give an unlimited power to state to rule over the whole nation. Besides, 
their definition of state was quite vague. However, the nation should not have been categorized 
under the state as a passive power. The nation was above state, since the state was supposed to 
work in favor of the nation, not as an organ for its own good. Ağaoğlu also criticized Kadro for its 
forgetfulness about importance of political position of the people, since the people were always 
described by Kadro as a passive group, which was obliged to obey orders regardless of their 
individual choices.
160
 In this way, Kadro reduced the people’s role into a passive input in socio-
economic matters. According to him, in Kadro’s language “the people” often disappears and the 
ambiguous nature of state takes its place as the sole executive power without question.
161
 
 
Despite the Kemalist rhetoric, the republican regime was hardly a “governance of people by 
people”, especially after 1925. In this sense, Kemalists were following their Ottoman forefathers’ 
governing mentality.  
 
Apparently, except for the occasions that they romanticized the people as an abstract idea, Kadro’s 
ideology carried Kemalist understandings of republicanism which lacked democracy and freedom, 
despite its modernizing features. Kadro members were, in fact, content with the Kemalist 
governance which, according to Parla, blurred the classical republicanist distinction between “the 
state” and “the political party”; glorified the state and the leader rather than the people.162 Kadro 
members did not seem to be interested in a fundamental alteration in existing mentality of power 
relations or governing. The journal’s main concern was not lack of freedom or lack of people’s 
participation to politics but lack of power to influence political machinery to implement Kadro’s 
own plans by using the top-down structure of single-party system. Consequently, they tried to 
justify those policies in several occasions. The existence of economically powerful totalitarian 
states like Italy and Russia made it easy for Kadro to approve of the strict regime of Turkey.  
 
 
1.4 Etatism 
Etatism was perceived by the Kemalists as the economic wing of nationalist policy, and it was 
designated to raise Turkey rapidly to the level of modern civilization.
163
 It was the final arrow 
introduced by the Kemalists as well as the first to be eroded after 1947.  
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Etatism became part of the Kemalist economic program in 1931 in response to deteriorating 
conditions for capital accumulation in the late 1920s.
164
 Although its meaning was never clearly 
defined,
165
 the role and meaning of etatism provoked a lot of discussion within RPP and among 
intellectuals of the time, especially between the third (1931) and the fourth (1935) RPP 
congresses.
166
 
 
As Dumont states, in the Kemalist republic etatism refers to a strategy of state intervention in all 
social, economic, cultural and educational activities; and, in a more limited sense, it indicates a 
specific economy policy. Like its predecessor, the Kemalist state was the supreme authority for all 
important initiatives and decisions.  When etatism appeared in the early 1930s, Turkey had already 
had a long history of state intervention in economic affairs, starting from the mid-nineteenth 
century. Although the Young Turks favored the idea of liberal economics for a while, CUP 
displayed more interventionist tendencies and tried to have an active role in stimulating the 
economy from 1912. In this sense, although the republican government tended to present its 
economic policy of the 1930s as a new departure, Kemalist etatism was in fact extension of 
previous experiments and discussions which began during the last decades of the nineteenth 
century.
167
 
 
As Zürcher explains, in the early 1930s, like many governments around the world, the Turkish 
government was not sure what to do about the crisis. Consequently, the years from 1929 to 1932 
became a period of searching. Even the debate between the RPP and the opposition party FRP (Free 
Republican Party) was mostly about economic policy. While FRP advocated liberalism, RPP under 
the leadership of Ismet Inönü demanded a greater role for the state in economy.
168
 In the end, in 
accordance with its general tendency, the state acquired greater responsibilities in the management 
of the industry and control over the economy.
169
  
 
Kadro group was formed in 1931 by a group of intellectuals when the regime was seeking new 
solutions for the economy. They came together in the Hakimiyet-i Milliye newspaper, which was 
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established by Mustafa Kemal in 1920. When these writers volunteered to solve existing economic 
problems, Mustafa Kemal gave permission for the publishing of a journal. The journal owed its 
existence to the Kemalist regime’s need to achieve new strategies. When the journal’s publication 
started in January 1932, its main focus was on economy. In this sense, etatism can be taken as the 
most important Kemalist arrow for the Kadro journal. This fact can be observed even in the first 
issue, since six of the twelve articles were directly about etatism and state’s crucial role in 
economy.  
 
According to Ismail Hüsrev, as an underdeveloped country, the main issues for Turkey were rapid 
industrialization and accumulation of capital. Turkey’s economy still depended on the rules of 
liberal economy, which as an exploitive system hindered the achievement of a self-sufficient 
economy in Turkey. In order to strengthen the economy, cutting relations with the liberal economy 
and capitalism was crucial for Turkey. At this point, Kadro advocated, what the writers called, 
“nationalist etatism.”170  
 
Vedat Nedim argued that the principles of nationalist etatism aimed at protecting nationalist 
interests against foreign powers, and ending Turkey’s economic dependence to them. Etatism was 
going to create a national economy, which, in turn, would function as a benefit to the whole nation. 
Indeed, if the implementation of an etatist program would be realized, 
.
the disadvantages caused by 
the Great Depression could have been turned into Turkey’s advantage.171 According to Şevket 
Süreyya and Burhan Asaf, the new era was going to witness wars of national independence, and 
was going to be an age of the new autarkic-national states.
172
 Since Turkey was a unique example 
for rising anti-imperialist independence movements, its solution for economic independence should 
have been original as well. This solution was often named as “nationalist economy”, “nationalist 
etatism” or “independent nation economy” (müstakil millet iktisadiyatı) by the journal. 
 
As Türkeş points out, nationalist etatism was perceived by Kadro’s writers as an alternative to both 
capitalism and communism. As often explained by Ismail Hüsrev and Vedat Nedim, there were 
three types of etatism: The first was one “fiscal etatism” in which the state had a direct role in 
economy for earning income for the state budget. This was usually seen in liberal economies like 
Turkey. Here, the main aim was maintaining the capitalist system. The second option was “socialist 
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etatism” in which the state assumed the main role in order to establish a socialist order on behalf of 
a specific class. The aim of this system was using the capitalist system in favor of a socialist order. 
The final and the third way was “nationalist etatism” in which the state could act on behalf of the 
whole nation.
173
 According to Kadro, this alternative and “original” system required the 
establishment of a nationalist economic plan in order to break away from the capitalist and socialist 
systems with the aim of forming an independent economy.
174
  
 
Kadro members continuously wrote about the crucial importance of a state-led economy and its 
possible benefits. Although expressed implicitly, they criticized some of the Kemalists who had 
liberal tendencies and did not support Kadro. Şevket Süreyya was probably aware of the similarities 
between the national economy program of CUP around WWI and Kemalist etatist plans in the 
republican era.
175
 He warned the regime to be more considerate about economic issues by 
reminding the failures of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and devastating effects of 
their shallow understanding of economy. According to him, the people who ruled Turkey after 1908 
only had ideals. They attributed too much meaning to politics and they ignored the real needs of the 
country such as the technical development of the economy. Instead of following the latest industrial 
and scientific developments firsthand, they hired foreigners to do that for them. Therefore, the new 
Turkey should not have forgotten that the fiasco of CUP was connected to its failures in 
economy.
176
  
 
Kadro advocated practices to gradually change society in order to apply top-down etatist plans. 
Compared to the milder interpretation of etatism by Mustafa Kemal, who tended to perceive etatism 
as a mere tool rather than an ideal, Kadro’s interpretation seemed to be more specific and stricter. In 
this sense, the journal’s view was closer to Ismet Inönü, who supported Kadro’s ideas about etatism 
as well as its discussions about land reform projects more than Mustafa Kemal. 
 
Despite Kadro’s strict ideas about etatism, the journal did not oppose private enterprise. As Türkeş 
has discussed extensively, Kadro believed private enterprises should have been allowed as long as 
their activity did not influence the decision-making process of the state apparatus. The state 
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enterprises should have occupied leading positions. The revenue acquired via state-led enterprises 
should have been invested in industrial projects by the state.
 177
   
 
Kadro also proposed a partial land reform project in order to abolish strong feudal structures in the 
Eastern provinces. As Türkeş also discusses in detail178, the writers believed that the effects of big 
landownership were quite pervasive in the Eastern provinces.
179
 Big landowners had a great deal of 
power not only on local populations but also within politics due to their strong connections. In this 
sense, Eastern provinces required extensive reform projects, which could start with the state’s 
intervention in the economy and gradually evolve into other areas.
180
 A land distribution project in 
the Eastern regions in favor of small-scale farmers and landless peasants could have been beneficial 
to decrease the influence of the big landowners.
181
 As Türkeş emphasizes, Kadro linked this issue to 
Kurdish upheavals and claimed that land distribution projects would have helped to ease the 
situation in the East. In this way, the peasants who owned their private land would not have 
depended on big Kurdish landowners and they would have sided with the regime.
182
  
 
Although Kadro’s above-mentioned ideas did not convince the regime about a land reform project 
in the 1930s, Ismet Inönü did a partial land re-distribution in 1945. Kadro’s ideas may have affected 
the implementation of 1945’s land reform by Inönü, since, as an early Kemalist group to defend a 
land distribution project, Kadro devoted several articles to this matter and brought about new 
insights in the 1930s. 
 
Apart from their suggestion for a partial land reform, Kadro writers did not suggest changing the 
power relations fundamentally on property. In this sense, they were not very different than Mustafa 
Kemal and the rest of the Kemalists, who did not attempt to change existing property relations 
either. This also shows Kadro members’ devotion to Kemalism, because although they tried to 
insert left-oriented concepts into Kemalist ideology, they did not intend to shift core ideas of 
Kemalism fundamentally. 
 
                                                 
177 “A Patriotic Leftist Development Strategy Proposal in Turkey in the 1930s: The Case of the Kadro Movement”, 
Türkeş, 2001, p. 100   
178 Ibid., p. 104-106 
179 “Şark Vilayetlerinde Derebeylik I,” Ismail Hüsrev, Kadro, issue 11, p. 28, November 1932 
180 “Türkiye Köy Iktisadiyatında Borçlanma Şekilleri,” Ismail Hüsrev, Kadro, issue 3, p. 34, March 1932; “Dersim ve 
Derebeyi,”  Şevket Süreyya, p. 44, June 1932 
181 “Dersim ve Derebeyi”,  Şevket Süreyya, p. 44, June 1932 
182 Ibid., p.44; Kadro Hareketi: Ulusçu Bir Sol Akım, Türkeş, 1999, p. 192 
 57 
Being consistent with their understanding of society, Kadro’s writers considered etatism as a 
regulatory power to organize society. According to Vedat Nedim, economic and industrial 
developments were going to change society gradually. With a well-planned, rapidly growing 
economy, Turkey was going to achieve a society free of class struggles. In this sense, etatism was 
not only an economic project but also a precaution against the formation of social classes.
183
 After 
all, in Turkey the main role and objective of the state was leading an indivisible united nation, not 
the representation of different social classes.
 184
  
 
Nevertheless, there are a few major differences between Kadro and some of the Kemalists within 
RPP, regarding etatism. These differences were probably caused by the left-oriented ideological 
background of Kadro writers. 
 
The first problematic issue about the etatism was whether etatism was an ideal or a mere tool for 
developing the economy. There were already different opinions on the possible duration of the 
etatist policies within the Kemalist group. Many considered it as a tool, rather than an ideal. For the 
groups with liberal tendencies, such as Iş Bank Group led by Celal Bayar, etatism was a temporary 
solution. However, Ismet Inönü perceived it as a useful method which could work for a longer 
period. At this point, Kadro tried to gain full support of Ismet Inönü, who wrote an article on 
etatism in the Kadro journal in which he defended his view of etatism and implicitly drew attention 
to possible negative outcomes of anti-etatist views from Iş Bank Group.185  
 
The journal differed from the Iş Bank Group, who perceived etatism as a temporary solution, by 
putting etatism in the center of their ideology. According to Vedat Nedim, the etatist arrow was not 
a temporary concept; therefore the RPP had to adopt etatist principles as much as it adopted 
republican, nationalist, populist, laicist and reformist principals.
186
 In this way, Kadro was forcing 
its interpretation of etatism to the high cadres of the RPP to be accepted. Due to the journal’s 
constant focus on etatism, its members were accused of trying to influence the regime’s economy 
policies by their communist ideas. On the other hand, liberals such as Ağaoğlu complained about 
Kadro’s desire for strict control of the state and pointed out Kadro’s tolerance for authoritarianism 
and fascism.  
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Kadro perceived etatism as a necessity for sustaining reform projects, which started in the late 
Ottoman period and intensified with the foundation of the republic. The writers were aware of the 
fact that the speed of reform projects was slowing down. According to them, the formation of a 
nationalist-etatist program and connecting Kemalism to anti-imperialist and anti-colonial 
movements of the underdeveloped countries of the East could prevent the decreasing speed of 
reforms. They believed that this connection would have brought back the revolutionary spirit of the 
national liberation and would have helped Turkey to secure its economic independence. However, 
the Kemalist regime was clearly reluctant to share Kadro’s enthusiasm on “continuous” reform 
projects, particularly within an anti-imperialist context. Even Ismet Inönü, who took Kadro’s etatist 
plans seriously, did not seem to have much interest for the journal’s efforts within an anti-
imperialist and anti-capitalist framework. After all, Kemalists did not intend to break their relations 
with capitalism but come to an agreement for working with foreign capital and investments.
187
 
 
As Ahmet Insel points out, the increasing effect of anti-imperialist and anti-colonial movements of 
the 1930s should be taken into account when the etatism policies of the 1930s are discussed, since 
in most of cases, the proponents of etatism attached these features to their etatism definitions.
188
 
Although Kadro was a vanguard rather than a follower of this subject, it seems the journal exhibited 
what Insel mentioned. The leftist background of the Kadro members and the powerful effect of the 
anti-imperialist discourse of Leninism in their early years could be understood as important 
contributions to this end.  
 
Kadro was impressed by the countries with strong economies such as Soviet Union, Italy and 
Germany, which dealt with the Great Depression seemingly well, at least in the beginning of 1930s. 
However, it was difficult for Kadro to support  the political regimes of Italy and Germany due to 
their fascist ideologies. Besides, Kadro opposed capitalism as an exploitive system and blamed it 
for the backwardness of underdeveloped countries. At this point, Kadro’s writers displayed a 
special interest for the Soviet style of development, although the journal disapproved of socialism 
and communism explicitly. They often emphasized possibilities of the Soviet style economy in 
order to build an independent, anti-imperialist economy. 
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Like Kadro, Mustafa Kemal also claimed to achieve a third way in the economy, as an alternative to 
socialism and capitalism. His discourse carried anti-liberal concepts of the 1930s but, in fact, he did 
not object to capitalism directly, except for some of his utterances during the War of Independence 
when Turkey needed support from the Soviets. At this point, as Parla emphasizes, Mustafa Kemal’s 
attitude towards capitalism seems consistent with the ideas of Ziya Gökalp, the ideological 
forefather of the Kemalists. Gökalp claimed to oppose both the socialist and capitalist systems, 
although his arguments were not completely directed against a capitalist economy since he was 
advocating for a solidarist-capitalist model at the same time. Therefore, what Gökalp really opposed 
was not capitalism as a whole, but the liberal version of it.
189
 Kemalists rejected corporatism, 
mainly due to its association with fascism. Nonetheless, they never rejected the solidarist form of 
capitalism, because they did not intend to break away from the capitalist system. They often applied 
a mixed economy, especially in the 1920s. In this way, they often used a solidarist-corporatist 
rhetoric which criticized liberal and socialist systems, but they opted for staying within the borders 
of a capitalist economy.
 190
 
191
  
 
Although Kadro members insisted that Turkey should not follow a capitalist route, they were 
probably aware that the Kemalist etatism of the 1930s was anti-liberal and anti-socialist, but not 
anti-capitalist. Under those circumstances, they tried to convince the Kemalist regime to implement 
Kadro’s ideas about etatism which had a broader extent than what Mustafa Kemal intended.  
 
Another problematic area for Kadro was the originality of their “nationalist etatism” program. The 
journal was devoted to etatism but the writers were never able to clarify the reason why their 
version of etatism was an alternative third-way to both capitalism and socialism. This point did 
attract the attention of Kadro’s opponents who were already annoyed with the journal’s 
interpretations. As a result, the journal was criticized of being communist, fascist, neo-fascist, 
nationalist-communist, national-socialist, social-fascist and neo-Hitlerist publication.
192
 
 
Kadro members defended their interpretation of etatism by explaining some of its key concepts. 
According to them, the journal’s version had a patriotic motive, not a communist one. The writers 
                                                 
189 Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm  ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm, Parla, 2009, p. 206 
190 Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek Parti Ideolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku, Parla, 1992, p. 
44 
191 At this point it should be noted that Kemalist economic program had been highly state-oriented, even before the 
declaration of etatism as a formal strategy. For further information: Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey:  Progress 
or Order, Parla & Davison, 2004, p. 125 
192 “Fikir Hareketleri Arasında Türk Nasyonalizmi I: Faşizm”, Şevket Süreyya, Kadro, issue 18, p. 5, June 1933; Bir 
Cumhuriyet Oyküsü: Kadro ve Kadrocuları Anlamak”, Tekeli & İlkin, 2003, p.154-157 
 60 
demanded a realization of economic planning, which they believed would be successful in Turkey 
as it had succeeded in Russia. They also insisted that the concept of a “five-year economic plan” 
and “state-led economy” did not necessarily belong to a socialist economy. In order to make their 
point, the writers tried to prove that five-year economic plans were not communist but rather 
capitalist methods in essence, therefore, they did not pose a threat to Turkey. According to Vedat 
Nedim, Russia started a communist revolution in 1917, on the basis of Karl Marx’s ideas. However, 
Russia broke off from the ideals of Karl Marx when five-year programs were implemented. In spite 
of Russia’s claims of communism, what was applied in Russia was a populist program in a broad 
sense, due to the central role of “state entrepreneurship” in those programs. Whether “state 
entrepreneurship” was applied deliberately or not, Russia was changing its system and breaking 
away from the socialist regime.
193
 
 
An interesting point here was Vedat Nedim’s choice of words. While he explained his ideas on this 
matter, he preferred to use the term “state entrepreneurship” instead of “state-capitalism”. However, 
the capitalist character of early five-year plans was quite obvious in Russia. Lenin considered state 
capitalism as a temporary solution until the state acquired enough revenue via state-led 
enterprises.
194
 However, in order to be consistent with Kadro’s pragmatic plans and also with the 
need for convincing his readers, Vedat Nedim ignored this, and he called Russia’s implementations 
a “populist program.” Otherwise, he would have contradicted with what Kadro was advocating: an 
alternative economic system, free from socialism and capitalism. 
 
Regarding capitalism, the attitude of other Kadro members was similar to Vedat Nedim. Instead of 
“capitalism”, they - especially Şevket Süreyya - used “autarky”, which meant a self-sufficient 
economy by Kadro’s definition. However, when leftists such as Şefik Hüsnü and liberal Ağaoğlu 
blamed Kadro for adopting a fascist ideology by pointing out the association between corporatism, 
fascism, and autarky, the journal had to abandon this term. In fact, what Kadro was proposing with 
“autarky” was a nationalist economic program for Turkey, which was already following a 
solidarist-capitalist route. 
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As Boratav points out, etatism is not an independent system on its own but an economic policy 
within the capitalist system.
195
 Accordingly, Parla emphasizes that between the two world wars, 
almost all of the third way (“tertium genus”) projects were in fact either a solidarist-corporatism or 
fascist-corporatism, despite their claim to be an alternative to both socialism and capitalism. They 
were, in fact, subgenres of corporatism; therefore they could be placed within a capitalist system.
196
  
 
It seems that Kadro’s etatist interpretations fit Parla’s and Karpat’s descriptions. Besides, the 
abovementioned discussions reveal Kadro’s dilemma with the nature of their etatism. In spite of 
their claims of uniqueness, the writers, in fact, were not advocating an alternative system to 
capitalism. The “third-way solution” of Kadro was still within the limits of a capitalist economy. 
When Kadro attempted to convince its audience about a planned economy and the state’s dominant 
role in it, the journal implicitly confessed what it proposed was a method within capitalism.  
 
Being the target of their ex-comrades, as well as liberals such as Celal Bayar, Mahmut Soydan from 
the Iş Bank Group and hardliner RPP politicians such as Recep Peker all at the same time, while 
trying to be careful not to offend leaders of the regime must have been a difficult position for Kadro 
members. It seems, due to the delicacy of the circumstances as well as the complexity of their 
ideology, they sometimes struggled to verify some of their claims, as it seen in the issue about the 
nature of their etatist plans.   
 
Despite introducing some of leftist concepts to Kemalism, their ideological similarities with other 
Kemalists as well as with Ziya Gökalp should not be underestimated. Similar to the main figures of 
the RPP, Kadro members were anti-liberal and anti-socialist in the 1930s. Although the journal was 
inspired by Marxist ideas to a great degree, it was openly against Marxism. Besides, as Türkeş 
points out, Kadro rejected corporatism due to its clear association with fascist Italy but by not 
writing about solidarism, they did not reject it categorically.
197
  
 
The main difference in Kadro’s etatist interpretation was its efforts for attributing anti-imperialist 
features to the Kemalist-type etatism, in order to connect Turkey to anti-colonial independence 
movements. The regime was not interested in such objective, in fact, nor as Kadro’s persistent 
insistence on putting the etatist arrow in the center of the Kemalist ideology. Indeed, by explicitly 
being against capitalist development, Kadro brought a new interpretation to Kemalism, particularly 
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to Kemalist etatism. In this way, the journal set a different example from the intellectual tradition of 
CUP and Kemalists cadres. 
 
Here it should not be forgotten that Kadro’s etatism was not limited to the field of economy. It had 
a broader spectrum compared to Mustafa Kemal’s interpretations. Kadro wanted to give more space 
for the state’s intervention in economy and even in society. At this point, Kadro seems to be in line 
with Ismet Inönü and Recep Peker, who also gave a great deal of space to a state organism above 
everything else. This also becomes evident in similar utterances of Recep Peker and Şevket Süreyya 
who expressed similar things about state’s upper hand over the society.  
 
Peker was against Kadro’s attempts to join discussions about Kemalism and the economy, since he 
thought that this issue should have been handled within the RPP strictly.
198
 Still, he shared similar 
tendencies with Kadro members when it came to strict policies and state’s role in economy and 
society.  
 
As mentioned before, Kadro placed the state above all classes to operate as an unbiased and 
objective institution in the hands of an intellectual cadre. Ağaoğlu published a book called “Devlet 
ve Fert” (State and the Individual), which was a collection of his articles in Cumhuriyet newspaper, 
in order to criticize these issues in detail. In the 1960s, the leftist thinker Hikmet Kıvılcımlı blamed 
Kadro for misleading young generations by presenting capitalism as if it was a novel and unique 
model. According to Kıvılcımlı, Kadro’s writers created this confusion intentionally to meet their 
ends. However, the confusion that Kadro caused proved to be a persistent one, since it became a 
blueprint for many, like Yön, and it turned out to be an obstacle for the people who wanted to 
achieve something within a socialist context.
199
 
 
Regardless, etatism became the most important Kemalist arrow for the journal, since it was the 
main reason for Kadro’s existence as well as the main culprit for its closing down. By 1932 the 
tension between Celal Bayar and Ismet Inönü about etatism resulted in favor of Bayar, since 
Mustafa Kemal appointed Bayar as the minister of economic affairs in Inönü’s cabinet.200 This 
meant a relative isolation period for Inönü. During this period, Kadro’s views maintained criticism 
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from Bayar’s side. As it was mentioned before, Inönü also had its share from criticism due to his 
support for Kadro. These tensions, as well as the slightly changing hand of power over the economy 
caused Kadro to cease its publication. However, Kadro writers, especially Şevket Süreyya and 
Ismail Hüsrev, continued to work on etatism, mainly with their contribution to the Five-Year Plans. 
 
 
1.5 Reformism 
Reformist arrow is one of the main tenets of Kemalism and often refers to extensive reform projects 
that were undertaken by the Kemalists, who claimed to reshape Turkey by replacing traditional 
mentality and institutions of the Ottoman period with modern ideas and institutions. 
 
As Dumont emphasizes, Kemalists’ conception of “inkılap” was not peculiar to the republicans. 
Tanzimat men, Young Turks and Unionists had pursued the same aim: to change the society by 
scientific means and to apply methods that had proved quite effective in the West. In this sense, 
reformism already started by Ottoman sultans and the process accelerated after the Young Turk 
Revolution. As a result, Mustafa Kemal’s “inkılap” was an extension of a reformist movement 
whose first manifestations had appeared almost in the beginning of the nineteenth century.
201
 
 
As Zürcher mentions, the correct interpretation of the term “inkılapçılık” has been a matter of 
debate in Turkey for a long time. What Mustafa Kemal and his followers meant when they used this 
term was “reformism”, rather than revolution. Although the French Revolution was an inspiring 
event for Kemalists as it was for the Young Turks, they were not revolutionists.
 
They carefully 
avoided using the term “ihtilâl” (revolution), when they mentioned the changes they made in 
Turkey.
202
 In 1935, Kemalists changed the term from “reformism” (inkılâpçılık) to “revolutionism” 
(devrimcilik), but they still meant reformism with this term. In general, what Kemalists meant with 
“inkılap” or “devrim” was series of reforms which aimed at transformation of society by radical 
measures. 
 
Similar to the regime’s rhetoric, Kadro made it clear what it had proposed with the reformist arrow 
was not revolution but reformism too. Nevertheless, Kadro’s interpretation of reform seemed more 
dynamic than Mustafa Kemal as well as some of the hardliners of RPP such as Recep Peker’s 
views.  
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Kadro’s descriptions of events about War of Independence carried implications that the writers 
interpreted it as revolution of Turkish nation. However, the writers were quite careful about 
terminology they used, since their usage of certain terms and concepts, such “ihtilâl”, could easily 
be perceived as trace of communism in their ideology. Consequently, they preferred the words 
“reform”, “transformation”, and “change” in their descriptions.   
 
Here it should be noted that, Şevket Süreyya’s book, “Inkılap ve Kadro”, which was published just 
before the Kadro journal, was used as a referral point by the Kadro writers regarding their 
interpretation about reformist arrow. For example Burhan Asaf mentioned “Inkılap ve Kadro” in 
one of his articles and suggested this book to his readers who wanted to understand Kadro’s 
interpretations of reformism in general.
203
  
 
Parallel to official history, Kadro also referred to the transition from Ottoman Empire to Turkish 
Republic as a fundamental change, and stressed the uniqueness of the “Turkish reformation”. 
Indeed, it stressed the foundation of the republic was a ground-breaking incident and it was peculiar 
to Turkey. It severed the century’s old ties to its Ottoman past.204  
 
As known, Kemalist ideology pictured Mustafa Kemal and his followers as the sole legitimate 
power to bring reforms to the country. Kemalist discourse often ignored the contributions of 
reformism projects during the late Ottoman period, prior to the Kemalist rule.
205
 In accordance with 
that, Kadro’s writers also preferred to ignore contributions of former rulers of Turkey to the 
reforms. The foundation of the republic was described as a drastic break from the Ottoman past 
which changed everything by introducing totally new and modern concepts.
206
 Kadro often 
compared the Kemalist Republic and Ottoman Empire (including CUP period) and emphasized the 
superiority of Kemalist rule.
207
 Almost thirty years later than Kadro, Şevket Süreyya did similar 
comparisons in his articles he wrote for the Yön journal.
208
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Nevertheless, as mentioned by Zürcher, Kemalists had quite common points with late Ottoman 
reformers. For example, the Young Turk generation was influenced by positivism via Gustave 
LeBon’s ideas on the psychology of the masses. As a result, the possibility of upheavals by the 
people who were not led by intellectual elites was a deep-rooted fear among them. Kemalists 
carried the same features and always preferred an orderly transformation from above, and strictly 
suppressed upheavals from below. Kemalists never questioned the rights of the ruling elite to 
govern or landowners to own the land.
209
 
 
Accordingly, Kadro’s writers favored reformism to be realized under the strict control of the state 
and to be shaped by a group of ruling elite as well. In other words, Kadro preferred a reform 
process in order. The journal expressed its dislike towards spontaneous movements from below, 
especially about Kurdish upheavals. This can be taken as a strong indication of Kadro members’ 
distance towards revolutionary ideas, at least in the 1930s. According to Şevket Süreyya, 
enthusiasm for reformism should have been subjected to conscious decisions, not to anarchism or 
alleged revolutionary upheavals which doomed to fail. A “real” reformation would never have 
occurred in the streets spontaneously. The best thing to do was to create it “in order” with the help 
of intellectuals and the discipline of their collective spirit.
210
 Thus, it can be said that although they 
favored extensive reform projects, Kadro still preferred to preserve the existing order, rather than 
changing it fundamentally. 
 
It seems, except for economic issues, Kadro writers were not in irreconcilable conflict with other 
Kemalists about the reform projects that were undertaken until 1930s. The writers often praised the 
success of reform projects and Kemalist attempts to change the society and customs via state, 
schools and several other establishments.
211
 Kadro perceived Kemalist reforms as an outcome of the 
modernizing power of Kemalist ideology. In this sense, Kadro seems to apply rules of historical 
determinism to their interpretation of reformism, since according to Şevket Süreyya, transformation 
was a necessary step in the nature of development.
212
  
 
Apparently, Kadro’s writers were sincerely convinced about the necessity of Kemalist reforms and 
the way these reforms were implemented.
213
 They took their conviction so seriously that sometimes 
they criticized the people who failed to come into terms with the reforms and even accused them 
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with treachery. According to the very first article of Kadro, it was the right and duty of the republic 
to rule over the will of people who did not support the reform projects. Those who did not 
appreciate new reforms had to comply with the whole body of the nation who acknowledged and 
supported these reforms.
214
 Şevket Süreyya claimed that those who did not understand the reforms 
should not have had the luxury of staying behind. They had to be forced to understand them.
215
 As 
stated by Burhan Asaf, according to Turkish reformism, until the independence and freedom of the 
whole nation were secured in every possible way, what mattered most for the citizens was their 
“duty”, not their “rights”.216  
 
In alignment with rest of the Kemalists, Kadro employed a discourse which praised religious-like 
devotion towards the six arrows of RPP and created an image as if those principles were part of a 
holy truth.
217
 According to Şevket Süreyya, enthusiasm for reformism should have been turned into 
a religious-like devotion.
218
  
 
Kadro’s writers aimed to bring new ideas and projects to awaken the dynamic spirit during the War 
of Independence. Kadro’s attempt to bring dynamism to reformism was connected to their 
interpretation of economy. According to Kadro, reform projects often lacked insight in economy,
219
 
therefore putting all the other reforms at risk. Turkey’s knowledge in economy was always rooted 
in liberal channels of Europe. If Turkey would have kept its relation with liberal economy close, 
Turkish nation was going to continue to be slave of liberalism.
220
 Only way to create a free country 
was making new reforms in economy. Therefore, in order to believe in Turkish inkılap, one had to 
believe in the constructive power of the state in the area of the economy first.
221
  
 
As seen here, Kadro saw etatism as the main part of the reform projects and gave a leading role 
above everything else.  
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Still, Kadro’s strong emphasis on the economy was not the only issue that Kadro caused 
disagreements. The journal caused debates within Kemalist ideology by advocating a different 
approach regarding “direction” and “continuity” of reforms as well.  
 
Kemalist reformism was inspired by European-based ideologies. Kemalist discourse usually 
emphasized breaking off with Ottoman mentality and reaching European norms for modernity and 
progress. Contrary to this view, Kadro claimed that Europe had nothing to offer Turkey anymore, 
especially after the Great Depression. In fact Mustafa Kemal and many other Kemalists were also 
aware of this fact, but unlike them, the Kadro group carried strong anti-Western sentiments. Burhan 
Asaf wrote that “modern European culture” was not the outcome of European countries solely, 
because this culture was built on at the expense of exploitation, stolen labor and richness of 
underdeveloped countries.
222
 According to Şevket Süreyya, the fate of Europe and Western culture 
was not going to determine the fate of the world anymore.
223
  Yakup Kadri drew attention to the 
declining power of European culture and warned intellectuals in Turkey to change their route 
before it was too late.
224
 According to Hakkı Mahir, Turkey should have stayed away from the 
establishments and norms that faltered the West. Turkey should have avoided copying Europe for 
its modernity and development.
225
 
 
Here it should be noted that, although Kadro declared that the journal was against Western norms as 
well as Western-oriented economic models, Kadro’s opposition towards the West seems to focus on 
economy, rather than Western culture. This also explains Kadro’s devotion to Kemalism without 
any crucial problems, although the Kemalist model was heavily inspired by Western culture.  
 
In parallel to their anti-Western sentiments, Kadro members categorized socialism and Marxism as 
European originated ideologies and rejected them along with capitalism and liberalism. Kadro’s 
analyses were often quite systematic. Vedat Nedim’s description of the “West” explicitly included 
Soviet Union, since it was a follower of socialist ideology that based on European-rooted Marxism. 
According to him, Turkey should not follow examples of Soviet Union or any European country; 
because Turkey’s conditions were not suitable for formation of a bourgeoisie state or a proletarian 
dictatorship. Capitalism, fascism, socialism all belonged to Europe, which enslaved the other half of 
the world in one way or another. The emancipation of humankind might have only occurred 
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through the national liberation wars of the exploited countries. Thus, Turkey only should have lent 
technologies from Europe and its ideas should have stayed native.
226
 Although it was not an easy 
task, Turkey should have created its own ideology which should have originated from Anatolia.
227
  
 
As seen, some of the arguments of Kadro resembled Ziya Gökalp’s ideas, regarding the journal’s 
desire for Turkey taking Europe’s technique solely while forming a native ideology. Here, it should 
be noted that Ziya Gökalp’s ideas about this matter might have been influenced by Marxist critiques 
of liberalism, which influenced the anti-liberal discourse of corporatist-solidarist ideas of Europe. 
Gökalp might have adopted them via solidarism, which borrowed some of its anti-liberal rhetoric 
from Marxism. At this point, both Kadro and Gökalp might have built their ideas on similar anti-
liberal arguments of Marxism. 
 
Kadro writers were usually quite implicit in their criticisms towards the regime. Still, questioning 
Europe as a role model can be taken as a strong criticism towards leading Kemalists, who were 
inspired by European models. At this point, Kadro’s writers must have taken advantage of the 
relatively anti-liberal climate of the world to express their ideas. Although they were part of the 
single-party regime and they were providing ideological support to justify its existence at many 
levels, compared to many of the Kemalists and to intellectuals of the 1930s in Turkey, Kadro 
writers had original ideas. They were capable enough to articulate influential ideas about 
development and reformation, alternative to European-oriented views. The difference between 
Kadro writers and more traditional elites of their time was probably Kadro members’ education and 
broader horizon due to variety of their inspirational sources in Arabic, French, Russian, German, 
and English. This must have helped them to follow events from original sources and to be quick to 
respond to new developments. Besides, they had variety of connections, a ceaseless enthusiasm and 
ability to think systematically and comprehensively due to their extensive knowledge.  
 
In addition to sources and objectives of the reforms, continuity of the reform projects was another 
important disagreement point for Kadro with some Kemalists including Mustafa Kemal himself, as 
well as deputies Recep Peker or Necip Ali. This was such an important matter for Kadro that the 
journal’s first sentence was “There has been a reform project in Turkey and this has not ended 
yet.”228  
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Along with other Kadro members, Şevket Süreyya always referred to the Turkish revolution as a 
continuous process. According to him, Turkish inkılap was just a beginning rather than an end.229 
He saw it as the beginning of a new era, in which national struggle of the underdeveloped world 
was going to take the stage. Since this new kind of revolution was spreading throughout the world, 
Turkey must have been in touch with liberation struggle of underdeveloped countries. In this sense, 
revolution was definitely not ended in Turkey.
230
 Countless articles were devoted to this subject, 
especially in the early issues. Kadro did not forget to use Mustafa Kemal’s own words, “Our 
revolution continues”, to make him remember this fact.  
 
Contrary to what Kadro believed, Mustafa Kemal, along with main figures of the RPP, was 
reluctant for continuous and extensive reform projects in the way Kadro envisioned. For the 
Kemalist regime, the Turkish revolution succeeded from its war of national liberation by achieving 
nation-state status. There was no urgent need for solidarity with the liberation movements of other 
underdeveloped countries who engaged in similar activities. The Kemalist regime’s choice was for 
the West, rather than the East. Besides, the regime was careful about not being seen as irredentist or 
expansionist.
231
 However, Kadro interpreted this as a weariness of the regime and founding cadres. 
According to Şevket Süreyya, what the Turkish revolution needed was enthusiasm and dynamism; 
pessimism was unforgivable.
232
 The weariness about change was an indication of national 
psychosis that should have been immediately cured.
233
  
 
As seen, Kadro was devoted to Kemalist reformism and reflected as modernist but at the same time 
it held conservative features. However, the link between reformism and etatism was emphasized by 
Kadro group much stronger than the Mustafa Kemal did. However, especially by insisting to 
engage Turkey with the countries that were fighting for their freedom, Kadro brought a new anti-
imperialist interpretation to Kemalist reformism.  
 
Kadro’s ideas about transformation and reform show Kadro’s eagerness to complete Kemalist 
ideology. In this sense, the journal was similar to Yön journal of the 1960s, which also wished to 
redefine and complete the Kemalist ideology, but in a different context. Kadro’s writers were well 
aware of ambiguities and contradictions of Kemalism as well as lack of structure in Kemalist 
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ideology. According to them, revolutions could not exist without an ideology; therefore, formation 
of a concrete ideology was crucially important.
234
 In this sense, Kadro created a new current within 
Kemalist ideology, which was heavily inspired by European sources. Kadro’s anti-Western 
sentiments, anti-imperialism and its insistence on continuity of reform projects helped next 
generations who wanted to connect Kemalism with their leftist inspirations, due to Kadro’s 
contributions in the early 1930s. At this point, it can be said that Kadro members constituted a new 
group of intellectuals who thought differently than tradition of CUP as well as founding cadres of 
Kemalists regarding their ideas about Europe.  
 
 
1.6 Laicism  
Laicist arrow is one of the six arrows of the Kemalist ideology, and along with nationalism it 
became one of the most distinctive features to describe Kemalist ideology.  
 
Due to their Westernized education in Ottoman military schools, Mustafa Kemal and his followers 
were mainly affected by positivism. They favored Westernization of Turkey and carried out a series 
of radical laicist reforms. In this manner, Kemalist laicism claimed to represent a break from a 
religious-oriented Ottoman mentality and an adoption of modern methods under the guidance of 
positive science. As Zürcher mentions, scientism and biological materialism, as well as social 
Darwinism, were characteristic of Kemalist ideology even more than they had been of that 
Unionists.
235
 As a result, laicism was seen as a guarantor of transformation to a modern society. 
 
However laicism efforts did not begin with the republic as Kemalists often claimed. As Zürcher 
points out, secularizing trends had been present in the Ottoman Empire for at least a century. The 
Tanzimat period and Hamidian era already witnessed transformation of administrative and 
educational institutions. The Young Turk reforms, particularly the ones in 1916-1917, excluded 
Şeyhülislam from the cabinet, although it represented the highest religious authority in the 
empire.
236
 After the republic, laicism became one of the main tenets of the Kemalist ideology. In 
this sense, Kemalist laicism reforms can be seen as acceleration and radicalization of a preexisting 
process.
237
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After the War of Independence, Muslim nationalism from the years of 1912–1922 was abandoned 
and Kemalists based the new republic on the idea of a “Turkish” nation.238 In accordance with the 
needs of the new republic, Kemalists spent a great deal of effort at nation-building and they tried to 
replace the concept of Ottoman religious community of “ümmet” with “Turkish nation”. In this 
way, they also tried to replace role of Islam with nationalism and Turkish identity.  
 
Kadro writers supported the main goals and principles of Kemalists laicism. Since the main issue 
about laicism (such as abolition of the caliphate and dervish orders, and laicization of education) 
was already handled by the regime in the 1920s, laicism was not an area of immediate importance 
for them. The journal’s primary issue was etatism. Due to this fact, discussions about laicism often 
appeared only in connection with the Kurdish upheavals of early the 1930s in Eastern provinces in 
the journal. In those articles, the writers usually tried to link laicism to etatist and reformist arrows.  
 
Kemalist rhetoric about laicism continued in Kadro articles. According to Yakup Kadri, laicism was 
not present in the minds of any other Turkish-Ottoman politician until it was expressed by Mustafa 
Kemal. Like the sultanate, the caliphate was considered to be an exploiter-institution that worked in 
collaboration with imperialists by Kadro. Yakup Kadri claimed that a sheikh with a green flag, a 
revolutionist with a red flag or a liberal with a white banner were equally dangerous for the 
republic.  
 
Burhan Asaf emphasized importance of being a nation. According to him, being “ümmet” meant 
being open to economic and political exploitations. Thanks to the abolition of the caliphate, 
religious authorities lost their power in Turkey. This brought an end to exploitation. Besides, as part 
of a modern nation, Muslims of Turkey did not need religious authorities.
239
  
 
As seen, Burhan Asaf’s articulations based on Kemalist laicism which was rooted in positivism and 
did not tolerate any authority or power centre other than political authority. Mustafa Kemal already 
eliminated religious establishments at early stages of the power struggle;
240
 since he expected 
progress to be realized in constant pace and under strict control of the political authority.  
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Kadro writers were always open about their materialistic world-view and showed distance to 
metaphysical beliefs. As a result, progress was expected to be realized in the light of science.  
 
Regarding the effects of positivism, Kadro writers’ early education, which was not very different 
than Kemalist generation, can be held responsible for these views. Other than that, they may have 
been affected by positivism via left-oriented ideas such as Leninism. In any way, effects of 
positivism were present in Kadro’s ideology and affected their interpretation of laicism. 
 
Kadro’s writers perceived laicism as a necessary element for progress, development and a basis for 
a modern nation-state. They emphasized the importance of leaving religious conservatism behind. 
According to them, Turkish reformism was part of materialist modern world; therefore it was 
situated opposite to mysticism of religion. According to Şevket Süreyya, Turkish reformism was 
there to give hope to people in the face of a dark mysticism of old times in which people were lost 
in desperation and false hopes.
241
 He often discredited religion by connecting it to 
underdevelopment and labeled it as an out-dated order. He made comparisons between dynamism 
of modernity and passiveness of religion. In this manner, Şevket Süreyya also justified political 
authority of the Kemalist regime by presenting it as the sole representative authority for the nation, 
since the Kemalists could interpret the modern world in the light of science. Ulama or any other 
religious authorities would not have been qualified for such an engagement with their out-dated 
world-view. 
 
As Parla states, the Kemalist regime did not entirely separate religious institutions and practices 
from the state. The regime preferred to maintain control over Islam through the office of 
Directorate of Religious Affairs. Kemalists removed religion in certain spheres of governance but 
they did not fully separate religious institutions and personnel from the state.
242
 After all, Kemalists 
were not atheists, and their laicism was not thoroughly anti-religious. They had no argument with 
religion as an individual or social norm. Thus, it is better to describe their politics as laicist, rather 
secular, since the latter is commonly understood as non-religious or even anti-religious in its 
Anglophone meaning.
 243
  
 
In this context, Kadro can be taken as laicist rather than secular as well. The writers were explicit 
about negative sides of Islam, although they did not oppose it thoroughly. They objected religion’s 
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position in many areas and sometimes mentioned it negatively but they did not call for more secular 
regulations either.  
 
Still, it is possible to encounter Kadro articles which attempted to question religion’s role even in 
the individual sphere. For example, Şevket Süreyya claimed that individuals should not have been 
able to escape scoop of society by turning into mysticism or religion by dreaming about an ideal life 
after death. Retiring from this world for sake of other world would have resulted in vain. Those 
ideas should have been replaced by realistic ideas about actual world and the individuals who 
seclude themselves should have been returned to the society by the authorities.
244
 Şevket Süreyya’s 
ideas were clear examples of Kadro’s ideology which declared that the journal was against any 
form of individualism, since individualism was perceived as part of liberal-capitalist thought by 
Kadro.
245
 This is also result of Kadro’s tolerance for strict order of the state which went beyond 
limits of economy and spread into other areas in society.  
 
As mentioned before, the society envisioned by Kadro was in parallel with the common Kemalist 
solidarist world-view: a society free of class struggles and in a top-down reform programs under 
control of the state. Under these circumstances Kadro was reluctant to give a broad autonomous 
space for individualism, even it was for people’s faith on religion. As seen, Kadro writers often 
expected from individuals to devote all of their energies to the republic and for the good of the 
whole society. Doing the opposite was perceived as either egoism or opposition towards the regime. 
The strict single-party regime must have made it easier for Kadro to express their ideas on these 
issues. 
  
As Parla states, in Mustafa Kemal’s view, the laicization process also had the purpose of rescuing 
and purifying Islam,
246
 because only then Islam could be in accordance with modernism and 
progress. As Zürcher mentions, Mustafa Kemal’s speeches had an anticlerical rhetoric and they 
were often included warnings about the danger caused by reactionaries, who would use religion for 
political ends. “İrtica”, religious reaction, a term which was used by Young Turks in April 1909, 
was referred quite often in his speeches. Mustafa Kemal’s arguments about “pure” Islam as a 
rational and a progressive idea owed a lot to Young Turk predecessors of the Kemalists such as 
Ahmet Rıza and Abdullah Cevdet.247 
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Although Kadro was not interested in rescuing Islam, the writers mentioned the possibility of a real 
Islam or pure Islam, when they wrote about how people were exploited through their religious 
beliefs. According to Şevket Süreyya, the reality of Kurdish religious sanctuaries was a deep 
obscurity which had nothing to do with Islam. Without the religious authority of sheiks, feudality 
would have been defenseless. In order to eliminate the power of big land owners over the people, 
authority of religious centers should have been targeted in Eastern provinces.
248
 At this point, Ismail 
Hüsrev called the position of religious leaders of the Eastern provinces as spiritual feudalism. He 
tried to prove that all of the religious orders and tekkes were reactionary centers and they were part 
of an out-dated economic-social system, rather than being spiritual centers as part of tradition and 
religion.
249
 Although many of those centers were eliminated by the government righteously, the 
power of Kurdish feudalism was quite resilient.
250
 As seen in the arguments, Kurdishness was 
usually linked to Islam and an economically and ideologically backward system. 
 
Apparently, Kadro added a distinctive economic dimension to the subject and contributed to 
creation of a link between underdeveloped economies and corrupted forms of Islam. In this way, 
discussions about laicism and religion were brought up within the context of economy and the 
etatist arrow. The writers assumed that economic development was the key to solve problems about 
religion gradually, since most of the problems about this issue related to economic backwardness of 
the East. Once economic development of Turkey improved, the authority of sheiks and big 
landowners was going to be diminished in the Eastern regions.  
 
According to Parla, for Kemalists, guarding laicism was equal to guarding the Kemalist republic. 
Those who contested laicist institutions were considered not simply anti-Kemalist, but also anti-
republican and anti-nationalist. Kemalists became adept at blurring these distinctions to their 
advantage.
251
 As devoted Kemalists, Kadro writers had a similar tendency. According to Şevket 
Süreyya, in the places where Kurdish feudalism was still strong, tekkes and religious sheikhs aimed 
at not only at the destruction of the pure form of Islam, but also the destruction of the Turkish 
population, Turkish language and free thought.
252
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Kadro’s anti-laicist, anti-nationalist and anti-republican implications about heavily Kurdish 
populated regions might have helped the regime to justify the heavy measures taken in those 
regions. With the help of this rhetoric, Kurdish upheavals with implicit national sensitivities easily 
degraded into reactionary movements against the regime. Thus, in accordance with the official 
Kemalist discourse, Kadro classified those upheavals as a form of treason. In this way, Kadro not 
only approved policies on the Eastern provinces but also provided necessary ideological discourse 
for the regime, by equating Kurdish upheavals with reactionism and feudalism. This discourse 
turned out to be a persistent one, since reductionism about Kurds by equating Kurdishness with 
feudalism and backwardness continued in the following years, especially within Kemalist groups 
which combine nationalism and left oriented ideas. 
 
Kadro’s materialistic world view and its distance to Islam are also clear in journal’s discourse about 
“struggle of exploited and exploiter countries”. Although most of the underdeveloped countries 
which were engaged in anti-imperialist movements were Muslim countries, Kadro’s emphasis on 
Islam was relatively weak, and often negative. The journal always focused on anti-imperialism and 
often avoided mentioning the possible role of Islam in this issue. Besides, although the writers 
focused on anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist utterances of Mustafa Kemal during the War of 
Independence, they ignored Mustafa Kemal’s Muslim-nationalist discourse and his efforts to use 
Islam’s unifying power in the same period.  
 
Some of the studies drew attention to similarities between Kadro and Sultan Galiyev’s ideas.253 
Apparently, Kadro’s cynicism and criticisms towards Islam and idea of religion in general indicates 
the most significant difference between intellectuals of Kadro and Sultan Galiyev, since Kadro’s 
ideology never intended to give Islam any crucial role. Kadro clearly mentioned that their members 
were against any kind of mysticism.
254
  
 
In short, Kadro’s writers supported Kemalist laicist policies in order to form a “nation” to take the 
place of Ottoman “ümmet”. Kadro’s laicism was in connection with the modern image of the 
republic, along with nationalist and reformist arrows. Kadro emphasized the insertion of economic 
dimensions to interpretation of the laicist arrow. In this way, Kadro provided Kemalist ideology 
with a powerful rhetoric to deal with Kurdish upheavals in Eastern provinces by categorizing them 
as reactionary movements and as enemies of the regime. In this sense, guarding laicism became 
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equal to guarding the republic and those who contested laicism were considered not only anti-laicist 
but also as anti-nationalist and anti-republican by all the Kemalists. 
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2 MARKOPAŞA 
Markopaşa was first published on the 25th November 1946 as a political satire journal. The group 
consisted of the writers Sabahattin Ali (editorial writer), Aziz Nesin (writer), Rıfat Ilgaz (writer), 
Mustafa Mim Uykusuz (caricaturist) and Haluk Yetiş (administration).  
 
Sabahattin Ali (1907-1948) was already a famous novelist by 1946. He was put on trial several 
times due to his leftist world-view. In 1932, he was imprisoned for one year and in 1944 he was 
targeted by the ultra-nationalists and he was accused of being a communist.
255
 Aziz Nesin (1915-
1995) was an ambitious young journalist at the beginning of the 1940s. He was writing for the 
famous “Tan” (Dawn) newspaper, which was published by the prominent socialist journalists 
Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel who worked with many of the important radical leftists of the 1930s and 
1940s. “Tan” was a center of opposition to the single-party regime of the RPP; thus it became the 
primary target of the attacks to leftist movement. On the 1st
 
December 1945, Tan and several left-
leaning newspapers, such as “Yeni Dünya” of Sabahattin Ali, were attacked by agitated ultra-
nationalist youth.
256
 
 
After Tan was destroyed, most of the leftist writers and journalists were out of the job. In those 
days Aziz Nesin and Rıfat Ilgaz, who had also been imprisoned because of his book “Sınıf" (The 
Class) and had recently been released, had relations with the TSP (Turkish Socialist Party) for a 
short period.
257
 When they decided to publish a journal, workers from TSP collected money for 
them.
258
 
 
Markopaşa was the first political satire journal which openly criticized the government.259 It quickly 
drew attention with its satiric style and harsh criticisms of the RPP. While the first issue sold just 
6000 copies, the journal reached up to 70.000 by its 6
th
 issue. The circulation of the most popular 
daily newspapers was around 20.000 at the time.
260
 Markopaşa gained a lot of attention and 
sympathy of the people, who were fed up with the single-party regime. Just after the first issue, the 
journal became center of a major debate within the parliament. It was accused of “being rooted in 
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the outside world, or: having foreign roots”, which implied a link to communism and to the Soviet 
Union.
261
 
 
Although Markopaşa’s articles bear no signature, it is known that most of the leading political 
articles were written by Sabahattin Ali and satirical pieces full of humour by Aziz Nesin and Rıfat 
Ilgaz. Mim Uykusuz contributed to the journal with caricatures and visual materials.
262
 The articles 
were often about the misdeeds of the government, lives of ordinary people and the working classes, 
the dangers of a liberal economy and foreign capital. 
 
Markopaşa was banned due to an article written by Aziz Nesin in its 4th issue. 263 Although the 
accusations about the article were not proven in court, Sabahattin Ali was found guilty of defaming 
deputy Cemil Sait Barlas and imprisoned for three months.
264
 Markopaşa was repeatedly banned and 
had to change its name several times such as “Malum Paşa”, “Merhum Paşa”, “Ali Baba”, “Yedi 
Sekiz Paşa”, “Bizim Paşa” and “Medet”. When one of the writers was sent to jail, the others 
continued to write. Although printing offices refused to print the journal because of fear of the 
government or because of their difference in opinion, Markopaşa members always found a way to 
publish, nonetheless.  
 
Finally in 1948, when the imprisonments and continuous pressure by the government and right-wing 
media became unbearable, Sabahattin Ali decided to stop publishing. He attempted to escape from 
Turkey but he was murdered in April 1948 on the Bulgarian border. His case became one of the 
notorious cases of the republican history. Other writers continued to publish similar journals, such as 
Hür Markopaşa, Nuhun Gemisi, and Başdan, but these publications never became as popular as 
Markopaşa. 
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2.1 Nationalism  
As Zürcher states, although a close relationship with the Soviet Union was a cornerstone of Turkish 
foreign policy throughout the 1920s and 1930s, it eventually soured due to Turkey’s neutral stance 
during World War II. After the war, the United States emerged from the war as a powerful country 
as well as a symbol for democratic values.
 Turkey’s political system, economic policies, and foreign 
relationships underwent a fundamental change within a few years after the end of World War II and 
Turkish governments gradually moved closer to the West, especially to the United States.
265
 
 
The transition to a multi-party period for democratization was the main debate in this time. An 
opposition party, the Democrat Party, which mostly consisted of landowners and traders, was 
formed in 1946. The RPP government had to adopt a more liberal program and give more space to 
foreign capital in the country, especially between 1947-1953 period.
266
 In the post-war era, the press 
used the relatively tolerant atmosphere that was brought about by the waves of democracy. The 
Markopaşa journal was the outcome of this transition period when its publication started at the end 
of 1946.  
 
In 1946, not only DP but also leftist parties such as the Turkish Socialist Party (TSP) by Esat Adil 
Müstecablıoğlu and the Turkish Socialist Workers’ and Peasants’ Party (TSWPP) by Şefik Hüsnü 
Değmer were founded as well.  However, martial law regulations were used and these parties were 
closed down only in December 1946. Following this, the years 1948 and 1949 saw a witch-hunt 
against the left.
267
  
 
The Markopaşa’s interpretations of Kemalist nationalism usually connected to pride of its writers 
over the success of the War of Independence and the writers’ anti-imperialist attributions about it. 
Parallel to this idea and due to the political climate of the late 1940s, the journal’s arguments usually 
focused on anti-imperialism and Turkey’s relationship with the United States. Similar to other leftist 
publications, such as “Hür” and “Zincirli Hürriyet”, which were published by Mehmet Ali Aybar, 
Markopaşa was very negative about the developing relationship between the United States and 
Turkey. As a result, a strong anti-Americanism rhetoric was quite apparent in the anti-imperialist 
discourse of the journal. Since the writers sonsidered themselves as proud members of a nation 
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whose independence was won through a national war against the imperialists, Markopaşa writers 
thought that Turkey’s closeness to the US was a betrayal of the anti-imperialist principles of 
Kemalism. According to them, the nation was at risk of losing economic and even political 
independence.
268
 In this light, Markopaşa writers attributed anti-imperialist features to Kemalism 
with the relative ease that Kadro members had in the 1930s. 
 
With the rising strength of racism throughout Europe, some of the ultra-nationalists became quite 
outspoken about their ideas, especially in the early 1940s. Unlike traditional Turkish nationalists, 
many of these ultra-nationalists, such as Nihal Atsız, expelled Islam from their thinking by 
denouncing it as an "Arab religion”. They embraced ancient Shamanistic and Turkic traditions, 
focused on the pre-Islamic period of Turkic tribes, and emphasized the importance of purity of the 
Turkish race. They started an active campaign against leftists, since according to them, leftist 
ideologies were foreign elements, and therefore, harmful to the Turkish race. In this way, leftists 
were pictured as the internal enemies of Turkey.
269
  
 
Even before Markopaşa was published, Sabahattin Ali was involved in disputes with pan-Turkists 
and ultra-nationalists, who labeled all leftists as “traitor communists”. The mid-1940s were marked 
by the conflicts between these groups. Just before Markopaşa was published, Sabahattin Ali - along 
with many other leftists such as Pertev Naili Boratav, Sadrettin Celal, Ahmet Cevat Emre, and Şefik 
Hüsnü Değmer - was the primary targets of ultra-nationalists.270 Sabahattin Ali severely criticized 
them in his articles and books.
271
 For example, one of the characters in his novel “The Devil Among 
Us” resembled Nihal Atsız, and triggered tensions between the two groups even more. Atsız 
published a leaflet, “The Devils Among Us”, in response, in which he heavily criticized Sabahattin 
Ali. However, due to the negative outcome of racism in Europe, extremist Pan-Turkists and Pan-
Turanists were brought to trial and some of them were sent to jail by the government.
272
 Still, 
nationalist campaign against the leftists turned out to be a successful one, since it negatively 
influenced the general opinion, which was already conservative and prejudiced about leftists. Along 
with Sabahattin Ali, many of the prominent intellectuals were stigmatized and labeled as suspicious 
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citizens by the state. Consequently, all of these developments made nationalism a very sensitive 
subject for the Markopaşa series. 
 
In that period, being a leftist was considered being a communist; and therefore a “non-nationalist”, 
“non-native” or a “traitor” by mainstream politicians. The people with leftist world-views needed to 
prove that they were patriots as much as anybody else in the country. Consequently, Markopaşa’s 
writers, just like any other leftist, had to defend themselves against accusations.
273
 The writers 
emphasized their devotion to the country with a visible patriotic tone. Apparently, part of this 
patriotism came from writers’ sincere feelings and respect for the spirit of the national War of 
Independence and Mustafa Kemal’s leading role in it. Still, it can be argued that a part of their 
emphasis on national pride was connected to Markopaşa’s defense-reflex against accusations about 
communism. Here, it is important to bear in mind that expressing leftist ideas was hindered by the 
141
st
 and 142
nd
 articles in the Constitution. Except for short periods, expressing socialist ideals was 
illegal. As a result, the leftists often tended to adopt a patriotic-populist discourse, as they had little 
choice and they were aware of the legitimizing effect of their discourse. 
 
For example, Markopaşa stated the term “nationalist” should be used very carefully since it was 
adopted by several groups who had crucially different from each other regarding their political 
views. In many cases, the groups who called themselves nationalists, in fact, had racist, fascist or 
pan-Turanist and irredentist motives.
274
  
 
In general, Markopaşa members separated their mild nationalism from ultra-nationalism. In fact, 
they opposed any nationalist idea based on race or ethnicity, and they rejected any classification that 
put one nation above another. They objected to the usage of “Turkishness” to downgrade the ones 
who were not ethnically Turkish.
275
 Accordingly, the journal used “nation” and “Turkish nation” for 
defining all the people who lived in the borders of the Turkish Republic. In order to mark their 
ideological differences, the writers preferred to use other terms such as “halksever” (someone who 
loves the people) or “vatansever” (patriot) to describe themselves, rather than “nationalist”, which 
often referred to either traditional or ultra-nationalists with negative connotations. The writers 
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sometimes used “real nationalism” and “real nationalist” to define their ideas, as well as to mark the 
journal’s difference from other types of nationalism.276 These terms appeared particularly in the 
articles of Sabahattin Ali and Aziz Nesin in Başdan and Zincirli Hürriyet journals. In the 1960s, the 
Yön group also often used “real nationalism” to describe their difference from traditional 
nationalism. 
 
The writers expressed their national pride on the grounds of being members of an independent 
nation. They were not opposed to the concept of “nation” categorically or reducing it to solely racial 
and ethnic connotations.
277
 It seems that they had national pride with patriotic feelings combined 
with humanism and internationalist ideas like many of the prominent Turkish leftists of the time. In 
this sense, and compared to Kadro, Markopaşa’s nationalism was less stressed, even though 
intellectuals of both groups were patriots and they embraced the national pride of being Turkish. 
Nevertheless, they all must have been aware of the legitimizing effect of stressing patriotism in their 
ideology. 
 
At this point, it is important to look at the relationship between Kemalism and Markopaşa in order to 
understand to what extent the writers identified the journal with Kemalist nationalism, since 
Kemalist nationalism was quite intolerant towards opposing ideas.  
 
Kemalist regime often regarded leftists as unreliable and treacherous citizens who had suspicious 
connections abroad. As patriotic leftists, Markopaşa writers were furious about the RPP’s oppressive 
policies. Although they described themselves as “Kemalist patriots”, it was inevitable to come into 
conflict with the RPP, due to their leftist views. Unlike Kadro, Markopaşa writers did not approve of 
the regime’s strict policies and authoritarian tendencies, and they showed an explicit opposition 
towards the RPP governments. According to them, the nation proved its power and maturity by 
gaining independence against the imperialists and establishing the Republic. However, RPP’s ill-
advised decisions in politics and economy put the nation’s independence at risk again. The RPP 
jeopardized the outstanding results of a hard-fought battle by denying its mistakes, insisting on 
oppressive policies and opening the doors to the US. In the end, due to RPP’s problematic 
perspective, the country was on the brink of losing its economic independence.
278
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Although RPP was harshly criticized, the powerful and legitimizing role of Mustafa Kemal was 
emphasized continuously and was used to create a discourse against the 1940s’ RPP government and 
Ismet Inönü. Instead of rejecting it, Markopaşa preferred to adopt the Kemalist legacy and bent the 
Kemalist ideology according to the journal’s worldview. At this crucial point, similar to Kadro, 
Markopaşa members wanted to connect their journal to Kemalism via anti-imperialism by 
attributing an initial anti-imperialism quality to the Kemalist ideology.
279
 
 
Markopaşa members were also proud of the victory of the War of Independence and the 
establishment of the nation-state. They interpreted the existence of the Turkish Republic as the 
achievement of national sovereignty as well as a victory against imperialists. Markopaşa’s anti-
imperialist interpretation was a fundamental element in their ideology as well as a necessity to 
connect their left-oriented ideas with Kemalism. In this light, they portrayed anti-imperialism as a 
dominant element in Kemalism to bring people together by connecting them to fight against 
imperialist enemies.
280
 
 
According to Sabahattin Ali, the Turkish Republic was the outcome of people’s war of 
independence against imperialism. However, the anti-imperialist and populist path of the early years 
of the Republic was gradually abandoned by the RPP. The republic, which used to be an ally of 
national independence struggles, became a supporter of the plunderer powers (US), which were the 
enemy of the people, in the name of democracy.
281
 
 
Still, at this point, Markopaşa did not place all the blame on Mustafa Kemal and his period, but 
mainly on the governors who came after him. The main reason was that in the late 1940s, their 
primary target was the RPP under the leadership of Ismet Inönü rather than Mustafa Kemal. The 
writers were quite respectful of Mustafa Kemal’s memory, in fact. Indeed, stressing the glorious 
victory over Western powers under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and the developments in the 
early years of the republic was helpful for Markopaşa to criticize the RPP for the ill-handed policies 
in the following years.  
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Markopaşa members were aware of the Mustafa Kemal and RPP’s stance against the leftists and 
how Mustafa Kemal eliminated them and excluded them from politics. Nevertheless, like many of 
the leftists of their time, intellectuals of Markopaşa cordially believed that anti-imperialism had a 
leading role in the War of Independence. They brought up the anti-imperialist discourse of early 
stages of the war, and Mustafa Kemal’s utterances about this matter quite often. They always 
mentioned anti-imperialism as if it was one of the main tenets of Kemalism.  
 
Markopaşa’s ideology included anti-imperialism with nationalist tones. Still, compared to Yön and 
especially to Kadro, national sensitivities were much less evident in Markopaşa.  
 
When internationalism is considered, Markopaşa gives clues about the journal’s view, which sought 
solutions for the incompatibility of nationalism and the internationalist character of anti-imperialism. 
This may not be very clear in the articles published in the series, but the writers’ efforts can be 
traced to their articles which appeared in other journals, such as Başdan and Zincirli Hürriyet.282 
 
Apparently, anti-imperialism was an indispensable element for almost all of the left-leaning groups 
who wanted to connect their ideology to Kemalism at some point. Although its attitude towards the 
regime was much different than Kadro, Markopaşa tried to create the same link as Kadro and Yön 
journal did. Kadro created this link in order to generate an ideology for Kemalism and to be 
effective in the decision-making process, while Yön did exactly the same thing in order to 
reconstruct Kemalism in their attempts to clear the way for Yön’s politic targets.  Although 
Markopaşa writers also tried to shape Kemalism according to their world-view, and were an elite 
group compared to the general population; they insisted on the opening of democratic channels for 
political diversity and inclusion of ordinary citizens to politics in a better way. In this sense, they 
were different than the Kadro and Yön groups which had more elitist tendencies than Markopaşa. 
Although the writers still needed Kemalism’s legitimatizing power in order to take action towards 
the present government, connecting anti-imperialism and Kemalism was not their primary aim as it 
was for Kadro and Yön. Their primary objective was creating a strong opposition towards the 
regime and the state-elites by reaching the general population and gaining their support for the 
series. 
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Unlike Kadro, Markopaşa was also more careful about the exclusivist policies of Kemalist 
nationalism. The writers did not hesitate to criticize the politicians - including Mustafa Kemal
283
 - 
for employing Turkish nationalism as an exclusion mechanism. For example, the government’s 
suppressive policies towards Kurds in the Eastern provinces, as well as discriminatory laws such as 
Wealth Tax concerning non-Muslim minorities were openly criticized in the journal. In a short 
article in Malumpaşa, the writers clearly mentioned that the thousands of people were suffered due 
to the unjust Tunceli Law of 1934.
 284
  Although these issues were briefly mentioned, Markopaşa 
was one of the rare publications which openly criticized the government’s actions in Kurdish 
provinces. In contrast to Kadro, it did not try to justify RPP’s interventions in the area by reducing 
the problem to economic backwardness or reactionary powers. Particularly Sabahattin Ali treated the 
subject very carefully, and he added a new dimension, a human factor, to the existing problem. In 
this sense, he hinted that suppressive operations of RPP in the Eastern regions were politically and 
morally wrong.  
 
In one of the articles, Sabahattin Ali mentioned that some Turkish people attempted to help some of 
the Balkan Turks who were considered to be in danger. Indeed, in order to help people, he believed 
that one should not seek a common religion or nation. Balkan Turks might have needed help, but 
this help should not have depended on their ethnic background. Therefore, the people who worried 
about the Balkan Turks also should have been interested in other people who had been living in 
Turkey and needed help, regardless of their nationality or religion.
285
 
 
Regarding the Kurdish issue and other minorities, Markopaşa had divergent views which were in 
conflict with exclusivist policies of Kemalist nationalism. The journal’s perspective was very 
different than Kadro’s as well, since Kadro usually relied on explanations about economy and 
statistics on this issue. Besides, unlike Kadro, which criticized the regime very implicitly, 
Markopaşa criticized the government in a direct way. Nevertheless, it is obvious that both journals 
shared the same objective by ascribing a great importance to anti-imperialism and stressing the anti-
imperialistic qualities of the independence struggle and Kemalist nationalism in every opportunity.  
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2.2 Populism 
In this chapter, Markopaşa’s interpretations of Kemalist populism will be discussed concerning 
people, society and classes, elitism and authoritarian tendencies. 
 
After the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938, Ismet Inönü became the leader of the republic and the 
RPP. The country experienced a difficult period during the World War II and struggled 
economically and politically. However, in 1946, when Markopaşa was first published, Turkey was 
in a transition period that carried an aim of establishing a multi-party system. In the aftermath of 
WWII, when the demand for democratic regimes became more pressing than ever, İsmet İnönü and 
the RPP struggled with changes in politics after years of a single-party system.
286
 Mainly due to the 
increasing effect of the United States, the Turkish government felt pressure to terminate its single-
party system. In January 1946, the Democrat Party (DP) was formed by a group of RPP deputies 
such as Adnan Menderes, Celâl Bayar, Fuad Köprülü, and Refik Koraltan as an opposition party. 
The same year elections took place and four years later, in 1950, the DP won the elections and ended 
the RPP’s rule.  
 
In order to show Turkey’s adaptability to democracy, and to prove Turkey’s improvement in this 
regard, the RPP governments of the transition period showed an unprecedented tolerance towards 
the press and opponents for a period of time. Markopaşa was the result of this period. However, the 
tolerance of the RPP governments was short-lived. Constantly changing names of the Markopaşa 
journal due to court orders, lawsuits, as well as problems with press-houses indicate that the political 
pressure of the regime on the press was still strong. Still, compared to Kadro, this small-scale and 
four-pages-a-week journal made a great impact in minds of people. The journal became hugely 
popular since people were fed up with the strict rule of RPP. Its writers claimed that even the 
existence of this journal was a protest against one-party rule and its deeds. Populist rhetoric of the 
RPP and its contradictions were open targets of Markopaşa. Therefore, the populist arrow has 
appeared as the most important arrow to analyze Markopaşa’s interpretations on Kemalism. 
 
Here it should be noted that after the elimination of the leftist movement of Turkey by the regime 
with the 1925 and 1927 prosecutions, the leftist groups under the one-party system were already 
weakened and they failed to impress the people with their cause. Indeed, there was hardly any legal 
ground for them to express their ideas. Occasionally, only prominent figures, such as the poet Nazım 
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Hikmet, journalists Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel, and politician Esat Adil had the chance to draw 
some attention of the people via their books, poems or articles, which were featured in legal or 
illegal publications. 
 
 
2.2.1 People 
Markopaşa put a great deal of emphasis on “the people”, which was often mentioned as “people” 
(halk), “nation” (millet) or “citizens” (vatandaş). The writers often used these words 
interchangeably. At first glance, the journal’s exalting of “the people” by presenting its supreme 
features might seem similar to Kadro members’ approach, which also praised “resilient” and “noble” 
features of the Turkish people several times. However, the arguments that followed these 
descriptions ensured that Markopaşa disagreed with Kadro journal as well as with the RPP’s view of 
populism in general, regarding how to define people and society.   
 
The noble features of Turkish people and its ability to govern itself were often glorified by Mustafa 
Kemal and RPP members in their speeches. However, the Kemalist regime was quite reluctant in 
taking necessary steps for sharing power with the people, since it often considered them as a source 
of divisive or reactionary movements, and it did not trust them. The people often were regarded as a 
mass to be educated until modern ways of governing by the regime. By labeling every oppositional 
group within the GNA as either reactionary or divisive, the Kemalist leadership claimed all rights to 
represent the whole nation via the RPP. Although they tried to legitimize their assumed role 
ideologically, they caused a great deal of resentment within the people due to their strict regime and 
top-down policies. To this point, Kadro’s perception of people and society was not so different than 
Kemalist leadership. 
 
Compared to Kadro and the ideas of Mustafa Kemal or Ismet Inönü, Markopaşa seemed to have a 
different approach towards society. According to the journal, the power holders had to be elected 
and supported by members of society as the expression of the will of all of society. The chosen 
power, as the representative of people’s sovereignty, should have a primary goal of working for the 
good of its citizens, rather than using the power for its own ends.
287
 In order to achieve this form of 
governing, active public participation in politics was necessary. As stated by Sabahattin Ali, Mustafa 
Kemal and the RPP owed their early political power to their populist policies and public support for 
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the regime was secured by the success of the War of Independence. However, after securing power, 
the “People’s Party” ignored fundamental rights and needs of the people and, despite its name, 
claimed the power mainly for the leading-elites. Although Kemalist populism had a public 
sovereignty claim initially, this was never applied in practice.
288
 The journal claimed that by 
abandoning populist policies and creating a self-righteous legitimacy rhetoric, the RPP betrayed its 
own people and put the party and state over citizens at the expense of freedom for twenty-five years, 
causing a great distance between the people and the government.
289
 
 
As seen, although its writers defined themselves as Kemalists, by continuously stressing the gap 
between Kemalist discourse and its practices, Markopaşa showed that the journal was well aware of 
contradictions of Kemalist populism. As noted before, Kemalists used their view of “the people” to 
justify their sole position as rulers of the state. However, the writers created their own descriptions 
about “the people” in order to deal with legitimizing rhetoric of the leading Kemalists of the RPP, 
particularly in 1947 and 1948. Therefore, Markopaşa’s descriptions about society and people can be 
read as direct criticism towards Kemalist populism. 
 
Compared to Kadro, Markopaşa had a profound interest in the people. Even the name of the journal 
can be linked to writers’ populist approach and interest in society.290 The writers emphasized their 
trust in ordinary people’s will and judgment all the time. People’s humble wisdom was always 
praised. According to them, people were poor, people were oppressed, and people were neglected by 
the leaders but they were wise enough to understand real causes of their hardships.
291
 They had the 
ability to endure difficulties under the rule of an oppressive regime.
292
 People were honest, brave, 
and expert in recognizing their enemies; and they detested the hypocrisy of the governments.
293
 
Thus, the people deserved respect, especially when they were compared to the dishonorable power-
holders.
294
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As seen, praises and descriptions concerning with “the people” were mostly followed by a bitter 
criticism towards the regime. Sometimes the well-known utterances of Mustafa Kemal, especially 
the ones from the first half of the 1920s with a populist tone, were employed to develop counter-
arguments against the RPP and Ismet Inönü.
295
 In these examples, Mustafa Kemal’s words were 
used with a satirical tone in order to show the contrast between utterances and practices of the RPP. 
Still, Markopaşa never ridiculed Mustafa Kemal himself, and the writers were usually very 
respectful to his memory.  
 
 
2.2.2 Society and Classes 
Markopaşa’s descriptions of “the people” indicate that the journal had a leftist and populist approach 
towards society. Instead of aiming for a well-controlled, united society like Kadro, Markopaşa opted 
for a dynamic and a politically more active society. Due to the waves of democratization in the 
world as well as to the left-leaning perspective and ideals of its writers, the journal attributed a great 
deal of importance to the active participation of ordinary citizens to politics. In every opportunity, 
the Markopaşa showed journal’s belief in people and their vast potential to create a better 
functioning system.
296
 
 
The writers recognized the class differences explicitly; workers, peasants, artisans, craftsmen, and 
owners of small-scale independent business were all mentioned as coming from various classes.
297
 
The journal’s strong emphasis on working classes made its leftist attitude even more pronounced. In 
the series, the problems of workers and peasants were accentuated, while the rights of the workers, 
accidents in workplaces, news about wages, living conditions of working classes, working 
conditions of mineworkers and seasonal laborers, laws about insurance and strikes were all 
discussed continuously, usually with a humorous style.
298
 The “Markopaşa Dert Dinliyor” section in 
the 4
th
 page was used successfully for expressing different problems of poor people from various 
backgrounds in an ironic way. Policies and laws about working classes were a great concern for 
Markopaşa; therefore political discussions and implementations of these matters were carefully 
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observed by the journal. Articles about workers increased gradually, especially after the journal 
drew great deal of attention from its readers.  
 
The RPP’s contradictory approach towards classes and its opposition towards class-based 
organizations, such as prohibitive laws about unions, were heavily criticized.
299
 When the 
nationalization issue of the trade unions prompted a debate in the GNA, Markopaşa made a 
comparison between trade unions and corporations and argued that in Turkey -where strikes were 
prohibited, classes were often denied, and laws were in favor of employers- the structure of trade 
unions resembled fascist corporations rather than workers’ unions which were supposed to protect 
workers’ rights at least to a degree.300 According to the journal, class-based organizations and their 
representation in GNA was crucial for freedom of speech and realization of a democratic political 
culture. Accordingly, in the last issue of Ali Baba, RPP’s promises and failures about democracy 
and freedom of speech was shortly discussed.  
 
According to Markopaşa’s writers, if the RPP really intended to bring a democratic political 
atmosphere to the country, then the party should have proven this by removing the preventive laws 
about class-based organizations. Indeed, the regime should have left more space for people from 
different backgrounds and classes. The state was supposed to take care of citizens rather than forcing 
RPP leaders’ ideas over the whole population. According to a short article in Ali Baba, the RPP 
pretended to be different after 1945 and made people believe in an opportunity of forming class-
based parties with new regulations but in fact, the party never intended to let it happen. As a result, 
many people were disappointed bitterly at the end.
301
  
 
As seen, the active participation of the people in politics and their representation in the GNA was 
paramount for the journal; therefore Markopaşa had a different interpretation of Turkey’s social 
structure than RPP’s formal view, which often denied the existence of classes or came up with a 
relatively solidaristic plan about it.  
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2.2.3 Elitism and Authoritarianism 
Since from the beginning, Markopaşa writers identified themselves with the ordinary people and 
working classes. They claimed that Markopaşa writers were the voice of suppressed people who 
were betrayed by the regime.
302
 In Markopaşa’s vocabulary, “we” often meant ordinary citizens 
including Markopaşa intellectuals, while “you” and “they” mostly addressed the rulers as well as 
the politicians or groups that the journal opposed to, such as Nihal Atsız, Recep Peker, Falih Rıfkı 
Atay, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın or Cemil Sait Barlas. According to the journal, Markopaşa was the 
enemy of people’s enemies.303 In almost every issue, the writers made sure that the journal sided 
with ordinary people against the mentality of leading elites.
304
  
 
In Markopaşa’s view, one of the major flaws of the RPP regime was its centuries-old governing 
mentality. As a result, the journal continuously stressed the distance between ordinary citizens and 
the government in order to show the regime’s failure of populist policies. According to Markopaşa, 
the RPP regime never trusted in its citizens,
305
 and it needed to be reminded that the people were not 
a flock of sheep to be led towards any direction when it was needed.
306
 Monotonous utterances of 
party members about the importance of the people made it clear that RPP neither knew its citizens 
nor cared to know them better. Besides, the party was only after maintaining its existence within 
current developments.
307
 The RPP underestimated political consciousness and the maturity of the 
people and intentionally hindered their active participation in politics.
308
 Therefore, RPP’s claim on 
being the “people’s party” was pretentious and its statute books, which were often incomprehensive 
for most of the population due to their vague style, were clear examples of this.
309
 Thus, despite its 
name, the Republican People’s Party, was in fact a “people-less” party.310 
 
It seems Markopaşa’s writers did not have any illusions about the Democrat Party either, since they 
did not distinguish DP leaders from RPP members in the long run. In the early days of the DP, some 
leftists were on relatively good terms with DP leaders; for example Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel 
welcomed them in their publications. However, their collaboration did not continue for a long time.  
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Once the DP gained more power, its leaders proved to be as intolerant as the RPP leaders towards 
the leftists. Thus, the series shows that the journal had no illusion about DP leaders and did not 
expect much from them, in terms of democracy.
311
 However, they supported DP as part of 
democratization process as well as to form a united front against the RPP regime. Therefore, the 
journal’s support was conditional, and it was not possible for its members to get along with DP’s 
state-elites in other issues. 
 
In 1946, there was already a great deal of resentment towards the RPP government due to 
abovementioned reasons. Markopaşa wanted to make use of this discontent by using the relatively 
less strict political atmosphere of the transition period. However, the writers did not expect to 
influence the state elites as the way Kadro and Yön did. Their main aim was to create pressure on 
the government by gaining the support of ordinary people by forming a simple but powerful 
opposition via the journal. In order to realize this objective, writers targeted government and 
politicians. Aziz Nesin and Sabahattin Ali criticized prime-ministers, RPP members and persons in 
key positions. Hitherto seemingly untouchable personalities suddenly became the target of constant 
teasing and satire of Markopaşa. The caricatures of Mim Uykusuz touched different aspects of 
political life and made fun of stern figures of the state officials mercilessly. In this way, the writers 
tried to show that the state and its officials were not untouchable; and if the people could overcome 
their fear, change was inevitable. In this sense, they can be considered vanguard intellectuals who 
dared to be an example to show how to object to an oppressive regime. Their effort was to activate 
the political consciousness of the people, at least the ones who could read their journals. While they 
were clearly aware of their “vanguard” role, they did not assume any privileged role or take the 
upper hand for themselves in this respect. Indeed, they did not try to claim any exclusive authority 
over the people via their assumed “intrinsic” qualities or intellectual potential. On the contrary, they 
bitterly criticized elitist attitude and privileged position of leaders and other power holders. 
Therefore, referring to these intellectuals as elitists in the same sense as the RPP deputies and Kadro 
members would not be right. 
 
This approach was very clear in journal’s style as well. In order to be understood by a wider 
audience, the writers avoided detailed analyses. They preferred striking expressions and visual 
material instead. Visual materials were important to reach people who could not read, but at least 
could identify the political figures in the caricatures. The journal’s simplicity, therefore, was very 
intentional. The journal owed its successful style to its writers’ ability to form a simple but well-
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structured language owing to the fact that Markopaşa writers were not only journalists but also 
successful writers. In 1946, Sabahattin Ali was already a very famous writer with his realistic 
approach and powerful language. His stories and novels were well known with their down-to-earth 
characters and social messages. He wrote poems which became lyrics for famous songs later. In the 
Markopaşa period, Rıfat Ilgaz and Aziz Nesin were relatively young and were at the beginning of 
their careers. Rıfat Ilgaz was a young poet who became a famous writer later. Aziz Nesin proved 
himself as a good writer as well as a leftist political activist in the following years. The life stories of 
the writers are a strong indication of their consistency about their ideas as well.  
 
In this sense, their pioneer role was quite different than Kadro, since Markopaşa explicitly opposed 
the authority of the regime although they shared basic Kemalist principles. Markopaşa members’ 
example also proved that opposing the government was not an easy task, since they were taking a 
great deal of risk by challenging the regime’s authority. In many cases, their lives were in danger; 
indeed, they were getting death threats all the time, they were sued and jailed due to their articles 
several times. An open letter that was published in the journal also confirms that they were in danger 
and they were concerned about their safety but they were going to publish the journal as long as they 
could.
312
 
 
Markopaşa writers, especially Sabahattin Ali, had good relationships with high profile leftists such 
as Esad Adil, Zekeriya and Sabiha Sertel, several other journalists and leftists.
313
 However, this did 
not stop him from being in touch with some of the state elites occasionally.
314
 Although his 
acquaintanceship with high profile people was criticized by leftists, he makes an impression of being 
an independent intellectual with a wide social web which could be applied to other Markopaşa 
members as well. Although all the writers shared similar ideals, they were relatively independent of 
the leftist organizations however.
315
 Even though the journal started as a publication connected to the 
TSP (Turkish Socialist Party), it continued as an independent publication. The support for the 
writers from the left was probably occasional and was mostly depended on personal relationships 
and connections. The journal also claimed that Markopaşa members were not supporter of any 
particular party.
316
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The writers, therefore, fought for their cause and had to deal with the consequences on their own. 
This is especially clear in Sabahattin Ali’s case, since in 1948, when he was under constant pressure 
and he was a target for ultra-nationalists as well as the regime itself, he organized his escape from 
Turkey mainly by himself but he was killed on the border of Bulgaria by a radical ultra-nationalist in 
April of that year.
317
 
 
Markopaşa writers’ analysis and ideas on the social structure of Turkey were left-oriented and did 
not include solidarism as the way Kadro’s ideas did. In fact, basic demands of Markopaşa and other 
leftist groups of the period were quite similar. Nevertheless, unlike others, the writers managed to 
attract the attention of a wider audience. It was unique in its success, since none of other leftist 
groups ever had such attention from people before via publication. The journals’ natural and 
expressive style was very successful, and its timing was just right. In 1947, selling 70.00 copies was 
definitely a great success for a four-page satirical journal that was published by a couple of penniless 
writers. This high circulation rate reassured Markopaşa writers that people were responding to their 
journal and their language and it motivated them to continue. However, the very same attention 
disturbed the leaders of the regime and caused serious problems for the writers rather than easing the 
conditions for them. Still they continued to demand equality, freedom, honesty and transparency in 
political life as long as they could. 
 
 
2.3 Republicanism and Democracy  
At the end of WWII, the defeat of the Axis Powers marked a decline of totalitarian regimes; 
democracy and liberal politics gained more ground with a strong position of the US in the post-war 
world. Until 1945, democracy was not an issue for the RPP. The regime was quite anti-democratic, 
especially during the single-party period. However, by November 1944, İsmet İnönü started to 
emphasize the democratic character of the Turkish political system.
318
 In 1945, the National 
Development Party was founded but it was not very effective. In 1946, the Democrat Party was 
founded and it was at first welcomed by the RPP and its organs.
319
 However, due to the widespread 
discontent towards RPP regime, DP became a strong rival to RPP in a short time.  
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Although DP was formed, the political system was still carrying features of a single-party regime 
and it was difficult to consider the existent system as a democratic regime. İnönü and RPP were 
introducing a multi-party system mostly due to internal and external pressure and in fact were not 
ready to share their power with any other group. 
 
As Nur Betül Çelik points out, after 1945 the discourse of democracy appeared as an alternative to 
Kemalist discourse. It was an expression of widespread discontent towards strict rule of the RPP as 
well as a platform for the groups which were resentful of the RPP and ruling elites. It became a 
manifestation of the groups which felt left-out in the power struggles after the foundation of the 
republic and wanted to be included into the politics again.
320
 Although most of its members 
belonged to the same bureaucratic class, DP became very popular with its populist discourse as rival 
of the RPP. Its slogan, “Yeter, Söz Milletin!” (Enough! The Nation Has the Say), became 
manifestation of DP’s wish for change and democracy, even though the policies of DP were not 
going to be crucially different than RPP, in terms of freedom of speech and political toleration. 
 
In the beginning, democratic discourse was a common denominator for growing discontent towards 
RPP and it brought people with different world-views together to some degree. In the early periods 
of the DP, some of the liberal and leftist intellectuals and journalists who wanted to end RPP’s reign 
supported DP’s founders. In 1945, the Tan journal of leftist journalists Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel 
and Vatan journal of liberal Ahmet Emin Yalman supported the DP by giving its founders room in 
their columns to express their ideas.
321
 Accordingly, Markopaşa’s early issues also showed a slight 
tolerance towards the DP.
322
 However, Markopaşa writers thought that the DP leaders did not set a 
different example than other RPP members in terms of governing mentality. Thus, they were not 
expecting a significant change through the DP.
323
 The journal made its stance clear with a small note 
in its 7
th
 issue and clearly put that the journal supported the DP on the grounds of democracy. This 
explanation means that Markopaşa writers needed to clarify their view about the DP, since the tone 
of this small note is quite different than Markopaşa’s usual humorous style. In the note, the journal 
emphasized that the DP was the only opposition towards the RPP, therefore the journal was on the 
same side with the new party. However, Markopaşa writers claimed, they were aware of the fact that 
the DP was an exploiter of the general discontent towards RPP and the party was mostly consisted of 
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people who were supposed to retire from the politics long ago. Due to its similar mentality to the 
RPP, the new party would not have brought anything new to the politics. Therefore, Markopaşa 
writers would not have had anything in common with DP’s elitist politicians.324 
 
In Markopaşa’s vocabulary, democracy meant freedom. However, the journal was not advocating 
for liberal democracy. Markopaşa’s interpretation of democracy was closely linked its writers’ leftist 
world-view. Accordingly, the writers often expressed their desire for freedom of speech, political 
toleration, transparency and people’s participation in politics, equality, and a multi-party system 
which includes class-based political parties. 
 
The journal considered the republican regime as a requirement for being a modern society and 
mentioned democracy as a part of republican values.
325
 Similar to the Kadro group, anti-
monarchism, anti-theocraticism, along with anti-imperialist attributions to the republic were basic 
characteristics of Markopaşa’s interpretation of the republican arrow. As a Kemalist left-leaning 
journal, these features were inseparable principles of their ideology. Turkey’s war against imperialist 
powers and triumph over the Sultan and caliphate was very important for them. Exactly like the 
early, founding Kemalists and the Kadro group, the republic was seen by Markopaşa as 
manifestation of national sovereignty. However, unlike Kadro, Markopaşa used the link between the 
republic and national sovereignty in order to criticize RPP policies. According to the journal, the 
republic as a regime was suitable for Turkey; however the RPP hindered its correct execution under 
the one-party rule. Changing the governing model was not sufficient without ensuring freedom and 
progress in the country.
326
 The journal claimed that RPP intended to maintain its reign and it was not 
sincere in its efforts for forming a democratic system.  
 
Intellectuals of Markopaşa were socialists but they always stated that they were also devoted 
Kemalists.
327
 They claimed that they were glad to live within the borders of republic and they were 
not leftists in relation with communist Russia.
328
 Unlike the Kadro group, they were quite 
independent intellectuals; they did not receive directives from the government or any leftist 
organization.  
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Although the journal easily attracted the attention of people and became a remarkable opponent 
against RPP, the writers did not mention or imply a desire for a socialist revolution. Although they 
were fed up with RPP’s despotic governing style, they were content with the republican regime. 
According to them, RPP’s policies caused the exclusion of individuals from politics, exhibited 
intolerance towards different ideas, created a mythical “national chief” figure quite unnecessarily 
and in this way undermined the original principles of republic, such as populism and anti-
imperialism.
329
  
 
Markopaşa made it very clear that this was not an easy task since writers were taking a great deal of 
risk by giving voice to discontent about the regime. Their lives were in constant danger.
330
 Their 
houses and offices could be raided by the police anytime, and they were sued and jailed several 
times due to their publications. In this sense, Markopaşa’s pioneer role was quite different from the 
Kadro group, since Markopaşa clearly opposed the authoritarian policies of the RPP in many ways 
rather than justifying and being part of it as Kadro did. Unlike Markopaşa, the Kadro writers’ 
relations rendered them to be bureaucratic elites because they were part of the regime. Still, it should 
be kept in mind that these journals were outcome of different periods and in Kadro’s period 
democracy was not an issue.  
 
 
2.4 Laicism  
In the post-war atmosphere of the second half of the 1940s, although religious matters were still 
under strict control of the RPP, the people were drawn towards the DP’s populist and relatively more 
tolerant discourse about Islam. In order to deal with DP’s popularity, RPP changed its policy and 
displayed more tolerance towards role of Islam. In order to prove this, RPP welcomed people with 
religious affiliations into the party, such as former theology professor Şemseddin Günaltay, who 
became prime minister in 1949 as a RPP deputy. However, RPP’s handling of the new situation 
annoyed people who were deeply bonded with the laicist principals of the republic. Markopaşa 
writers were among them.   
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As seen, discussions on laicism in the Markopaşa series were a result of the political scene of the 
mid-1940s. As a result, discussions about laicism were quite different than the Kadro period. 
 
Markopaşa writers described themselves as “Atatürkçü”331 and they interpreted this term to include 
the laicist arrow explicitly. As leftists, they embraced Kemalist laicism and supported laicist reforms 
which aimed at secularizing and modernizing society. Laicism was perceived by them as a 
prerequisite condition to become a modern, progressive and free-thinking citizen.
332
 Abolishment of 
the caliphate and becoming a nation rather than being religious based “ümmet” was very important 
to them. They contended with the modern and laicist image of Turkish society which was 
constructed by Kemalists mainly by leaving out the religion’s role in the social structure. This is also 
clear in Markopaşa’s interpretation about the spirit of the independence movement. The writers 
often emphasized the anti-imperialist character of the movement and, like Kadro, did not mention 
Mustafa Kemal’s early efforts to bring people together by employing Islam’s unifying power in the 
War of Independence. 
 
Compared to Kadro, discussions about laicism were more frequent and more oppositional in 
Markopaşa. Kadro adopted the laicist arrow and supported the regime by providing ideological 
discussions on the subject, especially by connecting the issue to Kurdish upheavals in Eastern 
provinces. Markopaşa supported basic laicist principals, but unlike Kadro, the journal also used 
laicism in order to criticize the regime.  
 
According to Sabahattin Ali, RPP used religion in order to be popular, especially after DP’s 
popularity became visible. However this was a risky maneuver.
 
The RPP let Islamists into the 
political arena and gave them opportunity to gain political credibility.
333
 The writers criticized the 
opening of religious schools, especially when the Village Institutions, which were known for their 
devotion to republic and laicism, were closing down.
334
 According to the journal, laicism helped 
Turkey to develop a modern and secular view; however religious conservatism was getting stronger 
again, because of the RPP’s mishandling of the situation and its newly adopted tolerance towards 
Islam. The existence of Islamist publications such as Sebiülreşat was proof of this decline. 
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Improvements of the last twenty-five years were about to be ruined in a twenty-five months of time, 
due to misdirected RPP policies.
335
  
 
In the series, Islamists were usually named “yobaz” (bigot) and their representation in politics was 
not welcomed by the writers. Due to the concessions about Islam, both RPP and DP were accused of 
betrayal to the Republic. Apparently, like Kadro, any threat towards laicist principles was 
interpreted as a threat towards the Republic by Markopaşa. Any kind of tolerance towards Islam in 
politics was described as a betrayal. In this sense, regarding laicism, Markopaşa writers were 
followers of early Kemalist policies which were stricter about Islam’s role in politics. They did not 
approve RPP’s line in the second half of the 1940s.336  
 
Sabahattin Ali did not hesitate to criticize Mustafa Kemal’s period as well. According to him, 
laicism was employed as a powerful political tool by the RPP in order to control the parliament and 
eliminate the opponents in the 1920s. The RPP used the threat of reactionary movements towards its 
opponents as an excuse in order to rule over politics, and the RPP did not let anybody but itself into 
politics.
337
 However, although he mentioned Mustafa Kemal, the main target of Sabahattin Ali was 
Ismet Inönü, since Inönü was held responsible for RPP’s decisions to use religion to the party’s 
advantage in the second half of the 1940s.
338
  
 
Markopaşa writers showed a distance towards Islam, mainly due to their leftist and materialist 
world-view. According to Rasih Nuri Ileri, Sabahattin Ali knew quite a lot about Marxist and 
Leninist theory
339
 and he described himself as a Marxist.
340
 Aziz Nesin was an atheist. Rıfat Ilgaz 
was also known for his leftist and laicist ideas. Consequently, in one way or another, they became 
the target of conservative groups and politicians throughout their lives. 
 
However in the 1940s, leftists seemed to be targeted due to their affiliation with communism and 
their possible anti-nationalist motives, rather than their relationship with religion directly. In those 
years, communism was often equaled with non-Turkishness and non-nativity by conservatives and 
nationalists. Communism was perceived as a big threat towards Turkish nation, and people with 
leftist beliefs were often accused of treason. Markopaşa writers had their share of these accusations. 
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Of course, accusations about communism already included a stigma around religion. Still, the 
writers of Markopaşa were often insulted as communists, rather than atheist, infidel or non-
religious.
341
 When Markopaşa became the target of ultra-nationalists, especially of Nihal Atsız, the 
main accusation about Sabahattin Ali was his leftist beliefs, not his distance to Islam. After all, Nihal 
Atsız himself was also a non-Muslim. He refused Islam on the grounds that it was an Arab religion. 
He adopted shamanism as he perceived it as original religion of Turks. At this point, Markopaşa’s 
responses to those accusations can be checked. None of them were about the writers’ religious 
beliefs or Islam but often about nativity of their ideology and patriotism.
342
  
 
Islam became a decisively important issue for Aziz Nesin long after the Markopaşa period, 
especially after he made his atheism public through his writings within the time. Nesin was a 
committed political activist. In 1984, he organized the intellectuals who signed the Petition of 
Intellectuals (Aydınlar Dilekçesi) as a protest towards oppression that was brought by the 1980 
military coup led by Kenan Evren. He was also head of Turkish Writers’ Union. In the 1990s, his 
confrontation with Islamists became more frequent, due to growing role of Islam in politics. When 
he started to translate Salman Rushdie’s “Satanic Verses” in early 1990s, he attracted vehement 
criticism. In 1993, his presence in an Alevi-based cultural event in Sivas was used as an excuse by a 
mob organized by the fundamentalist Islamists. After hours of provocation and siege, the hotel he 
was staying, along with several other intellectuals and artists, was set on fire. Nesin survived but 37 
people were killed. This event is known as Sivas Massacre. Due to these series of events and 
confrontations with Islamists, Aziz Nesin became known mainly through his atheism and his critics 
towards Islam. However, Sabahattin Ali, who was murdered in 1948, is remembered mainly by his 
leftist world-view, and his confrontations with ultra-nationalist Nihal Atsız due to the period he lived 
in.  
 
In short, Markopaşa’s articles did not target religion and Islam directly but people or institutions 
which used religion to their advantages. The main idea was that religion should have stayed at 
individual level, and representation of Islam in politics was not necessary. RPP and DP made a big 
mistake by making concessions about Islam. The writers were often content with early radical laicist 
policies, which were stricter over Islam. Still, Markopaşa did not hesitate to criticize Mustafa Kemal 
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and RPP’s usage of laicist arrow to their advantage. According to the journal, laicism was one of the 
main tenets of the republic and those who would have contested laicism were not only anti-Kemalist 
but also anti-republican. However, unlike Kadro, Markopaşa did not try to make a direct connection 
between underdevelopment, Islam and the Eastern regions with Kurdish population. 
 
 
2.5 Reformism 
In 1935, Kemalists changed the term reformism (inkılapçılık) to revolutionism (devrim); but the 
term revolution was scarcely used in Markopaşa. Although the writers perceived the transition from 
the Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic as a groundbreaking change in the sense of revolution, 
they preferred to mention it as liberation or people’s war, rather than revolution. The term 
inkılapçılık often appeared to refer to the reform projects about education, units of measurement or 
alphabet etc which were taken care by the Kemalist government. Similar to Kadro, Markopaşa also 
criticized the regime because of the stagnant manner of reform projects but unlike Kadro, 
Markopaşa did this in a bolder and direct manner all the time.343  
 
Unlike the Kadro journal, the Markopaşa series did not assume or claim that the transition from 
empire to republic changed everything. Markopaşa appreciated the gains of the republic such as the 
changing of the political system, the abolition of sultanate and caliphate, and changes in the 
education system etc.
344
 Nevertheless, contrary to what the RPP claimed, Markopaşa series were 
insistent on the continuity of the Ottoman mentality in the Turkish Republic, regarding governing 
and power-sharing mechanisms.
345
 The writers explicitly criticized the RPP governments, including 
Mustafa Kemal, and claimed that the practical impact of the reforms was in fact very limited. 
Indeed, the RPP failed to improve what mattered most for the country most: Governing styles, 
freedom of thought and democracy.
346
 Sometimes these criticisms went one step further and the 
journal claimed that mentality of power holders did not really change, therefore the RPP’s mentality 
was almost the same with the Ottomans’ concerning with governing the state.347 At this point, 
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Markopaşa’s writers can be taken as a group of intellectuals who rejected the formal ideology to 
some extent and even opposed to it by employing satire and humor very effectively in order to 
connect with people instead.   
 
According to Sabahattin Ali, Kemalism had an anti-imperialist and populist core, especially in the 
early stages of the national liberation war. The reforms that were made under those notions were 
sincere and successful. However in the later periods, that essence was neglected and the RPP 
became the center of stagnancy and political corruption.
348
 In this sense, Kemalism was perceived by 
Sabahattin Ali as a progressive and modern ideology which was eroded by the wrong decisions of 
the RPP governments.  
 
As seen, in the Markopaşa series, Kemalism does not appear as an already conservative ideology. 
Inconsistencies within Kemalism and Kemalist reformism were usually explained by wrong-doings 
of the RPP cadres, not through short-comings or defects of the Kemalist ideology itself. Although 
the governing mentality of the RPP was criticized by the journal all the time, Kemalism was usually 
acquitted by referrals to its constructive, unifying essence by the end.
349
  
 
This can be explained by the success and positive effect of the War of Independence on Markopaşa 
writers who were impressed by Mustafa Kemal’s role and achievements in the war as much as other 
leftist intellectual of their time. Thus, Markopaşa writers wanted to connect their ideology to 
Kemalism to some extent. Still, as leftist intellectuals, they were aware of how far Kemalists could 
go to eliminate their opponents, regarding the prosecutions of 1925 and 1927. Particularly between 
1947 and 1949 they also experienced this first hand. Although their journal appeared during a 
relatively democratic climate, the writers were heavily penalized due to their opposition in the 
witch-hunt towards the leftists in 1948 -1949 period. Sabahattin Ali knew this via his personal 
experience prior to the Markopaşa series, since he was already jailed in 1931 because of a degrading 
poem about Mustafa Kemal he allegedly read in a meeting.
350
 After a short sentence in jail, he was 
pardoned by Mustafa Kemal. In the Markopaşa period, Sabahattin Ali and Aziz Nesin were 
sentenced and jailed, and Rıfat Ilgaz was thrown out from the sanatorium where he was being 
treated for tuberculosis. Still, all of them declared that they were Kemalists (Atatürkçü). This means 
that they wanted to connect their ideology to Kemalism. It seems the writers used Atatürkçülük as an 
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umbrella term to include anti-imperialist, republican, laicist, reformist features which would bring 
modernism and progress. As it also happened in Kadro and Yön’s case, “Atatürkçülük” as a term 
must have helped Markopaşa writers to define themselves as patriots with a native ideology.  
 
In a way, Markopaşa was possibly similar to other left-leaning groups of Turkey in the 1940s, which 
criticized Kemalists but stayed connected to it one way or another.
351
 In the 1960s, a similar 
interpretation of Kemalism was adopted by leftist and left-leaning groups such as Yön, TIP, and 
MDD as well. This left-leaning interpretation often took examples from early years of the War of 
Independence and stressed Mustafa Kemal’s early anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist discourses and 
used them to criticize contemporary developments. These leftist groups often interpreted early the 
1920s as a golden age, and they tried to create an ideal form of real Kemalism, according to their 
need.  
 
Similar to Kadro, Markopaşa’s writers did not see the West as the only source of development and 
modernity. In the Markopaşa series, Western powers, especially the US, appeared as symbols of 
capitalism and exploitation.
352
 According to Markopaşa, the late-Ottomans trusted the West and 
ended up being an occupied country; and in the 1940s, RPP governments were making the same 
mistake by trusting the US.
353
 Closeness with the US would have brought nothing but dependency. 
Besides, this change of direction was a betrayal to Mustafa Kemal’s legacy and was a serious threat 
towards gains of the Republic.
354
  
 
As seen, the Markopaşa series stands out with their anti-imperialist, anti-Western attitude as Kadro 
did. Here, the main difference of Markopaşa from Kadro was Markopaşa’s anti-American stance 
which was triggered by improving relations of Turkey with the US in the aftermath of WWII. 
Another factor that might have worried Markopaşa was Turkey’s changing relations with Russia, 
since the relations were quite close until Turkey’s stance in the WWII.355 Turkey’s change of 
direction in favor of the US and the liberal world was not favorable to them.  
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Indeed, compared to Kadro’s sharp opposition towards the Western Europe, Markopaşa’s discourse 
towards Europe was not as negative as Kadro’s. Markopaşa’s arguments about the West usually 
focused on the US, and it often appeared when foreign investments and the US’ involvement with 
economy and politics were mentioned. In many articles, Europe was mentioned in a negative way 
but this was always in connection with imperialism and economic matters. Other than that, 
Markopaşa did not easily discard European culture in its discourse. With this approach, Markopaşa 
seems to be in parallel with the Yön journal, since Yön also presented a dichotomy when the West 
and Europe were discussed. 
 
Kadro’s writers categorized socialism and Marxism as European-originated ideas and claimed to 
reject them along with capitalism and liberalism. Although Markopaşa writers put emphasis on 
importance of nativity of their ideology,
356
 contrary to Kadro, Markopaşa did not reject socialism. 
They protested being condemned as communists due to the negative connotations of communism 
but they did not reject socialism categorically.
357
 It seems, according to them, Kemalism was 
qualified as an original and native ideology, but only with its “real” content that was formulized by 
the journal. Thus, the primary task of intellectuals and the people was bringing the original 
principles of Kemalism back and strengthening them through democratic, reformist, laicist, 
egalitarian and progressive features. Years later, the Yön journal claimed similar arguments. 
 
Markopaşa’s most obvious difference form Kadro was the journal’s approach to the regime. 
Although both groups associated themselves with Kemalism, being from different periods and 
having different mentalities, Markopaşa and Kadro’s stance towards the regime was quite different. 
Markopaşa’s reformism was directly connected to its anti-imperialistic discourse which became 
obvious in its anti-American manifestations. Unlike Kadro, Markopaşa connected itself to Kemalism 
by emphasizing pluralist and populist features of early stages of Independence War. As a leftist 
publication, Markopaşa did not hesitate to expose shortcomings of Kemalist reform projects. The 
authoritarian tendencies of the regime and its implementation of reforms in a top-down fashion with 
a “for the people, despite the people” understanding were the main targets for the Markopaşa series.  
 
Markopaşa series left a legacy behind with their style of opposition. In 2013, when the anti-
government Gezi Protests took place in Turkey, Birgün newspaper published a Markopaşa issue in 
memory of the original Markopaşa. Many of the well-known leftist and progressive intellectuals 
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wrote in this issue. This also shows that the intellectuals of Markopaşa left a blueprint for the 
opponents of the strict governments to follow in Turkey.  
 
 
2.6 Etatism 
Unlike the Kadro and Yön journals, the Markopaşa series did not provide detailed information about 
etatism. Still, there is enough material to draw conclusions about the writers’ ideas about Kemalist 
etatism and economic policies in general. 
 
The limited number of articles devoted to etatism shows Markopaşa writers were positive about 
etatism and found it very necessary. Although Kadro and Markopaşa writers displayed 
dissimilarities about their ideas concerning other arrows, etatism seems to be the one that brought 
them together, and which they both attributed a great deal of importance.  
 
Markopaşa was published in the post-war era when Turkey’s relationship with the US was 
improving, and the country was more open to liberal economic policies compared to the early 1930s. 
This issue also deeply disturbed Markopaşa’s intellectuals. According to them, instead of opening 
the country to the USA’s intervention and liberalism, Turkey’s independence should have been 
backed by etatist economic policies in order to achieve financial independence.
358
 
 
Apparently, the writers’ leftist ideas and their devotion to anti-imperialism were major reasons for 
their emphasis on etatism. Exactly like Kadro, they were worried about liberal advances in the 
country. They believed that a country which fought a War of Independence against imperialist 
countries should not have let liberal and capitalist advances in the country. This would have been a 
betrayal of the Kemalist principles
.359
   
 
Markopaşa always mentioned etatism in connection with anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism. The 
journal favored a planned economy as well as land reform projects. In this sense, the journal was 
very much in line with Kadro journal and its efforts to insert a left-oriented discourse to Kemalist 
etatism projects. However, their interpretation of etatism did not seem to give a priority for 
connecting Turkey to the international web of anti-imperialist countries, in the way Kadro journal 
did. This may be due to Markopaşa’s style which used satire and humour and did not devote much 
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space to ideological discussions as the way Kadro did. In this sense, Markopaşa was very different 
than Kadro and Yön, since it had quite an informal approach and it did not focus on the subjects in a 
detailed way. However, the writers continued to write about these issues in other publications. For 
example, Aziz Nesin was brought to trial just after the 17
th
 issue of Markopaşa, due to a leaflet he 
published himself against Truman Doctrine. He was jailed on the 30
th
 of April 1948 for ten 
months.
360
  
 
It should also be noted that the writers did not explicitly mention the etatist arrow very often. The 
journal often mentioned issues about etatism through arguments about foreign investments, 7 
September Decisions, the Truman Doctrine, and US economic aid. 
 
Markopaşa writers were quite worried about the 7 September Decisions of 1946, which was mainly 
about the devaluation of the Turkish Lira by the Recep Peker government. Here, it should be noted 
that a Five-Year Plan of Turkey was also completed in 1946 with a great deal of contribution by the 
former Kadro members Ismail Hüsrev and Şevket Süreyya. However, the power balance changed in 
favor of liberal policies within a short time and 7 September Decisions were implemented as an 
attempt of the government to adjust itself to the liberal developments in the world. Following this, 
the government formed a new group which established the Turkish Development Plan, one that was 
more in line with liberal policies and favored private sectors compared to the previous five-year 
plan.
 361
 
 
According to Markopaşa, the outcome of the 7 September Decisions and the formation of a new 
committee about the economy were quite negative for the nation.
362
 This was such an important 
topic that the 7 September Decisions, Prime Minister Recep Peker and the Minister of Economy Atıf 
Inan were all criticized at every opportunity in articles, in satirical poems, jokes and caricatures. 
Although the journal did not bring any extensive explanation, the writers routinely demonstrated 
their concern and opposition against the 7 September Decisions.
363
 In their view, the 7 September 
Decisions were a milestone for the intervention of liberal policies. According to the journal, prior to 
1945 the RPP governments were full of former or active military officers who considered etatism as 
part of communist ideology.  After 1945, the country enjoyed a civil government for the first time 
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but the government devoted itself to liberalism and American aid.
364
 Thus, the journal claimed, the 
RPP government was not an appropriate legal political body to represent all citizens, groups, and 
institutions. Twenty-five years of the RPP period proved that, as a political body, RPP failed to act 
in the best interests of its own citizens.
365
 
 
Markopaşa’s interpretation of etatism was closely attached to the journal’s view about populism. 
Unlike Kadro, which focused on rapid development and Turkey’s stance within anti-imperialist 
movements around the world, Markopaşa tried to focus on negative effects of liberalism, what 
etatism would have brought to people and how etatism or land distribution policies would have had 
a positive impact on people’s lives.366 Turkey’s economic independence was very important for 
Markopaşa. However, rather than focusing on rapid development like Kadro, the journal added “the 
people” to the picture and tried to explain the ways in which liberalism would have harmed Turkey’s 
independence, especially  the lives of the working classes.
367
 According to the journal, if the 
economy had been managed within an etatist program, people’s lives could have been improved in 
many ways, since etatism would have provided more of an equal share and less exploitation.
368
 In 
this picture, Markopaşa writers identified themselves with the people. For example, one of the many 
titles of the Markopaşa journal was “Ali Baba”, as the writers referred to the “Ali Baba and Forty 
Thieves” and claimed the role of Ali Baba against “bandit” and “thief” politicians.369  In this sense, 
especially compared to Kadro, Markopaşa’s etatism had a more direct connection to populism. 
 
In short, Markopaşa often used arguments of etatism in order to criticize the RPP as well as DP for 
their tolerance of the US and its liberal policies. Its main arguments often focused on discussions 
about foreign investments and the 7 September Decisions of the Recep Peker government. The 
journal equated national independence with economic independence, and its writers were worried 
about Turkey’s possible dependence on the US due to the liberal policies of the RPP government. 
For the journal, etatist economic policies and land reform could provide more equality for ordinary 
people and would have kept Turkey’s independence intact. 
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3 YÖN 
Yön (Direction) was published between 1961 and 1967 by a group of influential intellectuals who 
were interested in political and socio-economic issues. Originally, the movement started within the 
opposition block within the RPP, as a criticism against the rule of the DP in the 1950s. Eventually 
however, it became an independent publication.
370
  
 
According to Atılgan, the movement was founded by two young academics, Doğan Avcıoğlu and 
Mümtaz Soysal, who met at the end of 1957.
371
 Although several intellectuals contributed to Yön, 
the core of the movement consisted of Doğan Avcıoğlu, Ilhan Selçuk, Mümtaz Soysal, Ilhami 
Soysal, and Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu. The writers were usually leftist or at least had a left-leaning 
world-view, although they did not always share the same views on every matter. The difference of 
opinion between the writers was one of the strengths of the journal,
372
 although they all thought that 
the right “direction” for Turkey was socialism. Thus, the name “Direction” was chosen because 
these intellectuals wished to show Turkey which direction to go. Along with their emphasis on 
socialism, they were also determined not to discard Kemalism.
373
  
 
The journal was first published six months after the coup, which targeted the right-wing and liberal 
Democrat Party government and its strict policies. After the coup, Turkey witnessed the emergence 
of the Turkish left in 1961, and the TIP (Workers Party of Turkey) was formed by a group of trade 
unions in 13 February 1961.
374
 As such, the journal was a result of the relatively free atmosphere 
after the coup d’état of May 27th 1960, which was led by the Kemalist military officials. 
 
Yön began its publication with a declaration of “Aydınların Ortak Bildirisi” (The Decleration of 
Intellectuals), which was signed by the many prominent public figures and intellectuals. Some of 
the Kadro and Markopaşa writers, such as Aziz Nesin, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir and Rıfat Ilgaz 
also signed it. In this declaration,
375
 the journal explained its objectives and expressed its wish to 
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reach the level of modernity and development of civilized Western countries, which had also been a 
goal of Mustafa Kemal.  
 
The writers claimed that the original goals of Kemalism had not been achieved, and the national 
liberation movement that was initiated by Mustafa Kemal was not yet complete.
376
 They argued that 
the former RPP governments had not been able to grasp the importance of etatism to fulfil its 
original principles. Due to different opinions within the RPP, early etatist attempts had been 
interrupted,
377
 and the power of the dominant classes had continued.
378
 In addition, the constant 
instability of politics was directly related to Turkey’s underdeveloped economy and the journal 
believed this was the most significant problem for Turkey.
379
 As such, Yön journal intended to be a 
platform to find ways of solving Turkey’s issues, since it could bring “active forces” of society 
together - which included progressive military members and civil intellectuals - to form a “National 
Front” (Milli Cephe). 
 
At this point, Yön’s solution was formulating a non-capitalist development plan - a “new etatism” - 
to recover and strengthen the economy. The new etatism was not going to be limited solely to 
economy. Once it was well planned and carefully implemented, it was going to be a transformative 
force for society as a whole and carry it to a socialist order. This was perceived by the journal as a 
model of development “within social justice”.380 Indeed, the intellectuals of Yön thought that if 
Kemalism could be reconstructed with the help of socialism, it could be the “saviour” of Turkey. 
According to them, Kemalism was not fundamentally different from socialism. After all, Mustafa 
Kemal’s thought displayed anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist features; thus it could have functioned 
as a native “Turkish socialism”.381  
 
As a result, the journal always tried to connect Kemalism and socialism via the leftist attributions of 
Kemalism. In their attempt, they heavily emphasized the populist and the etatist arrows, the former 
for its claim of social justice and the latter for its possibility to enable a development plan. 
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In the 1960s, socialism was a taboo word in Turkey and Yön was determined to change this, 
although it was not the only taboo that the journal targeted. The other taboo subjects, such as the 
predicament of communist poet Nazım Hikmet - who was deprived of his Turkish citizenship and 
died in diaspora in the Soviet Union - as well as Kurdish issue, were addressed by the journal as 
well.
382
 As a result, similar to Markopaşa, Yön also had its share of reactions and attacks from the 
ultra-nationalists. In January 1962, copies of the Yön journal were set on fire by nationalist youth in 
Taksim Square, along with Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, Akşam and Dünya newspapers.383  
 
In its early days, and similar to Kadro, the journal tried to convince the RPP to implement their 
ideas. Later on, the members tried to collaborate with the TIP to achieve their goals via the 
parliamentary system. When their expectations were not met in the 1965 elections, the journal 
gradually turned towards the military and started to articulate the army’s power to change the 
system. Here, the positive image of the coup d’état of May 27th in the leftist and progressive groups 
of Turkey should be kept in mind. Since this coup was mainly directed at the right-wing DP 
government and Turkey’s set back in Kemalist ideals, it created a positive image for many 
leftists.
384
 It was described as the “27 May Revolution” or “27 May Movement” by many and it was 
considered as a restoration of Kemalist ideals by the army. This fact applies to the Yön intellectuals 
as well. Although not everybody in the journal shared the exact same view, the positive image of 
the coup affected them and possibly made it easier for the journal to change its direction.  
 
After Yön, the movement continued writing with “Devrim” (Revolution) journal between 1969 and 
1971. Devrim was published by some of the leading members of Yön, such as Doğan Avcıoğlu, 
Ilhan Selçuk, Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu, and Ilhami Soysal. It articulated the ways of military 
intervention, and it was in touch with prominent military commanders, such as General Cemal 
Madanoğlu.385 Eventually, the Devrim circle established a close relationship with the military junta 
planners of March 9
th
 1971 and were involved in a military conspiracy directed by Madanoğlu. 
Indeed, the future program of the movement was prepared based on Avcıoğlu’s theories published 
in Yön and “Türkiye'nin Düzeni” (The Social Order of Turkey).386 However, this junta attempt 
failed due to the problems within the group.  
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Devrim seemed optimistic about the March 12
th
 1971 military intervention, since the journal still 
regarded it as the army’s reaction against the anti-Kemalist course and continued to believe in the 
army’s progressive role.387 However, the March 12th intervention was quite different than what 
people expected from a “leftist” coup and it suppressed the leftists instead. As such, the journal was 
closed down on 27 April by the “operation sledgehammer” (Balyoz Harekatı), which was brought 
about by the Martial Law declared in eleven cities. Although the members were cleared of all 
charges in court, the March 12
th
 intervention marked the end of the Yön-Devrim movement.
388
  
 
Nonetheless, similar to Kadro and Markopaşa journals, Yön also surpassed being a journal, created 
a movement and left a legacy behind. It played a major role in the political life of Turkey and 
became a driving force to give more space to the leftists in the press and the politics. It refreshed 
the connection between Kemalism, nationalism and leftist ideas, which had already been made by 
the early Turkish socialists and systematized by the Kadro movement. However, Yön went one step 
further from its predecessors by claiming to target a socialist order and paved the way for radical 
interpretations of Kemalism. Its major difference from Kadro and Markopaşa was to take practical 
action in order to seize power. 
 
 
3.1 Nationalism  
Since the early 1920s, Turkish leftists interpreted the national War of Independence as an anti-
imperialist movement. In the 1930s, Kadro described it as an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, 
national democratic war, and was the earliest example of its kind. In this way, Kadro systematized 
leftist attributions between anti-imperialism, nationalism and Kemalism. In the following years, the 
association between these ideas continued; and the people who needed to make a connection 
followed this pattern. In the 1960s, the anti-imperialist independence movements of the third-world 
such as Cuba, Vietnam, Egypt, and China set different examples for the countries with similar 
issues. Even though Turkey gained its independence in the early 1920s, the attributions between 
Kemalism, anti-imperialism, and nationalism became important once again due to the new 
developments. 
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The Yön group described itself as a Kemalist movement and the writers often embraced its 
nationalist arrow.
389
 Nevertheless, Yön made it clear that the journal was against any sort of 
nationalist classification based on ethnicity or race.
390
 The writers made a distinction between 
“nation” (millet) and “people” (halk), and they put the main emphasis on the second one.391 Still, 
they intentionally mentioned “nationalism” as part of their development program, because 
nationalism was not a property of any particular group.
392
  At this point, they tried to use it in a 
different context and limited its meaning to patriotism. According to them, nationalism simply 
meant love of the people, and it required working for the best interest of Turkey; therefore Yön 
writers were the best nationalists.
393
 In this way, they connected nationalism and populism and they 
tried to undertake the nationalist image which was usually owned by the right wing politicians.  
 
Yön’s possible definition of the “nation” did not seem very different than Mustafa Kemal’s version, 
which referred the nation as a group of people who share a common language, history, and culture. 
However, due to its left-oriented ideology, the journal always perceived the economy as a crucial 
factor for Turkey and regarded it as a decisive element in nation-building process like Kadro and 
Markopaşa.  
 
Yön seemed to perceive nationalism as a social project and associated it with progressive and 
modernizing elements.
394
 According to Avcıoğlu, Kemalist nationalism was incomplete due to its 
lack of understanding of the economic field. He stated that socialism was the best method for rapid 
development within social justice, therefore, socialism was the best form of nationalism.
395
 In this 
way, he declared that the journal’s intention was challenging and reconstructing Kemalism by 
connecting it to socialism.
 
 
 
Yön members often described themselves as Kemalist, nationalist, and socialist intellectuals at the 
same time.
396
 Nonetheless, they claimed that their nationalism was different than traditional 
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nationalist views because it directly connected to modernity, development, and progress.
397
 Exactly 
like Markopaşa intellectuals, they called themselves as “real” nationalists in order to mark their 
difference. According to Avcıoğlu, leftists, Kemalists and modernist intellectuals were the genuine 
nationalists; not the traditional exploiter groups who claimed nationalism and accused all 
progressive people with communism.
398
   
 
Yön made a distinction between the progressive nationalism of oppressed countries and reactionary 
nationalism of oppressors as well.
399
 However, similar to Kadro, Yön interpreted Lenin’s work in a 
selective manner and underestimated his temporary and conditional tolerance for nationalism. By 
making a direct connection between nationalism and socialism via assumed anti-imperialist features 
of nationalism, the journal justified its nationalist interpretation within a socialist context. Here, 
Yön’s interpretations look similar to Third World nationalisms of the 1960s with its anti-imperialist 
outlook. 
 
According to Yön, co-existence of socialism and nationalism was not contradictory. On the 
contrary, to be a “real” nationalist, one had to be a socialist.400 According to the writers, as the War 
of Independence proved, nationalism could have revolutionary content to bring people together to 
fight against imperialism.
401
 A real nationalist was always against capitalism and imperialism, at 
least in the underdeveloped countries.
402
 In the 20
th
 Century, nationalism meant rapid development 
within a populist, etatist and revolutionist program.
403
 Thus, due to nationalism’s anti-imperialist 
features, a combination of nationalism and socialism was always possible.
404
  
Yön criticized the TIP for creating confusion by depicting internationalism and nationalism as 
opposing ideas.
405
 Contrary to what TIP expressed, Avcıoğlu claimed that being an internationalist 
and nationalist at the same time was possible, and the merging of these ideas did not create a 
conflict. The nationalism Yön supported was a nationalism of third-world countries, in other words 
“socialist nationalism”. As Atılgan also stresses, Avcıoğlu claimed that Yön’s “socialist 
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nationalism” was not opposite of internationalism because it was the result of a profound 
internationalism.
406
  
 
It seems Yön believed in the possibility of independent nations within a socialist world order. At 
the beginning of the 1930s, Kadro members advocated similar ideas. Although Kadro rejected 
internationalism as a concept due to its leftist connotations, the journal’s descriptions were quite 
similar to Yön’s model. The combination of anti-imperialism and nationalism was essential to 
Kadro’s ideology as well. Compared to Yön however, Kadro’s nationalism was more distinct and it 
did not seek a socialist objective, while the relationship between nationalism and socialism was 
more crucial for Yön. Another interesting point here is Şevket Süreyya’s support for Yön. His 
articles in the journal served to make left-oriented attributions to Kemalism again. As in the Kadro 
period, he wrote about etatism as well as anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist features of Turkish War of 
Independence. In the 1960s, he added a populist touch to his previous ideas and he argued for the 
possibilities of creating a “Turkish socialism”.407 However, he still argued that “Turkish socialism” 
was a form of reformism and it did not include an option for a revolution in a Marxist sense.
408
 
 
Like Yön, the anti-imperialist feature of nationalism was put forward in Markopaşa as well. The 
intellectuals of this journal linked themselves to socialism primarily via anti-imperialism. However, 
connecting nationalism and anti-imperialism was not a decisive element in Markopaşa’s ideology. 
Its main focus was primarily on populism and creating an opposition towards the system backed by 
the ordinary citizens.  
 
Indeed, by attributing anti-imperialist features to nationalism, Yön tried to connect socialism and 
Kemalist ideology, since Kemalism is heavily defined with nationalism. Yön’s interpretation of 
nationalism was almost the same with ideas of the MDD group (National Democratic Revolution 
Group) of the 1960s. Both groups believed in the possibility of a connection between Kemalism 
and socialism via anti-imperialism within a strong nationalist context.
409
 TIP also made similar 
attributions but with less stress on nationalism.  Still, almost all of the TIP members, including 
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Behice Boran who had a more Marxist line, accepted anti-imperialism as an essential feature of 
Kemalism.
410
  
 
At this point, Lenin and Stalin’s work seem to provide a necessary base for Yön to insist on the 
combination of the two ideas. As mentioned in the Kadro chapter, Lenin and Stalin’s differentiation 
between the “progressive” nationalism of independence movements in underdeveloped countries 
and “reactionary” nationalism of imperialist exploiter countries already opened the way for this sort 
of combination. As a result, Lenin’s “Rights of Nations for Self-Determination” and Stalin’s 
“Marxism and the National Question” became a widespread point of reference for the leftists of 
Turkey, who already carried nationalist tendencies from the beginning.  
 
Another important point that separated the Yön movement from Kadro’s and brought it closer to the 
Markopaşa was Yön’s handling of the Kurdish issue. Kurdish issue drew the attention of the leftist 
groups in the 1960s. For example, TIP organized Eastern Rallies in order to make connections with 
the people from those regions. Regarding the Kurds, Yön did not share the official Kemalist view. 
Doğan Avcıoğlu believed in the necessity of challenging the official view about this issue to break 
the taboo about it.
411
 As mentioned by Atılgan, he became the first one to name the issue as the 
“Eastern Problem” (Doğu Sorunu).412 When Yön members wrote about Kurds in other countries, 
they usually separated it from the “Eastern Problem” and mentioned the subject as “Kurdish 
issue”.413 
 
Yön became a vanguard publication in the republican history which voluntarily tried to make a 
contribution to solve this issue. The writers mentioned this subject by recognizing the problems of 
not only Turkish side but also of the Kurds. By daring to write about the problems of Kurds and the 
Eastern regions, the writers tried to normalize, and discuss this issue as well as to establish an 
objective ground to talk about it.  
 
Similar to Kadro, at first, the journal approached this subject with discussions about the economy 
and why the Eastern regions were underdeveloped and how those conditions contributed to the 
problems in the area.
414
 Nevertheless, the journal improved its discourse and in time it managed to 
bring up valuable discussions. The writers translated interviews of Kurdish leaders, such as 
                                                 
410 Yön-Devrim Hareketi: Kemalizm ile Marksizm Arasında Geleneksel Aydınlar, Atılgan, 2008, p. 133, 135  
411 “Kürt Meselesi”, Doğan Avcıoğlu, Yön, 16 December 1966 
412 Yön-Devrim Hareketi: Kemalizm ile Marksizm Arasında Geleneksel Aydınlar, Atılgan, 2008, p. 109 
413 “Kürt Meselesinde Son Gelişmeler”, Yön, issue 158, p. 1, 8 April, 1966 
414 “Doğu”, Yön, issue 3, p. 5, 3 January 1962 
 116 
Barzani, from other sources and published in the journal.
415
 More importantly, the journal opened 
its pages to young Kurdish and Turkish writers who had constructive ideas about this matter. In this 
way, different people with liberal or leftist ideas expressed their thoughts about the problems. For 
example, the consequences of not recognizing the existence of the Kurdish people and language, 
and positive and negative sides of a possible native-language education for the people who 
primarily speak Kurdish were discussed in Yön.
416
  
 
Despite the journal’s positive and constructive approach towards the Kurds, some of the writers 
were not totally immune to the common prejudices towards non-Turkish, non-Muslim minorities. 
Although the journal was quite careful about ethno-racial discrimination and racism, the writers 
sometimes did not hesitate to employ an exclusivist language about sensitive issues, such as 
minority schools or conflicts between Greece and Turkey about Cyprus.  
 
According to Niyazi Berkes, religion-based schools, especially Orthodox ones should have been 
strictly controlled by the Directorate of Religious Affairs.
417
 Yön blamed the mentality of those 
schools for their relatively independent spirit, the vague content of their programs and their 
tendency for engaging in treasonous activities in favor of their own establishments.  According to 
the journal, “In the minority schools, the students often do not speak Turkish and their Turkish 
language teachers do not speak any minority language. They can not communicate with each other. 
Besides, due to their obscure programs, nobody really can inspect those schools efficiently. It is a 
mystery what they teach to the students. Those schools teach the students everything about their 
religion and native language but they do nothing about teaching them Turkish.”418 The tone and 
ideas about this subject resemble Kadro writers’ ideas about minorities, especially the ideas of 
Burhan Asaf, who was furious at minorities due to their negligence about Turkish. 
 
As seen, the journal was sceptical about the non-Muslim minorities and their religious 
establishments. According to Berkes, the nationalism of the Anatolian Greeks was nothing but a 
tool for the imperialists. He claimed the religious leaders of the Anatolian Greeks were not only 
Greek nationalists but also US agents who were sent Turkey to fight against the leftists and the 
communists. The clergy of those religious establishments was supported not only by their 
community but also by the whole Greek nation and the US. Those establishments were harmful to 
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Turkey, because they were deliberately triggering nationalism of the minorities and working against 
the Turkish nation’s independence.419  
 
In another article, Yön stated that the “Armenian issue” did not exist for Turkey. The journal 
criticized the Armenians who still lived in Turkey but dreamt of an independent Armenia. 
According to the journal, problems about Armenians should not have been in Turkey’s agenda 
anymore, since all the issues about them were yesterday’s matter.420  
 
As seen, the expressions of the journal sometimes included an exclusivist tone and carried same 
nationalist defensive reflex which can be observed in Mustafa Kemal’s utterances as well as in 
Kadro and partially in Markopaşa journals. 
 
Apparently, not only Kadro and Markopaşa but also Yön attributed left-leaning ideas to Kemalism, 
mainly via anti-imperialism. This approach was a common tendency within almost all the leftist or 
left-leaning groups of the republic like TKP, TIP or MDD. Whether they adopted socialism or not, 
all of these groups seemed to use anti-imperialism as a mediator in order to connect their leftist 
ideology to Kemalism. Depending on the degree of their nationalism, some of them, like Yön and 
MDD, tried to connect nationalism and socialism as well. This link often meant proof of their 
nativity; since they were often accused of being communist. Thus, embracing Kemalism and its 
nationalist side was bringing them nativity and legitimacy within its established and respected 
nature. Except for Markopaşa, Yön and especially Kadro shared the exclusivist tone of the Kemalist 
nationalism to different degrees, even though the journals openly rejected any racist or ethno-racial 
discrimination. In Kadro, exclusivist features were more common and general. However, in Yön, 
they were less frequent and were limited to the certain subjects which were highlighted due to the 
political developments at the time.  
 
 
3.2 Populism  
“People” (halk) and “nation” (millet) were used interchangeably by Mustafa Kemal, the RPP and 
the Kadro group. Neither of the groups made any definite distinction between two concepts, since 
there was an overlap between two words for them. In the 1940s, Markopaşa also used the same 
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words interchangeably. Still, due to its leftist connotations made by many of the Turkish leftists at 
the time, the journal attributed more meaning to “people”. 
 
Unlike the early RPP members and Kadro, Yön made a clear distinction between the two words. 
The writers deliberately preferred “people” rather than “nation” due to its populist meaning. 
Besides, “people” gave a hint about the classes. According to them, this was also what Mustafa 
Kemal meant with populism.
421
 
 
Compared to Kadro, Yön writers had a different interpretation of the concept of “people”. 
According to them, “the people” mostly consisted of working classes and progressive military and 
civil intellectuals. They excluded the members of the bourgeoisie, upper classes, and rich landlords 
from their description of “the people”, because they were “the exploiters of the working classes”. 
They made an exception for members of the military by claiming that they usually originated from 
middle-class families, therefore the Kemalist army was part of the people.
422
 Like Yön, Kadro 
writers also mentioned exploiter classes when they referred feudal relations in the Eastern 
provinces, but they never articulated the meaning of “the people” clearly. Markopaşa’s usage of this 
term was more similar to Yön, since it displayed the journal’s class consciousness with its stance in 
favor of the working classes all the time. Still, it never gave any priority to the intellectuals or 
military like Yön. 
 
According to Yön, Mustafa Kemal was a populist leader and the Kemalists handled many things 
quite successfully. Nonetheless, they failed to bring long-lasting solutions, especially for working 
classes.
423
 This created one of the main problems with Kemalist populism which was never resolved 
the distance between the governors and the citizens.
424
 The journal declared that in order to solve 
this problem Yön was going to complement Kemalist ideology with “social justice”, because 
development could only have been achieved in that way.
425
 
 
Yön’s interpretation of populism had a socialist outlook, and their left-oriented ideas can easily be 
traced in the discourse of the writers. According to Mümtaz Soysal, “If democracy means 
‘governance of the people by the people’, then there should not be any incompatibility between 
democracy and socialism. (…) Within all economic systems, socialism is the only one which 
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attributes lots of value to the people and ordinary citizens. After all, socialism is the system of 
believers of people.”426  
 
As Fahrettin Altun points out, when Yön writers put socialism and Kemalism together, they 
focused on the concept of “populism”. They equated populism with socialism and this generally 
meant an opposition against the hegemony of rich and feudal classes as well as against 
capitalism.
427
  
 
According to the journal, socialism was just another name for Kemalist populism.
428
 Avcıoğlu 
argued that the populism of the early 1920s was similar to Yön’s interpretation of socialism in the 
1960s. He claimed that “The first assembly, which carried the spirit of Kuvayi Milliye (national 
forces of the liberation movement), was constituted of members of the middle class, such as military 
officers, merchants from small towns, and  religious leaders. There wasn’t any group there to 
represent big-trade and industry. There, Atatürk declared that they were populists, because 
national forces regarded populism as an essential part of liberation. Populism meant to them being 
against notables and wealthy landlords of the towns and cities and supporting governance of 
working classes. Today we call this outlook socialism. We might call it populism as well.”429 
Nevertheless, he also mentioned that the first assembly was still conservative rather than a 
progressive establishment. It adopted populism but did not push the reforms further to realize the 
populist ideals.
430
   
 
Yön writers emphasized certain aspects of Kemalism, such as anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, and 
the aim of a classless society to demonstrate the compatibility of Kemalist ideology and socialism. 
They often referred to the early years of the War of Independence, when the populist discourse of 
Mustafa Kemal was evident. The writers often revisited speeches and utterances of Mustafa Kemal 
to show socialist elements in them. In their descriptions, Mustafa Kemal appeared as a leader whose 
ideas were in agreement with socialism. In this process, some of the characteristics of Mustafa 
Kemal’s ideas which would have caused contradictions with Yön’s ideology were ignored. It can be 
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said that very much like Kadro and Markopaşa, Yön interpreted the motives of Mustafa Kemal and 
early Kemalists according to its agenda and ideological preferences. 
 
These attempts became quite obvious in Avcıoğlu’s book, “Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi” (The History of 
National Liberation), which he wrote just after the Yön-Devrim period. He argued that many of the 
Turkish nationalists of the 1910s and 1920s were in fact follower of leftist ideas. According to him, 
even Ziya Gökalp became a leftist in time, regarding his progressive ideas on populism, social 
justice and social classes. Avcıoğlu intentinally overlooked solidarist core of Gökalp’s ideology and 
insisted that Gökalp’s thinking swiftly shifted towards a leftist ideology, because like Yön, he was 
also a nationalist, anti-liberal, anti-Marxist and a supporter of a classless society, which was based 
on a mutual collaboration of social classes rather than a clash between them. Avcıoğlu claimed that 
even the former Unionist and later the liberal DP politician Celal Bayar had a leftist phase, and this 
was obvious in Bayar’s being one of the founders of Green Army of famous Çerkes Ethem, which 
aimed realizing a Muslim communism in Turkey.
431
 
 
As seen, Yön usually regarded Kemalist ideology as competent with left-oriented ideas. The writers 
perceived the War of Independence as a “national revolution” and the early Kemalists as the 
“nationalist revolutionaries”. According to them, those early attempts were interrupted due to the 
failure of the early RPP cadres. They left liberal and conservative exploiter powers intact, and at the 
end, collaboration of those groups stopped Kemalist reforms and Turkey departed from populist 
ideals. Still, the people who wanted to change Turkey’s fate in the 1960s needn’t have felt hopeless. 
Kemalism was not an end but a beginning. Kemalist populism could have resumed from the point 
where Mustafa Kemal left it and be a guideline for the restoration of Turkey again.
432
  
 
Since their interpretation of socialism was in the context of populism, Yön’s writers directed their 
attention to the social classes and classless society. Nevertheless, they were not always consistent 
with their arguments over the Kemalist interpretation of classes. Sometimes they criticized early 
Kemalist cadres for refusing to admit to the existence of classes, but other times they praised them 
for their Kemalist ideals of a classless society, even though Mustafa Kemal’s version carried a 
solidaristic outlook rather than a socialist one. Avcıoğlu claimed that Mustafa Kemal tried to create 
a classless society with the populist arrow in the beginning.
433
 According to Sadun Aren, Mustafa 
Kemal longed for creating a classless society; he even named his political party the “People’s 
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Party” accordingly. Therefore, socialism can be taken as an intrinsic element in Kemalism and the 
Kemalists of the 1960s should have been working to reach this original Kemalist objective, which 
could only be possible by the formation of a socialist society in the way Mustafa Kemal envisioned 
from the early 1920s.
434
 However, in another article, Aren criticized Mustafa Kemal by arguing that 
he knew socialism, and he intended to form a classless society with the help of populist arrow, but 
he abandoned this aim later. After this alteration, Mustafa Kemal changed the terminology about 
classes and he neglected the necessary entities which were a prerequisite for a classless society, 
such as etatism and land distribution.
435
 
 
The Kadro writers were aware of the existence of different social classes like Yön and they 
idealized a classless society. However, there was a difference between the discourses of the two 
groups regarding socialism. Contrary to Yön’s frequent referral to socialism, Kadro was openly 
against a classless society in a socialist - Marxist context, even though the writers were influenced 
by Marxist thought to some extent. Regarding classes, they often preferred the Kemalist solidaristic 
option over socialism. Here, it should be noted that Yön’s ideas about classless society were not 
indispensable ideological elements, since the journal’s emphasis on socialism changed within the 
years, as well as its idealization about classless society.  
 
Yön’s arguments about classes often belonged to the journal’s early years. Similar to Kadro, the 
writers did not embrace classic Marxist understanding of classes. In spite of their idealization of a 
classless society, they also claimed that the Yön movement was against a classless society in a 
Marxist sense, because that option would have involved class conflicts and the dictatorship of 
proletarian classes. Again very much like Kadro, Yön criticized Marxist theory due to its failure for 
not bringing a solution for underdeveloped, non-European countries. Avcıoğlu argued that bloody 
class wars would not have helped Turkey to reach a classless society as the way Atatürk imagined. 
The only way to achieve this goal was implementing a non-capitalist development strategy, in other 
words, a “new etatism”. In this way, Turkey would have reached a classless structure without 
dealing with the Marxist model. Turkish socialists who grasped the real meaning of Kemalist 
theory were to follow this road.
436
 Here, it is possible to see the power and persistence of Kadro’s 
arguments from the early 1930s, since Avcıoğlu built on the same arguments.  
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The issues of the populist arrow were usually explained in connection to the etatist arrow. 
According to Avcıoğlu, failure of the populist arrow was caused by the mistakes of the nationalist 
revolutionaries, who claimed to protect the people against the tyranny of capitalism but failed by 
adopting liberal policies in Izmir Economy Congress as early as 1923. Following this, the 
Constitution of 1924 hindered the possibility of land distribution. The leaders of the RPP tolerated 
liberal economy policies, and they let big business get involved in politics. As a result, a proper 
merging of populist arrow and etatist policies never took place.”437  
 
However, like early Kemalist cadres, Yön’s populist discourse seemed to deteriorate over the years, 
especially after Yön’s disappointment with changing the system via the parliamentary system. 
Indeed, unlike the TIP, which was led by Mehmet Ali Aybar and aimed to be in contact with 
working classes and peasants with its more populist strategy, Yön’s intellectuals always opted for 
military officials to collaborate from the beginning. Although they declared that the second step of 
etatism was a transformation process towards socialism, they did not intend to attract the attention 
of working classes since the journal was not after a revolution in the Marxist sense but a gradual 
change in a national context.  
 
As Altun mentions, Yön writers did not believe in transformative characteristics of social forces 
like the proletariat. According to them, the “active forces” (the dynamic sections of the public 
which included army officers and intelligentsia) were to be trusted to work with.
438
 According to 
Ilhan Selçuk, military forces had always been the executor of all the reforms since the Tanzimat 
period. Since the army always had a crucial role in the Westernisation and modernisation of 
Turkey, it was likely to be a more powerful ally for progressive forces rather than working 
classes.
439
 Ilhami Soysal described the army as “the light in the midst of despair” and “the source of 
hope”.440 
 
As explained by Atılgan, Avcıoğlu was aware of the fact that the army or state officials would have 
been reluctant to support a movement which would be based on the leadership of proletarian 
classes. He thought that a military officer would not have followed the leadship of the workers.
441
 
Thus, Yön eventually envisioned a political movement to be directed by the “active forces”. Once 
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the working classes and ordinary citizens saw tangible results by the active forces, they would 
support Yön’s choices. 
 
Yön believed that the army officials and intellectuals could be objective and could behave 
differently in order to work for reforms Yön targeted.
442
 Therefore, instead of persuading working 
classes, Yön members tended to connect with military and civilian elites to seize political power 
from above for quick results.  
 
The journal’s inspirational sources seemed to be nationalist and progressive regimes which were 
prone to coup d’états for seizing power, rather than the movements that organized from below. As 
the first country to gain its independence in Africa, Egypt became an idol for the journal due to its 
eclectic socialist discourse.  
 
According to its 1964 constitution, Egypt was a nationalist, anti-communist, anti-Marxist, anti-
imperialist cooperative-socialism which introduced a land reform project.
443
 Nasser came to power 
with a military coup d'état which was led by the members of pro-independence “Association of Free 
Officers”. Despite its eclectic populist discourse, active participation of the working classes in 
politics was not possible.
444
 As seen, it is possible to find similarities between Yön’s ideology and 
Nasser’s example in Egypt, especially when the journal’s admiration for Nasser’s success was well 
documented starting from the first issue.
445
  
 
The journal’s attitude towards the state was quite similar to Kadro, which claimed that the state was 
above all the classes, and could operate as an unbiased, objective institution in the hands of a right 
intellectual cadre. While Kadro insisted that a state model that had no ill-effects of any social class 
was possible, Yön believed in the objectivity of the military forces, elevating them above the other 
classes and relying on their help for socialist development. However, Yön’s methods and ideology 
became an issue of discussion within leftist circles. Yön was criticized on this matter by the TIP 
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and Hikmet Kıvılcımlı just as Kadro was criticized for a similar reason by liberal Ahmet Ağaoğlu 
and TKP members like Şefik Hüsnü and Nazım Hikmet.446  
 
After the 1965 elections, when discussions about a parliament-centered political regime intensified 
and ideological differences between leftist groups became more apparent, Yön was criticized by the 
TIP for its choice of the target group with whom to collaborate.
447
 As stated by Atılgan, according 
to the TIP and Behice Boran, army officials and state-elites were already a part of certain social 
classes, and they were indispensable for the existing system. This fact should have been enough for 
classifying them as unqualified allies. They were already playing a functional part within the 
system, and it was not possible for those classes to think independently, let alone lead crucial 
reforms against the benefit of their own social classes. Thus, those military and state officials who 
were relied on by Yön lacked any possibility of creating a radical transformation. They would not 
have risked their privileges. Thus, rather than embarking upon that risky choice, reaching out to the 
proletarians and peasants would have been a more logical decision.
448
  
 
Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, a prominent figure in radical left in Turkey, directed severe criticisms at the 
Yön movement as well. In 1970, he wrote about Yön in a book, “May 27 and A Denominational 
Critique of the Yön Movement”, where he criticized the movement for confusing the meaning of 
“nüfus” (population) with “nüfuz” (influence of authority). He claimed that Yön’s real aim was to 
strengthen the influence of the state rather than the influence of people. According to him, Yön 
postponed socialism to an unknown future, precisely like Mustafa Kemal postponed the Program of 
Populism in the 1920s and he never brought it into the agenda. As he turned his back to populism, 
Yön turned its back to socialism, because the journal was not genuine about its socialist goals. The 
journal’s vague ideas about the people were a clear indication of this. Despite its socialist discourse, 
Yön’s concept of the people was not different than traditional state elites, but it managed to disguise 
this by employing a modern terminology.
449
  
 
Regarding its wish for immediate action to realize its objectives rather than convincing the public, 
Yön’s understanding of organizing a political movement seems similar to Unionists and Kemalist 
cadres under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Indeed, the journal followed a similar pattern to 
Unionists, Ziya Gökalp, Kemalists and Kadro members when it comes determining the groups to 
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collaborate with and regarding the role of the masses in political action. However, Yön differed 
from them by referring to “the people” as a more active element, especially in its early years. Due 
to this fact, Yön was different than Kadro, which had even more elitist outlook and lacked a 
populist as well as a socialist discourse. Therefore, in their attempt to connect socialism and 
Kemalism via the populist arrow, and particularly in equating populism with socialism, Yön was 
more similar to the Markopaşa journal.  
 
Still, compared to Markopaşa and TIP, Yön’s ideology was more elitist. TIP insisted on giving 
more space to working classes in political life, as Markopaşa did in the late 1940s, and it objected 
relying on the power of the military. As Ulus emphasizes, the party was against transition to a 
socialist regime through an authoritarian solution and opposed to any top-down intervention by 
either the civil or military elites. According to Behice Boran, there could be “no short-cut” to 
socialism.
450
 Especially under the leadership of Aybar, the TIP’s regulation-book did not give any 
privilege to the intellectuals and even tried to hinder hegemony of their power.
451
 
 
In short, like Kadro and Markopaşa, Yön intentionally revived populist discourses of early years of 
the War of Independence and referred to anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist speeches of Mustafa Kemal 
quite often. These three journals, especially Kadro and Yön, were prone to shift the axis of 
socialism and Kemalism in order to use them according to their needs. In this process, ambiguity 
and the relatively ill-defined content of Kemalism must have helped them. 
 
 
3.3 Etatism  
In this chapter, Yön’s ideas on etatism and socialism will be discussed, since it regarded both as 
major tools for development.  
 
Yön regarded the economy as a substructure for society and political life. Since its writers 
perceived instability in the economy as a fundamental cause for the inconsistencies in the society 
and in politics, economic development had an utmost priority for them. In this sense, etatism can be 
taken as one of the core ideas of Yön’s ideology, as it was of Kadro’s.  
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According to the journal, Turkey’s biggest problem was economic development and Turkey needed 
to create an anti-imperialist, non-capitalist development plan immediately.
452
  Here, Yön was 
forming its own solution, “new etatism”,453 and the journal was attempting to bring a new 
interpretation to the third-way etatism practices, which were already expressed in several ways until 
then. Similar to Kadro, Yön members tried to restore the weak points of Kemalism by stressing the 
importance of etatist economic policies in order to break free from the capitalist system.  
 
Economic development was an important topic for the Turkish Republic since the 1930s. However, 
Yön differed from the existing interpretations with its emphasis on socialism.
454
 Accordingly, once 
it was adapted to Turkey’s conditions, socialism could be the best way for rapid development.455 
Yön‘s new etatism was going to be an alternative anti-capitalist third-way, which was originally 
developed by Mustafa Kemal.
456
 
 
As emphasized by Altun, 
 
Yön claimed that basic principles of Kemalist theory reflected the basic 
formula of Turkish etatism and Turkish socialism.
457
 According to Avcıoğlu, socialism could be 
taken as one of the arrows of Kemalism, since it was a continuation of Kemalist ideals.
458
  
 
Yön always connected etatist and populist arrows. According to its ideological leader Avcıoğlu, 
socialism was the only system that could enable the country to develop rapidly within social 
justice.
459
 The new etatism was not a project that ignores populist principles.
460
 The primary 
objective of etatism was giving preference to needs of people; therefore etatism and populism were 
inseparable.
461
  
 
Avcıoğlu argued that an independent economy could be achieved in two ways without causing class 
struggles. It could either be done by developing state capitalism in the country as the way Soviet 
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Russia did or by a transition to a “domestic” socialism outside of the capitalist circle with the help 
of new etatism. Yön advocated the second solution and insisted that this was an attainable 
possibility for Turkey. 
 
As Atılgan points out, the origin of this model was inspired by dependency theory, which appeared 
after World War II as a reaction to modernism theory and attempted to bring solutions of 
development to underdeveloped, third-world countries which engaged in an independence 
struggle.
462
  
 
Yön’s new etatism favored labor, but it was not against private enterprise. It had an anti-capitalist 
motive but the journal was against class conflicts and proletarian dictatorship in the Marxist sense 
and sought support of the “active forces” to realize a new model for etatism.463  
 
Similar to Ismail Hüsrev’s ideas in the 1930s, Avcıoğlu claimed that there were three ways for 
development. The first one was Asian Socialism and it was quite an efficient way for rapid growth. 
However, it was bound to result in totalitarian regimes. Besides, Turkey lacked a strong proletarian 
class and conscious peasantry that this system required. The second one was Western Socialism, 
but this system required capital accumulation which Turkey already lacked. The final one was 
“Third-World Socialism” or, as it was sometimes mentioned in the journal, “Socialism of 
Underdeveloped Countries”. He insisted that the third model was the only option for 
underdeveloped countries, which neither had necessary social classes nor capital accumulation in 
order to develop a socialist system. Thus, this model was peculiar to third-world countries.
464
 
 
Avcıoğlu further argued that Third-World Socialism was a transition period in essence, and it had 
two inner stages. The first step was an anti-imperialist “national democratic revolution”, which was 
already achieved by Turkey in 1923. This stage was going to be followed by a second step, which 
was basically a struggle for economic independence against the capitalist economy. Turkey lacked 
economic independence, therefore it had yet to reach this second step. The transition to socialism 
would have been much easier, once society had achieved an independent economy.  
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Similar to Kadro, Yön’s suggestions for the new etatism required a strict and broad etatist plan in 
order to create a sufficient accumulation of capital. According to this plan, an extensive land reform 
was necessary as well as spreading of organizations like syndicates and cooperatives.  
 
However, while explaining their economic program, very much like Kadro journal, Yön 
encountered an important obstacle to overcome. This was providing clear explanations to questions 
about the new etaism: How was Turkey going to stay outside of the capitalist economy? Why was 
the new etatism unique and in which ways was it going to be an alternative to the capitalist 
economy? Since Yön’s main arguments were based on this issue, the journal’s explanations about it 
are quite important. Despite its importance, this point was left rather ambiguous in the journal. Like 
Kadro members, Yön intellectuals wrote about etatism extensively but they deliberately omitted 
explaining how exactly new etatism was going to outside of the capitalist system. After the Yön 
journal, Doğan Avcıoğlu wrote on the same issues extensively in his book, “Türkiye'nin Düzeni”, 
but the book did not bring a satisfying answer as well.  
 
The problem originated over the claims about the uniqueness of the New Etatism. It seems that Yön 
was, in fact, advocating for an economic model which was based on a mutual collaboration of state 
and private enterprise. Apparently, this was a mixed model, including state capitalism. Therefore, in 
spite of Yön’s claims, “new etatism” was still within the capitalist economy, rather than a break 
from it. Here, Fahrettin Altun mentions an important point about development model of Yön. 
According to him, “All economic models of development refer to a  ‘Western level of development’; 
even though Yön’s writers have identified the capitalist development model with imperialism and 
the dominance of the private sector, they still considered the Western process of development as a 
historical model and a path to follow. There is no radical difference between these development 
models in practice. All these models are considered essential industrialization for non-Western 
societies and are based on top-down intervention policy regardless of a society’s authentic 
historical, cultural, geographical, social and economic conditions. In this sense, whether such 
models favor state capitalism or stem from liberal sources, they basically adopt similar policies.”465  
 
Yön was probably aware of this fact from early on, and members opposed liberals and right-wing 
conservative politicians, as their motive to avoid being associated with capitalism could be 
understood. This sort of association would have undermined the credibility of their discourse. The 
writers must have needed to follow a discourse of uniqueness in order to hold their ground. 
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Therefore, Yön explained how to apply new etatism clearly but avoided to explain its nature. 
Unlike Kadro, Yön had clearer explanations and resisted employing a prophetic, complex language. 
However, there were still ambiguous points in Yön’s new etatism exactly like in Kadro journal.  
 
Yön members seemed to be sincere about their anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist motives. 
However, they were trying to collaborate with army officials and state elites. Under those 
circumstances, they might have avoided expressions such as “state capitalism”, which would have 
been easily linked to Soviets and communism. As such, they did everything to prevent any 
association between the journal and the negative image of communism, due to powerful anti-
communist propaganda in Turkey and the world at the time.
466 
Moreover, socialism had a high 
prestige within the military due to the success of the national cooperative socialism experiments 
which were initiated by the military officers, and the writers were probably aware of the fact that 
communism would not have been a relatable ideology for progressive army members.
467
 According 
to Avcıoğlu, supporting Nasser meant supporting the Arab world, which changed its direction 
towards socialism.
468
 In this sense, except for the emphasis on Islam, Yön’s socialism model 
resembled socialism experiments in the non-Western world with strong national tones, especially 
the ones in Arabic and African countries.  
 
While having influential arguments over the economy was quite important for Kadro members in 
the early 1930s, Yön was in a similar situation in the 1960s, when non-Western national 
movements emerged from their strong anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist discourse and the writers 
were impressed by their rise and success.
469
 As a result, Yön highlighted revolutionary and 
innovative assertions about Kemalism, and claimed to complete Kemalism with the help of the 
socialist ideology. Being associated with Kemalism was crucial for Yön in order to demonstrate its 
nativity and originality. A modernized version of Kemalism was going to be a domestic version of 
socialism for the journal. This point became more important in the later periods of Yön, especially 
when the journal needed to secure its collaboration with army officers and other intellectual elites. 
Apparently, Kemalism was the common point to bring Yön and those circles together. 
 
Both Kadro writers and the RPP declared that their solution was a “third way” between capitalism 
and socialism. Nevertheless, they did not utter anything about changing the system towards 
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socialism and they never described socialism as an ultimate goal. Unlike Yön, Kadro’s third-way 
interpretation was an alternative to socialism as well as to capitalism. 
 
Indeed, Yön’s objective to realize socialism and its nature deserve a thorough examination. 
However, the body of this work is not enough for such lengthy arguments; therefore only some 
essential points will be mentioned. 
 
In his book, Atılgan refers to Yalçın Küçük’s comparison between Kadro and Yön, which indicates 
that Kadro’s etatism aimed at using leftist ideas for the Kemalist ideology to strengthen it but Yön’s 
interpretation of etatism helped the revival of socialist movements and spreading of socialist ideas 
instead.
470
 In a way, Atılgan displays Yön’s difference from Kadro with its stress on socialism and 
socialist movements. Nevertheless, despite its arguments about the connection between Kemalism 
and socialism, Yön was against a classless society in a Marxist sense, and it criticized Marxist 
theory for lacking a solution for non-European, underdeveloped countries.
471
 Besides, by not being 
against private property or private equity, and while rejecting class struggle and proletarian 
dictatorship, Yön showed its distance towards Marxism. The journal was particularly against the 
socialist line of the Soviet Russia.
472
 Although its writers did not think in the same direction all the 
time,
473
 the Soviet example of socialism was criticized in several ways by the journal and this made 
Yön’s anti-communist discourse quite apparent.474  
 
According to the journal, socialism was completely different than communism. First of all, 
socialism was not a destructive ideology like communism. It did not pose any threat to Turkey 
because it was a system to achieve a steady development within social justice. It was also the 
opposite to communism due to its national character. In order to stop the threat of communism, 
Yön’s interpretation of socialism should have been supported.475 
 
Similar to RPP and Kadro members, many of Yön’s writers shared an aversion towards upheavals 
and the idea of a revolution. Until 1965 they tried to support other leftists such as TIP, since they 
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believed that changing the system through democratic channels was possible.
476
 Although the 
writers appreciated the success of Cuba and Vietnam,
477
 they did not intend to follow the 
revolutionary pattern of those countries.  
 
In the first half of the 1960s, the TIP was also trying to bring socialism to Turkey but Yön’s writers 
did not join this party. The main reason was the ideological difference between the two groups, 
since the TIP also advocated a gradual transformation to socialism with democratic means but the 
party was clearly aiming a Marxism-oriented socialism.
478 
Yön criticized the TIP for dividing 
nationalist-socialist powers unnecessarily by neglecting nationalist features and emphasizing 
socialism more than necessary as if the TIP was the only socialist group in Turkey.
479
 Yön never 
intended to turn away from its connection with deep-rooted and well-respected establishments like 
army and state. Yön members were reluctant to abandon the Kemalist ideology since it would have 
brought an instant authority to Yön members once they seized the power.  
 
Although many Yön members proved the cordiality of their socialist ideas, compared to TIP, their 
motive to reach a socialist order seemed weaker.  Rather than having a genuine socialist goal, Yön 
seemed to employ it in the restoration of Kemalism. In this way, Kemalism was going to be saved 
from being a backward ideology and was going to continue to be Yön’s main ideological reference 
point as well as its source of political legitimacy.  
 
Yön’s stress on the state was not solely limited to the economic field, and it considerably went 
beyond the limits of economic etatism. Consequently, the journal tolerated the state’s dominant 
power over politics and society in many levels just as Kadro did. According to Altun, Yön’s writers 
depicted Kemalism as an unquestionably sacred path to follow and they approved of many of 
Kemalists policies, along with several aspects of the political culture of the 1930’s.480  
 
Hikmet Kıvılcımlı severely criticized Yön for its wide tolerance for state’s authority. He argued that 
its members regarded state intervention as the only solution for social and financial issues. They 
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simply perceived everything within the limits of the state by relying on the effectiveness of state too 
much. They wanted every single thing about Turkey to be under state control, because they 
assumed that everything belonged to the state. He further claimed that Yön’s socialist 
understanding was a “timid socialism,” because socialism was always “tomorrow’s matter” for Yön 
and it was always going to be postponed due to the urgency of other pressing matters. He accused 
Yön of bringing a seasoning of socialism to an already authoritarian state model, and presenting it 
as if it was a new alternative.
 481
 
 
In short, Yön writers aspired to develop a unique theory, a “domestic socialism” for Turkey and 
they perceived it as a tool for rapid development. They were also aware of the power of connecting 
socialism with a respected and native ideology of Kemalism. Yön needed to acquire legitimacy for 
the journal’s view of socialism, therefore the journal tried to redefine Kemalism by attributing an 
essence which could suit the world-view of left-leaning intellectuals. A socialism with strong 
national tendencies would also secure their hand towards traditional nationalists, once it was backed 
up with Kemalism.  
 
 
3.4 Reformism  
Yön’s understanding of reformism was closely attached to its writers’ interpretation of development 
and etatism.  
 
As Altun points out, the issue of development was integral to the post-1945 foreign policy of the 
US and it was considered as a supra-ideology objective in Turkey in the same period. The 
development discourse eventually spread from central government to all ideological groups.
482
 The 
importance of the development discourse continued in the following years. Accordingly, Yön 
declared that the goals of modernization and Westernization of Kemalism could only be achieved 
with economic development. Hence, future developments in education or culture depended on 
etatist plans.
483
  
 
The transition from empire to the republic preceded by the War of Independence was considered a 
national democratic revolution (Milli Demokratik Devrim) by the writers. This transition was often 
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referred to as the biggest reform project that ever took place in Turkey, since it fundamentally 
changed the form of the state.
484
  
 
Naming the transition as a national democratic revolution urged Yön writers to explain their 
interpretation of Kemalist reformism. Similar to Kadro and Markopaşa, Yön supported basic 
features of the official Kemalist version of the War of Independence and Mustafa Kemal’s 
indispensable role in it. Similar to those journals, Mustafa Kemal’s being anti-imperialist and his 
wish to found a republic was accentuated.
485
 This view often overlooked deeds of Mustafa Kemal 
which would have contradicted the journal’s claims over Kemalism.  
 
Like Markopaşa, Yön partially adopted the Kemalist discourse of the reformist arrow and tried to 
insert left-oriented concepts to Kemalism as if these concepts would have been the initial motives 
of the Kemalist movement. As Altun also mentions, Yön writers often appeared to deliver their 
messages via Mustafa Kemal and they claimed what Turkey confronted in the 1960s was similar to 
the situation in the 1920s, and the revolutionists of the 1960s needed to overcome obstacles by 
embracing Mustafa Kemal’s original principles.486 As a result, when Yön called its readers for 
returning to the original, the journal presented its objectives as if they were the primal purposes of 
Mustafa Kemal and his supporters in the early 1920s. 
 
In Yön, the implementation method of the reforms was an important issue which was subject to 
long discussions. According to Avcıoğlu, the revolutionary action program of the 1960s should 
have been in favor of people, because all the other options failed before. The gap between power-
holders and citizens should have been overcome, since this gap caused an alienation between 
people and early revolutionary forces. It was possible to seize power in spite of the people’s will 
but that sort of tyranny would not have lasted long.
487
 As former experiences proved, by working 
against the people’s will and without convincing them of the reforms and securing their voluntary 
collaboration, any realistic change would not have taken place, even though all the efforts were for 
the benefit of those people.
488
 As seen, these arguments are very much in the same line with the 
Markopaşa journal.  
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In this way, Yön connected the populist and the reformist arrows. However, in the course of time, 
the populist discourse of the early issues gradually toned down, and the writers started to justify 
top-down reform methods more often. For example, Niyazi Berkes claimed that some of the 
necessary reforms should have been implemented, even though the people would not have 
understood them thoroughly. That was what prestigious leaders like Mustafa Kemal did 
previously.
489
  
 
Although Yön criticized the “for people, despite people” mentality of Kemalists, in the long run, 
the journal’s ideology proved to follow a similar pattern, especially when the methods of reformism 
were concerned. Yön came after the relative success of the May 27
th
 coup d’état and believed in a 
top-down reform process. Although the writers used the term “revolution” quite often, they 
expected to realize the progress in order and stayed away from revolutionary ideas of Marxism.  
 
Regarding this issue, Atılgan argued Yön was a continuation of a traditional mentality, because like 
the Young Turks, Unionists, and Kemalists, intellectuals of the Yön movement believed in a 
transformation in a top-down fashion, not the other way around. Years later, in an interview with 
Hikmet Özdemir, Doğan Avcıoğlu also acknowledged this similarity.490 Indeed, according to 
Fahretin Altun, all the development models which considered industrialization essential for non-
Western societies were based on top-down intervention policies, regardless of society’s background 
and conditions.
491
  Yön was no exception to this fact. 
 
Yön’s interpretation about the essence of Kemalist reformism was an issue that caused a 
contradiction about the West and Westernization. Gökhan Atılgan argues that there was a 
dichotomy about Westernization in the Yön movement.
492
 This seems quite right because it was 
possible to come across articles which contradicted with each other due to their pro or anti-Western 
sentiments. After all, Yön consisted of a broad group of intellectuals who did not necessarily think 
in the same direction. This can be understood as one of the main reasons behind the dichotomy 
about the West and Westernization.  
 
Still, a gradual change in the overall view towards Westernisation can be observed in the journal. In 
the early issues, anti-Western sentiments were relatively weaker and the journal’s discourse was 
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more parallel with official Kemalist discourse.
493
 As early as 1962, ideas about development outside 
of Western practices appeared in the journal. Although criticism towards the West was not as strong 
and extensive as it was in Kadro journal, the journal’s anti-imperialist stand was quite clear. It 
seems that by 1964 anti-American sensitivities became more obvious. By 1965, in the articles of 
Niyazi Berkes about westernization and modernity, Yön’s criticism towards the West became 
clearer.
494
 This change was also a result of political developments as well as Yön’s constant search 
for alternatives for modernity and development. 
 
Here it should be kept in mind that compared to the Kadro and Markopaşa journals, Yön was 
published for a longer period, and it was affected by various changes between 1961 and 1967, 
especially by the success of non-Western examples of third-world countries. The writers had the 
chance to observe the circumstances of underdeveloped countries from Latin America to the Middle 
East, and from Asia to Africa for a longer period. In the course of time, they might have elaborated 
on their ideas better and reached the idea that the West was responsible for the underdevelopment 
of the third-world, therefore Westernisation should not have been taken as an ideal model.  
 
Yön’s anti-Western sentiments made it easy for the journal to insist on the unprecedented nature of 
the Turkish national democratic revolution, which was mentioned by Kadro thirty years ago. 
According to Berkes, the Kemalist notion of revolutionism was different from both Western and 
Bolshevik models and it was a unique example for the world.
495
 These are the exact ideas that were 
expressed in Kadro in the 1930s. However, unlike Kadro, Berkes avoided discarding socialism as a 
Western ideology. 
 
Regarding modernism and westernization, Yön interpreted Kemalism as a break from the 
traditional mentality of Turkish-Ottoman elites. In refusing the traditional inclination to follow 
Western examples and turning to non-Western alternatives instead, Yön can be seen as a successor 
of Kadro journal.  
 
However, Yön’s criticism of the West does not directly place the journal in parallel with the ideas 
of Marxist wing of Dependency theory. As Nasser’s movement in Egypt, Yön was distant to 
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Marxism in many ways, even though it was inspired by it and employed some of its core concepts 
to develop its socialist discourse. It should also be kept in mind that Yön always made changes 
about the core ideas of Marxism and did not share its revolutionary spirit or its reliance on the 
proletariat. This issue became very obvious in the ideological differences between Yön and the TIP 
groups. As mentioned before, the TIP, and especially Behice Boran, criticized Yön’s ideas about 
socialism from the beginning, particularly about the nature of the desired socialist regime and how 
to organize it.  Still, due to the necessary alliance between two groups for the 1965 elections, both 
groups ceased criticism towards each other. However, after they were disillusioned with the 
elections, both turned against each other again and brought up the issues which showed their 
different approach to socialism.
496
 
 
For Yön, leaning on the proletariat would not have worked in Turkey since this class was not strong 
enough to end the feudal system of powerful notables and landlords of small towns and cities. 
Instead of using TIP’s suggestions for organizing a movement from below with the support of 
workers and peasants, Yön chose to collaborate with the already strong classes, like progressive 
military officers and intellectuals to make a sudden change in the system with a top-down 
movement. Yön’s arguments about these issues clearly show the journal’s distance to Marxism. 
Avcıoğlu emphasized that Turkey’s structure was not suitable for revolutions, therefore socialism 
should be brought about step by step. Further, since Turkey already had Kemalism as a domestic 
and anti-imperialist ideology, the socialists should have started using Kemalism as a development 
plan and improve it with socialist ideas. Only after some improvements in Turkey’s structure, could 
socialism be brought about through reformist policies.  
 
The journal was inspired by Soviet Russia’s “non-capitalist development” arguments, since some of 
the third-world countries followed an anti-imperialist and nationalist course and reached a certain 
level of development.
497
 For Yön, the main inspiration for this model was clearly Egypt. The 
journal connected anti-imperialism, development and Kemalism and, exactly like Nasser’s 
movement, came up with an anti-imperialist, nationalist, reformist, anti-liberal discourse which 
gave working classes a secondary position. While the TIP was clearly more anti-capitalist in its 
discourse, Yön’s relationship with capitalism was sometimes contradictory like Nasser and not anti-
capitalist.
498
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As pointed out by Atılgan, with the effects of 1968, leftist youth in Turkey were more receptive to 
revolutionary ideas and this marked a break from the methods of Yön and TIP movements. Groups 
like THKP-C and THKO were affected by the examples from China and Cuba and the ideas of 
THKP-C specifically followed the revolutionary ideas of Latin America, Soviet Russia, Vietnam 
and especially Cuba to a great extent and developed a new revolutionary action program in the late 
1960s and early 1970s.
499
 Contrary to the younger generation’s revolutionary efforts, the core group 
of Yön followed a more traditional example and decided to seize power from above via the support 
of the military - like Nasser had in Egypt in the early 1950s. Yön became a unique group by 
bringing non-Western development ideas to the agenda and staying loyal to a heavily emphasized 
anti-imperialist discourse, although it stayed away from the revolutionary aspects of Third-World 
movements. Indeed, it preferred seeing development result from top-down reform projects which 
did not fundamentally change the system of property relations. 
 
Although they elaborated on criticism towards West, Yön writers hardly made a connection 
between the conservative and authoritarian nature of Kemalism and its possible European sources. 
Instead, they tried to reformulate Kemalism within a socialist context. This eventually created some 
inconsistencies and contradictions in their ideology. As Altun states, they often idealized Kemalism 
in the form of “real” Kemalism and presented it as an unquestionably sacred path. In this manner, 
Yön contributed to the formation of a conservative political language and political philosophy in 
the name of modernization. Although the journal gave new interpretations to Kemalism, Yön 
contributed to the formation of a political conservatism of Turkish political culture, even though it 
defined itself as a socialist movement.
500
 
 
 
3.5 Laicism  
Yön perceived laicism in connection with the reformist arrow and part of a major reform project 
that took place in Turkey. 
 
According to Yön, the modern world required modern systems like socialism, which could set 
people free from the restrictions of religion and tradition. The journal pointed out that socialism 
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was an endeavor to create a new type of people.
501
 According to Mümtaz Soysal, this objective 
completely depended on laicist and rational education, especially in rural areas.
502
  
 
Ilhan Selçuk argued that when the worn and torn barricades of religion were demolished in the 
1920s, the country became a better place. The abolition of religious establishments carried Turkey 
further and made Turkish people more Turkish, more human, more nation-like, more civilized, and 
more free.
503
 Berkes stated that development could only be achieved within laicist establishments, 
where Kemalist laicism was strong, since when mistakes and concessions were made about laicism, 
the system deteriorated.
504
 As seen, Yön writers were thinking in the same direction with Mustafa 
Kemal, Kadro and Markopaşa members who also referred to laicism as one of the main traits of 
Turkish nation as well as of the basic and progressive principles of the modern world. 
 
Berkes and Mümtaz Soysal often mentioned discussions about enlightenment and Islam, regarding 
the discussions about training “enlightened” clerks through state schools like the Imam Hatip 
Schools.
505
 According to Berkes, enlightenment within religion was a highly contradictory issue 
due to opposing natures of enlightenment and religion. One should not have expected fruitful 
outcomes from procuring “enlightened” clerks through the religious schools, because it would have 
ended with nothing but more concessions about laicism.
506
  
 
In parallel to Kadro and Markopaşa, Yön followed the Kemalist rhetoric about laicism and how 
religious establishments and groups exploited people’s beliefs and how they helped the imperialist, 
occupying powers during the War of Independence.
507
 In the articles, religion, exploitation, and 
imperialism are often connected to each other. Niyazi Berkes mentioned the ties between the 
caliphate and occupying powers of the War of Independence and he reminded everyone of the 
reasons for the abolishment of the caliphate and several other religious establishments by Mustafa 
Kemal.
508
 The writers perceived traditionally conservative groups such as big landowners, big 
businessmen, and religious leaders as anti-laicist and comprador classes which collaborated with 
imperialists. According to Yön, those groups were not different than the caliph and his supporters in 
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the 1920s who subjected the country to exploitation. However, East was still East, and nothing had 
really changed there. Thus, it was impossible for Turkish intellectuals not to oppose those tyrants.
509
 
As seen, the laicist arrow was another way for Yön to connect Kemalism and anti-imperialism. 
 
As Atılgan points out, in the 1960s, when socialism was on the rise and was finding legal channels 
for representation in the parliament, anti-communist propaganda was getting also stronger. The 
Association for the Struggle Against Communism (Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği), The Society 
for Dissemination of Science (İlim Yayma Cemiyeti) as well as the newspapers like Sabah and 
Bugün were leading this propaganda and were calling for a jihad against communism in their 
meetings and rallies.
510
 Under these circumstances, Yön needed a new description for socialism, 
which could show people socialism did not necessarily mean an exclusion of religion and it could 
be in accord with Islam.
511
  
 
Here, Arab and African anti-imperialist movements were guidelines for Yön with their efforts to 
link Muslim citizens to their causes. Yön’s choice of articles makes this quite obvious, especially 
the frequency of the articles that belonged to intellectuals from those countries and the articles 
devoted to the relationship between socialism and Islam are considered.
512
 In one of those, Algerian 
politician and writer Beshir Ali Haci argued that the real enemy of third-world was imperialism; 
therefore collaboration between socialism and Islam against imperialism was the best solution. 
Indeed, being a Muslim was not an obstacle for being a revolutionist, since being a revolutionist 
was about one’s stance towards the classes, rather than one’s position towards Islam solely.513  
 
These discussions indicate that the journal was aware of the political importance of Islam in Turkey 
and was trying to develop fruitful discussions. By believing in the consolidation of power of 
religion to some extent, Yön came close to the Mustafa Kemal’s ideas about Muslim nationalism in 
the War of Independence. However, being laicist left-leaning intellectuals, Yön’s writers ignored 
this parallelism. Although they referred to the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist utterances of 
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Mustafa Kemal from the same period all the time, they avoided referring to his Muslim-nationalism 
period to make their point.  
 
The abovementioned discussions were also in parallel with Yön’s anti-Western sensitivities. Yön 
emphasized that the real culprit of underdevelopment and exploitation of those countries was 
imperialism, rather than Islam. However, as Atılgan points out, Yön never intended to give a central 
role to Islam.
514
  
 
According to Atılgan, Yön differed from other leftist groups with the journal’s relatively tolerant 
attitude about the role of religion since it resisted negative categorisations of nationalism and 
religion, which was quite common within leftist circles at the time. Atılgan explains this with Yön’s 
efforts to bring an end to the reactionary attributions of religion.
515
  
 
It is correct that in many articles Yön referred to religion in a positive way. Similar to Mustafa 
Kemal, Kadro and Markopaşa, Yön also claimed that religion should not be equated with 
reactionism and fundamentalism directly, since a pure form of Islam existed for believers.
516
 
However, it is not possible to discredit the existence of the articles which indicated the opposite and 
addressed Islam as a source of obscurantism and reactionary movements. As it can be observed in 
the articles of Niyazi Berkes and Ilhan Selçuk, the writers made negative comments about Islam 
and they connected religion, exploitation, and imperialism quite often.
517
 Thus, it can be said that 
similar to the dichotomy over Westernisation, there was a dichotomy about reactionary nature of 
Islam and religion in the journal as well. Nevertheless, it would not be correct to categorize Yön as 
an anti-Islamist or anti-religious publication.  
 
Yön’s laisict line was also obvious in the journal’s call for state control over religious minorities. 
According to Berkes, Orthodox churches and schools should have been under the strict control of 
Directorate of Religious Affairs. It was normal for Orthodox Christians to have their churches in 
Turkey. However, the existence of an Orthodox church which claimed ecumenism rights over a big 
part of the Orthodox Christians was absurd in a country like Turkey, which abolished the caliphate 
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itself.
518
 Therefore, there should have been a strict control over those churches and minority 
schools, since they had a tendency for engaging in activities in favor of their own establishments, 
rather than Turkish Republic.
519
  
 
As seen, like Mustafa Kemal, Yön writers advocated for state control over religion rather than 
entirely asking for a separation between religious institutions and the state. They were often not 
against religion but its exploitation by certain groups for anti-republican and reactionary purposes. 
In this sense, it is better to call them laicist, rather than secular intellectuals.  
 
Like Kadro and Markopaşa, Yön regarded the concessions over laicism as a threat towards the 
republic. The writers perceived laicism as one of the tenets of the republic and those who contested 
laicist reforms were accused of treason. Nevertheless, the army was the guarantor of the republic 
and would not let those “so-called” nationalists and reactionaries to ruin the country. The army was 
going to defend Turkey and was going to defeat reactionists as it did in the period of Atatürk.
520
 
 
 
3.6 Republicanism  
As mentioned before, Mustafa Kemal’s interpretation of the republican arrow was deeply connected 
to the nationalist and populist arrows. As devoted Kemalists, Yön writers stayed loyal to his 
interpretation to a great extent. However, the 1960’s were the times when leftist ideas had more 
chance to be expressed in Turkey compared to previous decades. Consequently, the Yön journal’s 
interpretation of republican arrow carried hints of socialism. In their attempts, the writers seemed to 
connect the populist arrow and republican arrow, since the journal often equated populism with 
socialism. 
 
According to them, the foundation of the republic was a very important event. The journal 
considered the War of Independence as a “national revolution”. As mentioned, Kadro and 
Markopaşa also put great deal of stress on this issue; however they often avoided using “revolution” 
due to its negative connotations. Still, all three journals glorified the gaining of political 
independence following the anti-imperialist struggle, and the vulnerability of independence unless 
it was strengthened and secured by an etatist economy program. In this way, all these journals 
connected republicanism with nationalism (the nation’s sovereignty), populism (the people’s 
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government), etatism (the national economy to secure political independence), laicism (the 
abolition of absolutist and religious authority of Ottoman Empire), and reformism (the greatest 
reform that took place in the country) together. By making this connection, and without sacrificing 
any of the six arrows, they proved that they were followers of Kemalist ideology, although with 
different interpretations.  
 
Yön differed from the other two journals by connecting all the arrows to socialism more clearly. 
According to the all three journals, the foundation of the republic was a proof of the anti-imperialist 
character of the Turkish people. Although it did not change the economic structure profoundly, the 
new Turkish state was based on republican ideas and replaced the imperialist and monarchical 
structures of Ottoman Empire; therefore it brought modernity to the country.
521
 However, according 
to Yön, the foundation of the republic was not an end, it was part of a continuous process, and it 
was eventually going to evolve into a socialist regime.  
 
The journal did not bring clear explanations about this second stage and how exactly this transition 
was going to take place. Still, they hinted that they considered the republican regime as a tool, 
which was helpful for a certain time but it had to change to gain better results. According to 
Mümtaz Soysal, their socialist ideas were a continuation of their republican ideas. The transition to 
the republic was the first step. After achieving economic development, Turkey was going to go 
through a gradual transition in order to found a socialist regime.
522
 Accordingly, Avcıoğlu 
emphasized that the form of the regime, he meant republicanism here, was not an ideal but a tool. 
The important thing was reaching the level of Western Europe development as the way Mustafa 
Kemal had envisioned.
523
 
 
Yön seemed to have an indecisive relation to parliamentary democracy since the beginning. In the 
early years of the journal, democracy was mentioned quite positively and the writers made 
comparisons between Kemalism, democracy, and socialism more often. The early issues show that 
the journal was open to the possibilities which could be brought by the parliamentary system. At 
this point, the journal was different than Kadro, which consistently rejected parliamentary 
democracy as a part of the liberal capitalist system. Yön, on the other hand, intended to consider 
possibilities of democracy and did not completely discard it from its discourse. The changing 
meaning and role of democracy between the 1930s and 1960s might have a role in Yön’s choices. 
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In the 1960s, discarding democracy would not be easy due to the equations between democracy and 
freedom by people. 
 
For Mümtaz Soysal, democracy meant “people’s rule”, therefore it would not have been in 
contradiction with socialism, because socialism was a populist system in essence. He claimed that 
since both aimed at a system for the people’s benefit, democracy and socialism were basically the 
same thing.
524
 According to Avcıoğlu, “Democracy is twin brother of socialism and it is a natural 
result of democracy as much as it is of Kemalism. It is possible to reach socialism by either 
revolution or democracy. We prefer the second one, since we believe in the possibility of a ‘real’ 
freedom of speech and right for organisation in this country.”525  
 
Still, regarding democracy, the journal was not exactly in the same line with Markopaşa either.  
Although the writers mentioned democracy in a positive way, they did not directly equate it with 
freedom as much as Markopaşa did. As early as 1962, Avcıoğlu was questioning the weak points of 
democratic regimes. He claimed that “Seventeen years ago (in 1945) multi-party system appeared 
as a progressive step but it also turned out to be a destroyer of the revolutionist spirit. (…) It 
marked the end of etatist policies and beginning of concessions about laicism. It is also responsible 
for hindering the leftist movement, while supporting and strengthening the right-wing. In this sense, 
it can be taken as a reaction against the Kemalist reforms.”526  
 
He also stressed the possible difficulties of establishing a real change via parliament since it was 
heavily dominated by conservative right-wing politicians.
527
 Consequently, Yön writers thought 
that a strong leadership could make a difference, as it happened in Mustafa Kemal or Nehru’s 
cases.
528
  When doing this, similar to Kadro, Yön brought up Mustafa Kemal’s “special qualities”; 
his intuition and farsightedness as well as his ability that enabled him to shape the events and 
occurrences beforehand.
529
 In those expressions, it is possible to follow traces of the leadership 
myth about Mustafa Kemal very clearly. 
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Regarding Yön’s reservations about the parliamentary system and democracy, the journal never 
went too far to reach a point to oppose the state and to say that the real struggle was between an 
oppressive state and the people. This interpretation came from a younger generation, which matured 
into the Federation of Debating Sociaties (Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu) which formed in the mid-
1960s. These young radical leftists decided to oppose to the state and its armed forces, and they 
organized within armed guerrilla groups in the 1970s. However, Yön intellectuals never considered 
themselves as opponents of the state or armed forces. According to them, a crucial part of the 
military already sided with them and they could help the Yön movement to correct the course of 
events. This can also be seen in the journal’s first closing-down in 1963. The journal was accused 
of supporting an attempted military intervention by Talat Aydemir and its publication was banned 
for 14 months.
530
  
 
Despite this fact and their disappointment over closing down of the State Planning Organisation 
(Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı), Yön supported TIP with the 1965 elections between September 1964 
and October 1965. The main goal was to achieve a strong anti-imperialist front within government 
in order to achieve radical reforms. The members were also hoping to direct RPP’s axis towards the 
left to a degree.
531
 Nevertheless, their expectations were not met in the elections. The TIP managed 
to enter the parliament with fifteen deputies but the results marked a big victory for the right-wing 
Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) of Demirel which symbolized the continuation of DP and the 
Menderes line, which had 52.9% of the votes.
532
 This was a huge disappointment for Yön, and the 
writers started to articulate other means in which to be efficient in politics. 
 
The journal’s reservations about the parliamentary system can easily be followed in Avcıoğlu’s 
book “Türkiye'nin Düzeni” (The Social Order of Turkey) as well as in his articles in the Devrim 
journal. In Devrim’s early issues, he explicitly discussed the abovementioned issues as the reasons 
for disillusionment with parliamentary democracy and hinted that armed forces were not content 
with the current developments and were ready to get involved in the process.
533
 Still, he warned 
against the possible harmful results of the military dicta that didn’t act with the people’s support. 
According to him, any kind of intervention would fail without closing the gap between its leaders 
and the people.
534
 Therefore, any intervention by the active forces should have targeted the people’s 
                                                 
530 Yön-Devrim Hareketi: Kemalizm ile Marksizm Arasında Geleneksel Aydınlar, Atılgan, 2008, p. 175 
531 Yön-Devrim Hareketi: Kemalizm ile Marksizm Arasında Geleneksel Aydınlar, Atılgan, 2008, p. 176, 191 
532 Ibid., p. 194 
533 “Takke Düştü”, Doğan Avcıoğlu, Devrim, issue 1, 21 October 1969; “Çelişme”, Doğan Avcıoğlu, Devrim, issue 2, 
28 October 1969 
534 “Dikta”, Doğan Avcıoğlu, Devrim, issue 12, 6 January 1970   
 145 
government at the end.
535
 His ideas bear a great deal of importance, since he was very popular in 
military, especially with the officers who sought a progressive intervention to change the system.
536
 
 
As mentioned before, Kemalist republicanism does not solely consist of modern and progressive 
features. Some of its characteristics, such as the idea of charismatic leadership, hierarchical 
structuring and authoritarian tendencies do not meet with the modernist progressive ideas. 
Therefore, it was not democratic at all, in a liberal-democratic sense. Along with Kadro, Yön’s 
interpretation of the republican arrow carried some of these contradictory features. Yön put much 
less emphasis on democracy than the Markopaşa journal did due to the different meanings attached 
to the notion of democracy at their time. And when necessary, they didn’t hesitate to attribute a 
democratic side to Kemalist ideology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
535 “27 Mayıs Uzerine Düşünceler”, Doğan Avcıoğlu, Devrim, issue 32, 26 May 1970   
536 Yön-Devrim Hareketi: Kemalizm ile Marksizm Arasında Geleneksel Aydınlar, Atılgan, 2008, p. 221 
 146 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, I examined the ideological connections between the left-leaning Kadro, Markopaşa, 
and Yön journals and Kemalism. This research attempted to discover what the exact relation of the 
writers with the Kemalist regime of their time was, whether these journals contributed to Kemalist 
ideology by using their intellectual influence and how they attributed left-oriented concepts to 
Kemalism. Further, it explored how they coped with contradictions of combining left-oriented ideas 
with Kemalism and what the similarities and differences were in terms of expressing the views of 
the left-leaning intellectuals in the mid-1930s, the late 1940s and in the early 1960s. Moreover, this 
study sheds light on how the journals coped with the intolerant stance of Kemalism towards leftist 
ideologies. Finally, the answers to these questions were discussed in connection to the six tenets of 
Kemalist ideology. 
 
The first one was nationalism, which includes policies of nationalization, especially during the 
1920s and 1930s. Like Mustafa Kemal, all three journals seemed to perceive nationalism as a social 
project and associate it with progressive and modernizing elements. Inspired by leftist ideologies, 
the journals regarded the economy as a decisive element in nation-building process, and their 
interpretations of Kemalist nationalism usually connected to the pride of the writers over the 
success of the War of Independence and their anti-imperialist attributions to it. This approach was a 
common tendency within almost all the leftist or left-leaning groups of the republic like TKP, TIP 
or MDD and became the common point to bring them together. 
 
Kadro, Markopaşa and Yön used anti-imperialism as a mediator in order to connect their leftist or 
left-oriented ideas to Kemalism. This link was often interpreted as proof of their nativity, since they 
were often accused of being communists. Embracing Kemalism and its nationalist side brought 
them nativity and legitimacy within its established and respected nature. As a result, they pointed 
out anti-imperialist qualities of the War of Independence and interpreted the early 1920s as a golden 
age, when Kemalism displayed its “real” nature and potential. All three journals defined themselves 
as “real” nationalists, adopted a patriotic discourse and put effort to distinguish themselves from 
traditional-conservative nationalism. 
 
Connecting anti-imperialism and Kemalism was more crucial for Kadro and Yön than for 
Markopaşa, which clearly displayed more distance towards nationalism. Although Kadro writers 
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were inspired by Leninist theories, they reformulated a theory of anti-imperialism by rejecting its 
Leninist core and limiting its meaning solely to the solidarity of underdeveloped nations which 
engage in anti-imperialist independence movements. On the other hand, Yön claimed that the co-
existence between socialism and nationalism was not contradictory and the combination of the two 
ideologies was possible. At root, their ideas were based on the articulations of Lenin and Stalin on 
nationalism and the journal regarded this way of nationalism as progressive. 
 
The anti-imperialist attributions about Kemalism, which were made by the early leftists of the 
1920s, and were theorized and improved by Kadro became a strong tendency within the leftist 
movement. Kadro made a significant contribution to associate leftist ideas with nationalism and left 
a blueprint behind to be followed by many who wanted to combine Kemalism with leftist ideas in 
the following years. In the 1960s, Yön refreshed this connection and went one step further by 
claiming to target a socialist order and paved the way for radical interpretations of Kemalism.  
 
Yön and especially Kadro shared the exclusivist tone of Kemalist nationalism to different degrees, 
even though the journals openly rejected any racist or ethno-racial discrimination. However, 
Markopaşa criticized the RPP, including Mustafa Kemal, for employing Turkish nationalism as an 
exclusion mechanism. 
 
The populist arrow was not a crucial issue for Kadro, since it focused on economic conditions of 
the republic, rather than bringing a social program for the people. The populist arrow has appeared 
as the most important arrow for Markopaşa, while it was equated with socialism by Yön. Both 
journals referred to the early years of the War of Independence, when the populist discourse of 
Mustafa Kemal was evident and they interpreted Mustafa Kemal’s actions according to their own 
ideological preferences. 
 
Although they were all inspired by Marxism and Leninism, Kadro’s interpretation of class and 
society seemed most compatible with the Kemalist solidarist alternative, which aimed at achieving 
a united and well-controlled society in harmony, without strong class divisions. Unlike Kadro, 
Markopaşa opted for a dynamic and more politically active society. By continuously stressing the 
gap between Kemalist discourse and its practices, Markopaşa revealed the contradictions and 
conundrums of Kemalist populism. As a result, the journal became hugely popular for the people 
who were fed up with the strict rule of the RPP.  
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Kadro aimed at forming an elite cadre which would create an ideological framework for the regime. 
Markopaşa writers were clearly aware of their “vanguard” role, but unlike Kadro, they did not 
assume any privileged role for themselves. Being independent intellectuals, they explicitly opposed 
the authority of the regime and aimed to put pressure on the government through the support of 
ordinary people. Compared to Markopaşa, Yön’s ideology was more elitist, since Markopaşa 
insisted on giving more space to working classes in political life. Yön believed in the objectivity of 
the military forces and, elevated them above the other classes, relying on their help for socialist 
development. In this sense, Yön’s attitude towards the state was quite similar to Kadro, since the 
latter claimed that the state was above all other classes and could operate as an objective institution. 
 
The romantic idealization of the concept of “the people”, along with a distrust of the masses, 
authoritarian tendencies, elitism, intolerance for upheavals, anti-liberal and anti-socialist attitudes, 
and a solidarist view of a united and well-controlled society were the features shared by Kadro and 
Mustafa Kemal in the early 1930s. The traits of positivism and solidarism were clearly present in 
their ideology. Therefore, despite its left-oriented discourse, Kadro’s ideology was quite compatible 
with Kemalist populism, regarding its interpretations of elitism, the people, society, and social 
classes. At this juncture, Kadro’s Kemalist interpretations and its tailoring of left-oriented concepts 
placed the journal closer to Kemalism and to its solidarist-positivist rightist core rather than 
Marxism and socialism. 
 
Regarding its wish for immediate action rather than convincing the public, the Yön movement 
seemed similar to Unionists and early Kemalist cadres. However, it differed from them by referring 
to “the people” as a more active element, especially in its early years. In its attempt to connect 
socialism and Kemalism via the populist arrow, Yön was more similar to the Markopaşa journal. 
However, in the long run, Yön followed a similar pattern to Mustafa Kemal and its populist 
discourse diminished in time. 
 
Regarding republicanism, all of the journals shared the anti-monarchist and anti-theocratic ideals of 
Kemalism, and like Mustafa Kemal they highlighted the differences between the Kemalist republic 
and the Ottoman Empire. Still, none of the journals advocated liberal democracy. Kadro often 
rejected individualism, freedom, democracy, and multi-party system as part of the liberal-capitalist 
system and sided with the one-party rule of the RPP. On the contrary, “democracy” meant freedom 
in Markopaşa journal while Yön put much less emphasis on democracy than Markopaşa did due to 
the different meanings attached to the notion of democracy at their time. However, unlike Kadro, 
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Yön did not completely discard democracy from its discourse. For this journal, the republic was 
eventually going to evolve into a socialist regime.  
 
All three journals regarded the economy as a substructure for society and political life and called 
for an immediate anti-imperialist, non-capitalist development plan. Etatism, as the economic wing 
of Kemalist nationalist policy, was the most important arrow for Kadro. The journal presented its 
“nationalist etatism” as an alternative to both capitalism and communism and it considered it a 
regulatory power to organize the society. Compared to the milder interpretation of etatism by 
Mustafa Kemal, Kadro’s interpretations seemed to be stricter and advocated the state’s domineering 
power over the public sphere. In spite of its claims of uniqueness, like almost all of the third way 
(“tertium genus”) projects, Kadro’s “third-way solution” was, in fact, still within the limits of a 
capitalist economy. Still, by explicitly being against capitalist development, Kadro brought a new 
interpretation to Kemalist etatism, and set a different example from the intellectual tradition of the 
CUP and other Kemalists cadres. 
 
Like Kadro, Markopaşa always mentioned etatism in connection to anti-imperialism and anti-
capitalism. However, in Markopaşa, etatism had a more direct connection to populism. Unlike 
Kadro, Markopaşa tried to focus on what etatism would have brought to people and how etatism or 
land distribution policies would have had a positive impact on people’s lives. 
 
Yön attempted to bring a new interpretation to the practices of third-way etatism by connecting 
them to socialism, thus differing from existing interpretations. The journal’s interpretations were 
affected by Nasser’s movement in Egypt to a great degree. However, in spite of Yön’s claims, the 
journal’s “new etatism” plan was still framed within a capitalist economy, rather than being a break 
from it. Yön claimed that the basic principles of Kemalist theory reflected the basic formula of 
Turkish socialism, therefore socialism could be taken as one of the arrows of Kemalism. It 
considered socialism a tool for rapid development and aspired to develop a unique theory, a 
“domestic socialism”, for Turkey by combining Kemalism and socialism. In order to do that, Yön 
writers highlighted revolutionary and innovative assertions about Kemalism, and claimed they 
would complete Kemalism with the help of a socialist ideology.  
 
Kadro, Markopaşa and Yön all supported Kemalist laicist policies in order to form a “nation” to 
take the place of the Ottoman “ümmet”, and they often followed the Kemalist rhetoric about 
laicism, which often connected religion, exploitation, and imperialism to each other. 
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The discussions about laicism and religion were brought up within the context of the economy and 
the etatist arrow. Kadro especially contributed to creation of the link between underdeveloped 
economies and corrupted forms of Islam. By equating Kurdish upheavals with reactionism and 
feudalism, Kadro provided Kemalist ideology with a powerful rhetoric to deal with Kurdish 
upheavals in Eastern provinces. Markopaşa supported basic laicist principals, but criticized the 
RPP’s use of the reactionary argument to eliminate Kurds or other opponents. Yön, on the other 
hand, tried to demonstrate that socialism did not necessarily mean an exclusion of religion and it 
could be in accordance with Islam. 
 
Still, all of the journals supported the early radical laicist policies of Mustafa Kemal, and like him, 
regarded those who would contest laicism not only anti-Kemalist but also a threat to the republic. 
Like Mustafa Kemal, they advocated state control over religion rather than an entire separation 
between religious institutions and the state. They were generally not against religion but against its 
exploitation by certain groups. In this sense, it is better to call them laicist, rather than secular 
intellectuals.  
 
In connection with the reformist arrow, all of the journals perceived the transition from the empire 
to republic as a ground-breaking change, and thus the most important reform in Turkey. Still, 
Markopaşa was clearly more critical of the continuation of the Ottoman mentality within the 
Turkish Republic, especially regarding governing, power-sharing and suppression mechanisms.  
 
All journals displayed distrust towards the West and in the case of Markopaşa and Yön, also more 
specifically towards the US. Kadro and Yön also shared a desire to keep connections with third-
world countries which followed anti-imperialist and anti-Western paths. Indeed, Kadro’s opposition 
towards the West - which focused on the economy rather than Western culture and included a 
strong anti-imperialist dimension - set a unique example and separated the journal from traditional 
anti-Western views of nationalist or Islamist groups. In parallel to their anti-Western sentiments, 
Kadro and Yön both criticized Marxist theory due to its failure for not bringing a solution for 
underdeveloped, non-European countries. Kadro particularly categorized socialism and Marxism as 
European originated ideologies and rejected them along with capitalism and liberalism.  
 
Indeed, Kadro writers made crucial changes to the concepts they borrowed from Marxism, 
sometimes by keeping its main schema, while emptying its Marxist core or simply by using the 
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schema in an entirely different context. These three journals, especially Kadro and Yön, were prone 
to shift the axis of socialism and Kemalism in order to use them according to their needs. In this 
process, ambiguity and the relatively ill-defined content of Kemalism must have helped them. 
 
Unlike Kadro, Markopaşa did not reject socialism. However, it did not see the West as the only 
source of development either. In the Markopaşa series, Western powers, especially the US, 
appeared as symbols of capitalism and exploitation. Meanwhile, Yön’s criticism towards the West 
was not as extensive as it was in the Kadro journal although Yön writers did insist that the Kemalist 
revolutionism was completely different from Western and Bolshevik models. Indeed, Yön created a 
dichotomy about Westernisation, as the journal’s position towards West changed over time. 
 
Although Yön differed from the other two journals by connecting all the arrows to socialism, it 
preferred to preserve the existing order, rather than fundamentally changing it. Therefore, and 
exactly like Kadro, it preferred reformism to revolution and displayed Kemalist features, rather than 
Marxist-socialist characteristics. In this manner, Yön followed the tradition of the Young Turks, 
Unionists, and Mustafa Kemal and believed in a transformation in a top-down fashion, not the other 
way around.  
 
None of these journals made a connection between the conservative nature of Kemalism and its 
possible European sources. Instead, they tried to reformulate Kemalism within a new left-leaning 
context and tried to revive the original principles of Kemalism. 
 
These three left-leaning journals were the result of different time periods and had different 
functions and objectives. Kadro mainly consisted of former communists who generated an ideology 
for the Kemalist government in the early 1930s. Markopaşa was an independent and unique 
oppositional leftist current in the late 1940s. Finally, the Yön writers were a left-leaning group 
which claimed to have formulated a domestic socialism for Turkey in the 1960s and attempted to 
seize the power to realize its aims in early 1970s. Still, all declared that they were Kemalists. It 
seems they used Kemalism as an umbrella term to include anti-imperialist, republican, etatist, 
laicist, reformist and some of nationalist features to different degrees which would bring 
modernism and progress. In this manner, they tried to form an ideal version of Kemalism to be in 
accordance to their left-oriented ideas. 
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It is quite interesting to observe how tremendous the effect of Kemalism was on these three 
journals, which were different in many ways but were still brought together by the strong 
hegemonic power of Kemalism. Whether they criticized, challenged or contributed to it, all of these 
journals insisted on keeping Kemalism as part of their ideology. It seems that their interpretations 
opened Kemalism to left-wing attributions to a great degree and the different examples they set 
found followers within left-leaning and leftist currents in the following years. Although 
Markopaşa’s line was more oppositional and can be placed closer to the TIP of the 1960s due to its 
relatively more leftist line, Kadro and Yön became pioneers of the “Ulusal Sol” (The National 
Leftism) movement which endures to this day in Turkish politics.  
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